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CONSERVATION AND ECONOMICS 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
When this study commenced several years ago it was to be about 
the economics of energy conservation, which became a centre of 
attention for a time following the supply disruptions and the 
large oil price increases of 1973/74 and 1978/80. However, even 
a cursory glance at the large volume of literature about energy 
published in the 1970s and early 1980s reveals fundamentally 
different attitudes and approaches towards conservation. Though 
general support is widespread, opinions differ greatly about 
why, to what extent and by which means conservation should be 
pursued, and how best to quantify the benefits. 1 In effect the 
'new' energy conservation literature was reflecting a long 
standing and broader conservation controversy. 
This broader issue is in part about the proper use and 
allocation of all natural resources that feed the production 
process. Economists have paid intermittent attention to the 
relationship between physical resources and human welfare ever 
since Thomas R Malthus published the first edition of his 
influential Essay on Population in 17982, in which he brought to 
the fore the inherent conflict between a finite environment and 
an ever increasing demand on that environment by a growing 
industrialisation of the economy and an expanding population. 
But standard Natural Resource Economics has taken its lead much 
more from Harold Hotelling, whose article entitled 
'the 
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Economics of Exhaustible Resources' (1931)3 has been the basis 
of much subsequent work. 
With increasing knowledge of environmental problems and 
risks, considerable concern for the environment emerged after 
the Second World, War and strengthened from the 1960s onwards. 
This meant that the vital resource base supportive of mankind's 
activities came to be more widely defined, to include the 
environmental media of air, water and land, all of which are 
used as waste depositories of one sort or another. The 
beginnings of Environmental Economics is usually attributed to A 
C Pigou (1932)4, who was the first economist to give serious 
consideration to the problem of environmental pollution. 
Nevertheless his preoccupations, like those of Malthus, appear 
to have lain dormant for some considerable time, a lack of 
interest in such issues on the part of academic economists 
apparently mirroring the relative lack of concern amongst 
society at large. Later contributions, for instance by Ronald 
Coase (1960)5 who challenged the Pigovian theory of 
externalities, and by RV Ayres and AV Kneese (1969)6 who 
emphasized the pervasive nature of pollution, have provided 
important insights, and are evidence of a new interest in 
environmental matters by mainstream economists. 
The conservation of energy is obviously related to 
arguments over both the proper use of natural resources and 
environmental resources, since energy makes such a major 
contribution to the production of goods and services but also to 
pollution. Energy production and consumption, however, also 
provokes controversy because of its effect on naturally 
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beautiful environments and the species that inhabit them. There 
has for long been an influential strand of thought, interwoven 
with the dispute over the proper use of physical resources, 
which says consideration should be given to preserving natural 
environments irrespective of the resources they contain. 
Within the economic literature, the idea that a stock of land 
was valuable not only for extractive purposes but also for the 
natural beauty and solitude it offered, has been traced to JS 
Mill (1848)8. The marked revival of interest in the 
preservation of natural environments amongst academic economists 
though is much more recent, stemming from JV Krutilla's 
recons ideratioan of the traditional concerns of conservation in 
19679. Several other economists, however, have been preoccupied 
more generally with 'quality of life' issues, vocal amongst them 
being EJ Mishan. He published The Costs of Economic Growth in 
1967 and popularized it as Growth: The Price We Pay, in 196910. 
The specialised concern about the use and conservation of 
energy can clearly be interpreted as being embedded in the more 
aggregate study of the use and conservation of the physical 
environment more generally. Obviously for some purposes it is 
useful to study energy in isolation. But much of the complexity 
of the energy and energy conservation literature, as well as the 
disagreements found within it, and also the passion with which 
points of view are sometimes expressed, often appear to derive 
from and are a reflection of, a similar conflict in this broader 
natural resource/environmental/quality of life literature. It 
is because of this close connection, and the judgement that 
energy controversies may well be seen more clearly if the 
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problems in the wider perspective are first better appreciated, 
that this study is addressed to differences of opinion in the 
broader area. 
A traditional dichotomy exists in this general 
'physical environment' literature, between economists who study 
the environment from the perspective of mainstream economics, 
and conservationists who are united by their distrust of 
conventional economic analysis and solutions in such matters. 
The conservationist standpoint is sometimes 
referred to as 
Neo-Malthusian, since Malthus's essay proved to be inspirational 
for both economists and conservationists alike. But the more 
radical strand of 'ecocentric' conservationism, which 
is 
concerned with the preservation of natural environments and all 
forms of life contained therein, owes its scientific perspective 
more to Darwin", who founded theoretical biology with his 
Origin of Species in 1859. Darwin though acknowledged that it 
was from Malthus's Essay on Population that his own theory of 
natural selection originated. 
The broad sweep of conservationists' scientific thought 
revolves around a preoccupation with the finiteness of the 
physical environment upon which mankind and other forms of 
life 
depend. It numbers amongst its proponents several leading 
economists such as Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen12 and 
Kenneth 
Boulding13, who have made important contributions to standard 
economics and acknowledge its usefulness, but who 
find the 
standard approach inadequate in exploring the relationship 
between mankind and the environment, in all its 
facets. 
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Of course, not only economists but other scientists, 
particularly natural scientists, have paid much attention to the 
use, abuse and preservation of the physical environment, and 
undoubtedly the difficulty of communicating across disciplines 
is a factor in the apparent lack of understanding between some 
economists and conservationists, which is frequently'a feature 
of their exchanges. David Pearce in his paper 'Economics and 
Ecology' (1974)14, quoted several 'life scientists' who looked 
unfavourably on economists because of their apparent narrowness 
of vision, and cited also the equally distainful view that some 
economists have of life scientists, who comment on economics in 
apparent ignorance of the subject they criticize. 
Talbot Page (1977)15 in a reconciliatory study suggested 
the Economists' and Conservationists' strands of thought could 
be fitted together so that one contributed to the other. The 
complementarity arises, he says, because economists are 
concerned with efficiency in resource use and conservationists 
with intergenerational fairness in the distribution of 
resources. On the face of it Talbot Page's statement appears 
incorrect in that mainstream economists have indeed for long 
confronted, if not resolved, the question of intertemporal 
equity. But they had done so within the traditional welfare 
criterion based on summing the present value of the resource. 
Within this framework the inter generational debate has revolved 
around the appropriate rate at which to discount the welfare of 
future generations and whether or not it should be discounted at 
all. 
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The discount rate issue exercised the minds of some 
economists around the'time, early in the century, when the first 
American Conservation Movement was at its height. Lewis C Gray 
for instance, in 191316, attempted to combine economic theory 
and conservation principles and stressed, when using the present 
value maximization criterion, the importance of both future 
price expectations and discount rates. Later in 1925 John Ise, 
also much preoccupied with American conservation issues, asked 
'how much difference are we justified in making between present 
wants and future wants? ' He concluded as Gray had done earlier, 
that it is a question without a definitive answer, but he 
proffered the opinion that whilst future wants should be 
discounted somewhat to take account of uncertainties 'it is 
doubtful if the wants of the next generation, for instance, 
shoud be rated less than half as important as our own-t17 
However, within standard economics it is usually Ramsey who 
is credited with provoking a widerscale discussion amongst 
academic economists about the appropriate rate at which to 
discount the utilities of future generations, when in 192818 he 
described discounting as ethically indefensible and arising from 
a weakness of the imagination. Thereafter Marglin (1963)19, 
made a significant contribution to the standard debate by 
suggesting intergenerational fairness could be viewed as an 
issue of intergenerational efficiency, since consumption by 
future generations could be viewed as a''public good' to members 
of the present generation. The main implication of his analysis 
is that the social discount rate must be below the private rate. 
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Talbot Page though raised the intergenerational fairness 
issue in a different and more fundamental way than many previous 
economists had done, in that he criticized the use of the 
present value maximization criterion per se. Instead he 
suggested a criterion based on John Rawls' (1971)20 'maximin' 
rule. The latter, Page claimed, would be consistent with the 
conservationists' objective of keeping the resource base in tact 
from generation to generation. 
Rawls concentrated on applying his 'maximin' criterion to 
only one generation. But the essential difference between 
'maximin' and 'present value maximization' as a welfare 
criterion, whether applied to one generation or many, is that 
'maximin' does not attempt to sum up values. Instead, social 
welfare is assumed to be maximized by maximizing the welfare of 
the least-well-off-individual, or generation. 
Some mainstream economists were applying 'maximin' in an 
intergenerational setting earlier in the 1970s, for instance 
Arrow2i, Dasgupta22 and Solow23, published papers in 1974 which 
extended Rawl's criterion to the evaluation of intergenerational 
issues. Page's unique contribution in this respect was to 
equate 'maximin' to 'the conservation criterion' of maximum 
physical sustainable yield. If within Rawl's hypothetical 
constitutional setting, representatives from all present and 
future human generations voted, under a veil of ignorance as to 
which generation they come from, to maximize the welfare of the 
least-well-off generation, then, said Page, the groups would 
agree on a minimum requirement of 'permanent livability'. 
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Such a state of 'permanent livability' he goes on to say 
could be maintained operationally only if each generation were 
'self- sufficient' in the sense of not reducing resources for 
succeeding generations, though capital accumulation and new 
technology can create new resources to substitute for those 
being depleted and the interpretation of 'sustainable yield' 
must take these factors into account. 
However, if we ignore the conservation criterion claims 
Page then the 'iron law of the discount rate' could promote 
excessive material throughput as judged by the 'maximin' 
criterion for inter-temporal equity. Depletion could be too 
fast to allow time for technology to find substitutes, and too 
fast to ensure safe solutions to problems of waste so that 
costs, even catastrophic costs, might be imposed on future 
generations by long-lived wastes. If we ignore the present 
value criterion altogether though, says Page, we would lose the 
efficiency benefit it can bring to intra-generational 
allocation. Thus each criterion, he says, has its proper place, 
with one criterion setting the conditions in which the other 
works at its best. They can be reconciled, in other words, as 
macro and micro aspects of the same policy. 
Page described the relationship between the economists' 
present value criterion and the conservationists' physical 
sustainable yield criterion, which he interprets as equivalent 
to 'maximin', as 'being on the same logical level'. Thus, he 
writes, 'it is no more appropriate to conclude that the 
sustainable yield criterion is invalid because it does not 
satisfy the present value criterion than it is appropriate to 
-9- 
conclude that the present value criterion is invalid because it 
does not satisfy the sustainable yield criterion. One cannot 
use one criterion to bludgeon another'24. 
One of the aims of this present study is to explore the 
kind of claim made by Page - that in effect the differences 
between economists' and conservationists' perspectives involve 
basic values, which may leave the divide between the groups 
essentially unbridgeable, a matter of judgement. Another aim is 
to determine whether the economists' and conservationists' 
positions are as clear cut as Page presents them as being, for 
the purposes of his own analysis. 
Underlying both of these aims is the view, doubtless shared 
by others before, that the exchange of ideas between economists 
and conservationists about the proper interaction between human 
beings and the natural world may eventually generate the 
knowledge to aid a superior resolution of this issue than those 
currently available. To help facilitate the mutual 
understanding necessary for such a venture, this study seeks to 
elucidate in some detail what conservationists and economists 
are currently saying about the relationship between mankind and 
the physical environment, and to explore where their views 
complement and conflict with each other. 
To determine how standard economics is applied to the 
physical environment we obviously need to look at the relevant 
subdisciplines. To expect to find complete unity of view within 
natural resource and environmental economics, when controversy 
exists within the wider economics discipline, would of course 
be 
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naive. Nevertheless, there is a reasonably clear disciplinary 
boundary, and a body of literature which lies within it, from 
which to explore the mainstream economists' perspective on the 
physical world. 
A consistent exploration of the conservationists' position 
is much more difficult. The conservation/environmental 
movement comprises an array of social and political groups at 
all levels of society, united in their preoccupation in one way 
or another with changing the current inter-relationship between 
mankind and the physical environment. Though most prominent and 
long-standing in America, conservationist organisations exist 
in all Western industrialised countries. The conservation 
movement in turn embodies conservationist thought about how the 
world is and how the world should be, which is as diverse as the 
organized movement itself. And since conservationists may be 
non-scientists or come from many different scientific 
disciplines the beliefs and theories which support the movement 
are equally catholic in origin. 
Conservationist literature covering both movement and 
thought, separately and intertwined, is written by those wishing 
to popularize and document the movement, by its leaders and 
their biographers, by non-scientific thinkers as well as by 
scientists from many disciplines interested in conservationist 
concerns. This large and variable literature presents problems 
of selection and inevitably the final selection we have made 
from the literature is partial, its interpretation personal, and 
both selection and interpretation open to challenge in view of 
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the scale and heterogeneity of the material available. In 
addition the cited references can represent only a select 
bibliography, with many other texts, read but not specifically 
re-read, almost certainly influencing the final perspective. 
After a preliminary review of the literature it soon became 
clear that an in-depth study of the economists' and 
conservationists' positions required prior investment in 
understanding some of the historical and current issues in the 
Philosophy of Science. As far as the economist's viewpoint is 
concerned, an investigation as to how economists do and how they 
'should' build and justify their own theories, and how they 
judge the theories of others, necessitates some knowledge not 
only of the methodology of economics but also of the wider 
philosophy of science literature. From the conservationists' 
literature the path back to the philosophy of science is via the 
frequent use made in it of TS Kuhn's notion of paradigm. 
25 
Kuhn's term refers to a 'way of seeing', and he interpreted it 
both narrowly and broadly. 26 Whilst some economists have 
investigated the development of economics by using the narrower 
version, the more radical conservationists tend to adopt the 
broadest of Kuhn's general usages to describe the 'woridview' of 
whole societies and cultures together with the sciences they 
contain. 
Chapter 2 then contains an exploration of the philosophy of 
science, dwelling in particular on Kuhn's concept of paradigms 
and Lakatosi27 similar concept of scientific research 
programmes. Though their ideas were originally expounded in the 
context of natural sciences, nevertheless growth of knowledge 
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theories seem to offer a useful perspective for analysing the 
differences between economists' and conservationists' and 
against which to judge their respective scientific claims. More 
generally a study of the philosophy of science helps us to 
become aware of the value judgements which individuals and 
groups make, either explicitly or more often implicitly, and 
which combine to inform their theories and policy 
recommendations. 
The study continues in Chapter 3 with an investigation of 
the radical conservationists' position which we have described 
as 'ecocentric'. The ecocentric strand of thought has been an 
important element in the conservation movement from the 
beginning, but the fact that it conflicted with the overtly 
'homocentric' orientation of many earlier conservationists, 
described in Chapter 4, suggests that within the 
conservationists' ranks quite fundamental differences can 
arise. New themes which helped convert 'conservationism' into 
modern-day 'environmentalism' (though we have tended to retain 
the earlier title) are discussed in Chapter 5. Here it becomes 
apparent that the broader spectrum of concern about how the 
world is, that conservationists now confront, tends often to 
unite ecocentric and human-centred conservationists in common 
cause. Nevertheless, the points of view remain quite 
fundamentally different in some respects. 
Chapter 6 begins an in-depth analysis of the traditional 
economic approach to the physical environment seeking the 
fundamental assumptions that unite mainstream economists 
- 13 - 
whatever their subdisciplines. Chapter 7 looks at the 
methodology of positive economics - at the different ways 
economists, using the same fundamental assumptions, justify the 
scientific nature of the theories they build. Chapter 8 
examines links between positive and normative economics. 
Chapter 9 is concerned with how positive and normative economics 
is applied to the use and conservation of natural resources and 
the environment, and more specifically with economists' 
approaches to quality of life issues and the welfare of future 
generations. In Chapter 10 we draw some conclusions about the 
differences and complementary aspects of the economists' and 
Conservationists' positions. 
- 14 - 
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CHAPTER 2 
TILE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE - 
A FRAMEWORK FOR COMPARISON 
This chapter seeks in the philosophy of science a perspective 
from which to compare systematically the differing viewpoints of 
conservationists and economists, and against which to judge the 
status of their respective scientific claims. 
2.1 HUME'S GUILLOTINE 
It appears desirable initially, in analysing different opinions, 
to make a distinction between 'is' and 'ought' statements, 
between factual statements about how the world is, and 
presciptive statements about how the world ought to be. The 
idea of a logical distinction between facts and values is 
attributed to David Hume who declared that 'one cannot deduce 
ought from is'', purely factual positive statements by 
themselves can never imply norms or prescriptive 'ought' 
statements expressing an evaluation, approval or disapproval, of 
the state of the world. Labelling this proposition 'Hume's 
Guillotine' implies the distinction between facts and values is 
- 17 - 
watertight. Such a clear-cut distinction, however, is of 
doubtful validity. As Blaug writes 'No doubt, Hume's Guillotine 
tells us that we cannot logically deduce 'ought from is' or 'is 
from ought'. We can, however, influence 'ought' by 'is' and 
vice versa'. 2 
To take all 'ought' statements at face value would, in 
effect, fundamentally limit discussion of different viewpoints 
concerning the proper use of the physical environment because it 
would tend to suggest that normative statements by different 
groups could be listed but not reconciled in any way. Blaug3 
indicated a way out of this dilemma by suggesting that a 
rational discussion on values can proceed in most instances by 
distinguishing between 'basic' and 'non-basic' value 
judgements or pure and impure value judgements. A value 
judgement is 'basic' or 'pure' if it applies under all 
conceivable circumstances and 'non-basic' or impure otherwise. 
It is possible to ascertain whether a value judgement is basic 
or non-basic therefore, by posing alternative factual 
circumstances and questioning whether the same judgements will 
be held if these alternative circumstances prevail. Thus, so 
long as a value judgement is non-basic, a debate on values can 
take the form of an appeal to facts. Most value judgements 
people make about social questions are, according to Blaug, 
non-basic and therefore amenable to influence by persuading the 
people concerned that the facts are other than they believe them 
to be. 
The idea that seemingly normative disputes can be settled 
by reference to facts on the face of it expands the scope for 
- 18 - 
rational analysis. A potentially intractable problem is 
encountered though when we realise that 'is' statements are 
influenced by 'ought' statements. The kind of 'is' statements 
which are relevant to the present study are economic and 
physical theories which explain present and predict future 
states of the world. For such theories to be authoritative they 
must be the product of science. 
In order to begin to organise knowledge about the world, 
scientists must make what Nagel4 called characterising value 
judgements, involving the choice of subject matter, the method 
of investigation and the criteria for judging the validity of 
findings. Since characterising value judgements are 
pre-scientific - that is, agreed upon by scientists before 
scientific inquiry begins - knowledge resulting from such an 
inquiry properly conducted will be regarded by them as 
scientific. Nagel sought to protect Hume's Guillotine by 
distinguishing characterising value judgements from appraising 
value judgements. Science as a social enterprise, he said, 
cannot function without characterising value judgements but it 
can free itself in principle of any commitment to appraising 
value judgements referring to evaluations of states of the 
world. 
Blaug acknowledges the logical distinction between 
characterising and appraising judgements but doubts how 
different in kind they are from one another. it is adherence to 
characterising judgements which gives the scientist's work 
'objectivity'. Nevertheless shared opinions about what the 
rules should be are necessary to arrive at scientific knowledge 
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about how the world is, in much the same way as shared opinions 
about 'correct' ethical standards are required if groups are to 
agree on evaluations about how the world 'ought' to be. 'The 
acceptance or rejection of is-statements is not a very different 
cognitive process from the acceptance or rejection of ought- 
statements. ... there is no empirical descriptive is-statement 
that does not rely on a definite social consensus that we 
'ought' to accept that is-statement'. 
5 
Blang thus acknowledges the important role played by the 
social consensus of scientists in validating theory choice, but 
sees these methodological rules and adherence to them as 
fundamental. They represent, he says, the only possibility of 
objective knowledge about the world, since the alternative to 
the setting of scientific standards and the public criticism of 
individual scientists by reference to these standards, is to 
take the extreme subjectivist stance that all opinions count 
equally. 6 
Until the 1960s the philosophy of science was almost 
exclusively concerned with prescribing what constitutes good 
scientific practice, which Blaug considers of such crucial- 
importance. Philosophers, in other words, attempted to 
delineate the professional standards which groups of scientists 
should attempt to enforce on members of their scientific 
community in order to advance 'objective' scientific knowledge. 
Since then the purely authoritative nature of scientific 
philosophy has become blurred as 'growth of knowledge' theorists 
have concentrated more on theories which purport to 
describe 
scientific endeavour rather than on prescribing what scientists 
ought to do. They have claimed a gap of varying widths between 
- 20 - 
what scientists have been told they should do and what they 
actually do. 
As a result the philosophy of science is in something of a 
turmoil. What it is that demarcates science from non-science 
has become much less clear than it appeared to be in times 
past. Previously, philosophers of science tended towards a 
consensus on good scientific practice even though what was 
considered 'orthodox' changed over time. Now the 'new view' on 
theories has displaced previously held normative positions in 
the philosophy of science without putting any generally accepted 
alternative in its place. An understanding of the current 
disarray in the philosophy of science thus requires an 
historical perspective. 
2.2 THE NINETEENTH CENTURY RECEIVED VIEW AND ITS DEMISE 
The standard view of what constituted 'good' science for much of 
the nineteenth century and before was based on the principles 
which it was felt Newton followed with such success. Scientific 
inquiry was neither purely deductive nor purely inductive but an 
integrated combination of the two. What Lakatos called the 
'Cart esian-Newtonian Circuit ', combined both 'intellect and 
experience' and was the scientific approach developed amongst 
others by Francis Bacon, Rena Descartes and Isaac Newton. 
According to this philosophy, scientific investigations can 
start from first, principles and proceed to deduced hypotheses, 
then on to theoretical predictions which are finally checked 
against observations. Or an inquiry may start by collecting 
empirical facts and proceed inductively via reasoned facts 
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through intermediate hypothesis to first principles. True 
theories could thus originate either from empirical 
investigation or from conjectured first principles. 
However, the circuit was an integrated whole. The truth of 
the conjecture is guaranteed by the full circuit, by the 
cooperation of intellect and experience. Moreover the 
experience must not be partial experience but general 
experience, individual experience being insufficient to justify 
a deduced hypothesis. Similarly, if the foundation for the 
theory is not the conjecture of first principles but 
observations, then that data must be collected from general 
experience. Ideally the scientific process would cover the 
Cartesian-Newtonian circuit several times, the end result of the 
process being the accumulation of a body of 'justified true 
belief', which constituted scientific knowledge of the world. 
From this persective then a theory is true or false. A 
true theory is universally applicable and no opinion, nor time 
or space can alter it. A true theory once it has been 
demonstrated as true constitutes scientific knowledge, which can 
be expected to remain immutable. Even a true theory is not 
scientific knowledge unless it can be justified - that is proven 
true - by the presentation of empirical observations which 
support it. Only if the predictions from general theories stand 
up to comparison with all possible observations can such 
theories lay claim conclusively to form part of the body of 
scientific knowledge. Since the veracity of the proof depends 
on the quality as well as on the quantity of collected evidence, 
the testing of theories is closely related to the calibre of the 
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scientific studies in question. Scientists must be unbiased and 
careful in their collection and interpretation of relevant 
evidence. 
Newton had followed Descartes' philosophy by describing how 
the world is, through a concept created inside the mind-8 The 
imaginary state used by Isaac Newton was the mechanical state of 
nature. Newton, however, placed the constraint of experience on 
his intellectual activity by actually observing the universe. 
Thus it was that Newton formulated his Law of Universal 
Gravitation which states that forces of attraction and 
repulsion among bodies in space keep them in motion and 
balance. Gravity causes the universe to run predictably 
forever. 
Newton's Universal Law of Nature encompassed the special 
cases which suggested the existence of natural laws but had not 
been generalized, such as Kepler's idea that the planets move 
around the sun in ellipses, and it conformed with Galileo's law 
of falling bodies. Newton considered he had found a cosmic law, 
subject to precise proof and as applicable to the smallest 
object as the entire universe. 
All phenomena, Newton theorized, consists of the 
arrangement of atoms following mechanical, regular laws. Since 
nature could be conceived as mechanical, its workings could be 
revealed by observation. And within this tradition of sientific 
investigation the goal of science is to discover the 
'connections' among phenomena and express them as general laws 
of nature. Such laws about how phenemena occur could be used to 
predict and control nature. 9 By the beginning of the eighteenth 
century Newton's scientific synthesis had caused a revolution 
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in intellectual outlook and inspired many other scientists in 
several different disciplines to adopt his view of the world and 
his method of scientific investigation. 
The crisis of belief in Newtonian science began when 
scientists working in the late nineteenth century failed to 
observe a Newtonian prediction. Newton's theory implied that 
the speed of objects through space was limitless, since space 
was a void occupied only by light through which the earth and 
all the other planets move, but scientists failed to detect any 
apparent motion of the earth through space. Subsequently 
Einstein's theory of relativity and Planck's quantum theory 
undermined the absolute truth of Newtonian mechanics. 
'° 
Late in the nineteenth century philosophers of science were 
becoming aware that the Truth content of Newton's physics might 
not be absolute, and considering the wider implications as far 
as good scientific practice is concerned. The truth of Newton's 
Universal Law had been established and justified by an appeal to 
general observations. Were then the empirical investigations at 
fault in being. insufficient, or, insufficiently objective? Or 
more fundamentally, was the faith placed in inductivism itself 
misplaced? Philosophers of science became much preoccupied with 
attempting to resolve these issues. 
2.3 THE PROBLEM OF INDUCTION AND THE CONVENTIONALIST RESPONSE 
David Humeli had much earlier questioned the practice of using 
inductive methods to discover and justify theories, though 
without much heed from scientists or philosophers who seemingly 
had no reason to question the validity of Newton's scientific 
practice. 
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An apparently unsolvable 'problem of induction' expounded 
by Hume and which has since caused people to reflect on the use 
of inducton in science is that strictly it is non-logical, 
because it cannot be demonstrated that its premises always 
entail its conclusions. 
It is not possible logically to employ premises about some 
members of a class in order to support a generalisation about 
the whole class, and it is not possibe logically to infer 
anything about future experience merely on the basis of past 
experience. Thus no universal theory can be logically (ie 
demonstratively or compellingly) derived from a series of 
observations, nor can such a universal theory be conclusively 
judtified by a series of confirming observations. There is thus 
no such thing as demonstrative induction, the point being as far 
as the critics are concerned that a non-demonstrative argument 
can at best persuade a reasonable person, whereas a 
demonstrative argument is inherently superior because it must 
convince even the most sceptical. 
Hume suggested that the problem of induction cannot be 
solved, that is, induction cannot be rationally justified, but 
reasonable people still expect the future to resemble the past. 
And though we cannot prove universal theories to be true, we 
still believe them to be true. The origins of such beliefs, 
said Hume, are 'habit and custom' and ultimately based on an 
individual's experience. 12 Though apparently insoluble, many 
attempts to provide a logical answer to Hume's problem of 
induction have been proposed. 
The solution chosen by conventionalists was to by-pass the 
problem. Scientific theories they asserted are neither true nor 
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false in themselves since the same observation may be explained 
by many different theories each in a sense equally true, because 
they all account for the facts to be explained. Theories are 
simply conventions for storing empirical information. 
Thus Poincarg wrote in 190213, that the theory of universal 
gravitation does not have a truth content to oppose to the 
falsity of the theory which assigns to each heavenly body an 
angel who regulates its movements, since both may explain the 
same observations. Moreover, both theories would be placed on 
exactly equal footings, if we add to the second theory that the 
angels make the heavenly bodies move as if they were attracted 
to each other indirect proportion to the masses and inversely 
to the squares of the distances. 
In effect, this early positivist position on theories was 
more insistent than Newtonian science that the röle of science 
was to answer the question how. To go beyond observed phenomena 
in search of ultimate explanations was not the role of 
science. 14 So long as a theory performs its intended task of 
explaining the phenomena in question there is no need to justify 
it further, or to justify . its constituent assumptions. 
Explanation became for conventionalists synonymous with 
correlation. A theory could have implausible assumptions, yet 
the theory may be explanatorily adequate and hence scientists 
would be justified in defending it and tolerating its 
implausible constituent parts. 
Indeed, an important conventionalist argument associated 
with Duhemi5 says it is not possible to justify single 
assumptions because a theory invariably consists of a 
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conjunction of hypotheses, each of which is assumed or asserted 
to be true in the sense that they contribute overall to an 
'acceptable' explanation of the empirical facts under 
consideration. 
Thus, if a particular hypothesis is found to be in conflict 
with some observations all that can be said is that the 
conjunction of the particular hypothesis with a set of auxiliary 
hypotheses is false. The mistaken idea that it is only the 
isolated hypothesis which is being tested stems, according to 
Duhem, from the unjustifiable belief that the supportive 
hypotheses and ceteris paribus clauses hold with certainty. 
Thus, said Duhem''crucial experiments' cannot confirm the target 
hypothesis, because of the jointness of testing, whilst non- 
confirmation is equally inconclusive since it implies only 
various alternative conjunctions of hypotheses some of which may 
contain the target hypothesis. 
A more extreme version of conventionalism is Instrument- 
alism16, whereby prediction is seen as the sole goal of science, 
so" that a theory's predictive success is sufficient 
justification for its acceptance. The assumptions of which the 
theory is comprised may be unrealistic, yet if the theory yields 
satisfactory predictive results it passes the instrumentalist 
test of justification. If predictive adequacy is the sole or 
primary criterion of theory evaluation supported by a group of 
scientists, then those scientists should prefer statistical 
correlation over causal explanation, if the former provides 
better predictions. 
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Individual assumptions have no independent status within an 
Instrumentalists theory and therefore it does not matter whether 
'fictitious' assumptions are eliminated or not. 17 In other 
words, the methodology of instrumentalism considers any 
distinction between realistic or unrealistic assumptions is 
irrelevant. No defence of a theory's realism is needed since 
predictive accurancy is all. 
2.4 LOGICAL POSITIVISM 
Whilst conventionalism was a dominant view in the normative 
philosophy of science around the turn of the century and in the 
early years of the present one, another positivist position, 
logical positivism, was much in vogue during the 1920s and 
1930s. 18 
As the name implies, logical positivism differed most 
notably from earlier positivists' positions in the emphasis 
placed on the use of logical, that is deductive, analysis for 
the clarification of problems. The application of -logic to 
empirical investigations by Bertrand Russell and other 
philosophers of the period led logical positivists to state that 
the scientific world has two essential features - first, the use 
of a specific method, namely logical analysis and second, 
agreement that scientific knowledge comes only from general 
observation. The goal of science therefore for logical 
positivists was to apply logical analysis to the empirical 
material. 
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The logical positivists' position was radically 
empiricist. The primacy of observable phenomena which permeated 
this approach to science led to the belief in the methodological 
unity of all scientific endeavour. The social sciences, no less 
than the natural sciences, are concerned with physical 
evidence. Therefore approaches to social sciences which rely on 
subconscious motivations or introspective states of mind to 
justify theories which purport to explain and predict social 
phenomena were, according to logical positivism, bad science. 
The unity of science philosophy was summed up by AJ Ayer thus, 
'the scale and diversity of the phenomena with which the social 
sciences dealt made them less successful in establishing 
scientific laws, but this was a difficulty of practice, not of 
principle: they too are concerned in the end with physical 
events'. 19 
To summarise their approach, logical positivists employed 
the 'verifiability principle of meaning' to demarcate science 
from non-science. This principle states that true scientific 
activity is concerned only with two kinds of statements, first 
purely deductive logical analytical statements reasoning from 
principles to conclusions, second with statements which are 
conceivably verifiable. All other kinds of statements were 
deemed meaningless as far as science is concerned. 
Verifiability implies empirical testability, but the 
strictness of the testability criterion varied amongst logical 
positivists. The most extreme insisted that to have meaning 
factual statements must lend themselves to complete verification 
by-observational evidence. One interpretation of- this strict 
criterion was that only evidence which could be conceivably 
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observed during the lifetime of the scientist concerned and his 
contemporaries would count. 20 
Though varying in their specific requirements, a heavy 
reliance on observational evidence characterized logical 
positivists' effort at demarcating scientifically meaningful 
factual statements from other factual statements. This emphasis 
raised for logical positivists the question of what status 
should be given to non-observable entities in theories, such as 
absolute space and time in Newtonian mechanics, and natural 
selection in Darwin's theory of evolution. Since no one has 
observed these entities, were statements asserting their 
existence meaningless for science? 
Some logical positivists suggested they were meaningless. 
Ernst, Mach, for instance, considered only propositions about 
observable phenomena should be granted the status of knowledge 
and an eventual goal of science therefore should be to eliminate 
all other factual,, but non-observable, statements from its 
theories. Scheffler12 characterized this position as 
eliminative fictionalism and constrasted it with the 
fictionalism of instrumentalism, where no independent status is 
granted to such statements but which does not call for their 
elimination. 
This radical version of the 'verifiability principle' led 
Popper to proclaim that 'positivists, in their anxiety to 
annihilate metaphysics, annihilate natural science along with 
it'. 22 The bias against non-observables of logical positivists 
bred the ultra-empiricist methodology of operationalism. First 
advanced in 1927 by P Bridgman23, operationalism defines a 
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scientific concept as the physical operation that measures it, 
for instance, intelligence is what is measured by intelligence 
tests. . 
2.5 LOGICAL EMPIRICISM 
For most advocates of an analytical and empirical approach to 
the philosophy of science logical positivism proved an untenable 
position. After the Second World War, the received view of what 
scientists could authoratively claim, as 'best practice' shaded 
into the less extreme empirical philosophy of science known as 
logical empiricism. 24 Those associated with this tradition 
include Rudolf Carnop in his later work, AJ Ayer, Carl Hempell, 
Richard Braithwaite. and Ernest Nagel. 
Logical empiricism endorses the characterization of 
theories as axiomatic hypothetico-deductive structures, given by 
the form dictated by syllogistic reasoning whereby major and 
minor premises are followed by a conclusion. But logical 
empiricism requires only that some of the terms in the 
hypothetico-deductive system be given an empirical 
interpretation. This means that individual statements contained 
in a theory need not be tested separately. Instead only the 
entire theory need be tested by checking if its observable 
deduced consequences correspond to empirical evidence. This 
means that non-observable terms need not be excluded from 
theories, on the contrary logical empiricists recognise the 
important role of theoretical terms in science, and it is 
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sufficient that such terms gain partial meaningfulness 
indirectly, if the theory in which they are embedded is 
successful. 
But what is a successful theory? Another important 
modification introduced by logical empiricists is that theories 
cannot be conclusively verified, no matter how careful is the 
empirical work in terms of the quantity and quality of the 
observations. Carnop stressed the importance of distinguishing 
between truth and confirmation as follows. 'If verification is 
understood as a complete and definitive establishment of truth 
then a universal sentence, for example a so-called law of 
Physics or Biology, can never be verified, a fact which has 
often been remarked ... The number of instances to which the 
law 
refers - for example, the space-and-time-points - is infinite 
and therefore can never be exhausted by our observations which 
are always finite in number. We cannot verify the law, but we 
can test it by its single instances ... If in the continued 
series of such testing experiments no negative instance is found 
but the number of positive instances increases then our 
confidence in the law will grow step by step. Thus, instead of 
verification, we may speak here of gradually increasing 
confirmation of the law'. 25 
The goal of science for logical empiricists is objective 
truth. All truly scientific explanation, they say, involves at 
least one true theory (true in the sense that it is asserted to 
correspond to the relevant universal facts), plus a set of 
initial conditions. If both the general law(s) and the initial 
conditions obtain, the phenomena described by this explanandum 
must occur. It follows that there is according to logical 
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empiricism, a symmetry between scientific explanation and 
prediction, the only difference between them being the passage 
of time. But logical empiricists are interested in prediction 
because it enables scientific explanation. Theories are not 
seen merely as instruments of prediction26, logical empiricists 
seek 'true' theories, that is universal laws. 
Nevertheless in endorsing the criteria of confirmation as 
far as justification of theories is concerned, logical 
empiricism acknowledges that scientists can never be certain 
whether the theories they 'accept' as true really are so. They 
can argue that good scientific practice of the kind they 
recommend will ensure that theories are accepted as 'true by 
convention' only if they are grounded in reality to the extent 
that theories must be confirmable and confirmed. The more 
highly confirmed the more acceptable the theory. But still 
every decision in science is seen as necessarily implying a 
risky decision made under uncertainty. Ultimately a universal 
statement may be held to be 'true' by a group of logical 
empiricists 'because it is highly confirmed, though the theory 
may be false. 
Logical empiricists restrict their domain of inquiry 
regarding theories to the 'context of justification', being 
concerned only with the structure and justification of fully 
developed theories. They view the study of the discovery and 
emergence of theories, the 'context of discovery' as outside the 
scope of scientific philosophy. Thus the 'problem of induction' 
that arises if general theories are induced from observation is 
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by-passed. This means whether assumptions should be properly 
derived from general observation, introspection or conjecture is 
a moot question. Either realistic or unrealistic assumptions 
are consistent with the hypothetic-deductive model of scientific 
explanation propounded by logical empiricists. 
2.6 FALSIFICATION 
In the post-World War Two period, the main dispute in 
prescribing what constitutes good science has been between 
logical empiricists and falsificationists, the latter led by 
Karl Popper. 28 Karl Popper's philosophy of science is in many 
ways consistent with the logical empiricist received view on 
theories. His methodology is predominantly normative 
prescribing sound practice in science. He is primarily 
concerned with the 'context of justification' of theories; 
he adheres to the importance of deductive theoretical 
structuring and denies the possibility of demonstrative 
induction. 
The use of inductive inferences in formulating general 
theories Popper considers not only logically invalid but 
practically impossible, because to select certain observations 
amongst an infinite number of possible ones implies an already 
held (if only partially articulated) theoretical point of view. 
This idea of theory-laden facts was later to be used against 
Popper's own methodology. Like the logical empiricists Popper 
denied conventionalist views. Theories can, he said be true or 
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false. The goal of science is objective truth, and predictions 
are important not only in their own right but because they can 
help in testing the truthfulness of theories. 
Where Popper parted company significantly with the 
Positivists is over the 'proper' testing of deduced hypotheses. 
Whilst theories cannot be shown conclusively to be true they 
can, he contended, be shown to be false. And whereas 
probabilistic confirmation of theories is comparatively 
unrigorous since there are few theories that will not be found 
to be confirmed by some observations, seeking truth by 
falsification is comparatively difficult. Thus the Popperian 
belief is that scientific theories are only truly put to the 
test when a scientist specifies in advance the observable 
conditions that would falsify them. The greater the range of 
empirical observations which could falsify the theories - that 
is the higher the content of theories - and the more probable 
their occurrence, the greater the risks of falsification. If 
such a high content theory succeeds repeatedly in resisting 
falsification and if, in addition, it successfully predicts 
results that do not follow from competing theories it is judged 
to be 'well corroborated'. 
Thus, whereas for the Positivists a theory is highly 
confirmed if it agrees with many observations, for Popperians a 
theory is well corroborated if it is impossible to find any 
observations that refute it. Scientific knowledge is acquired 
and improved on by a constant succession of conjectures and 
refutations, the end result being deeper explanatory theories. 
It follows that a further difference between Positivists and 
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Popperians is in what constitutes the proper task of 
scientists. The Falsificationists ideally seek theories with 
high content which can be subjected to severe empirical tests, 
even though such theories may have low probabilities of being 
true. - The logical empiricists by contrast seek theories with 
high probabilities which are likely to have low content. 
Popper is not without critics and the idea that theories 
can be decisively falsified is as much of a mirage as the notion 
of proving their certain truth. First, though Popper 
acknowledged the far-reaching implications of the Duhem 
irrefutability thesis, he did not resolve the problems for 
hypothesis testing that the -thesis presents. It was because no 
conclusive disproof of an hypothesis can ever be produced that 
Popper considered the need for methodological limits on the ways 
that may be adopted by scientists to safeguard their deduced 
hypotheses against refutation. His falsification methodology 
quite explicitly conjoins the falsifiability principle with 
additional methodological rules to avoid what Popper called ad 
hoc auxiliary assumptions, representing the kinds of 
conventionalist strategies Duhem previously pointed out could 
always be used to maintain a refuted hypothesis. 
Thus Popper considered that Duhem's thesis did not 
necessarily destroy the possibililty of subjecting theories to 
rigorous empirical testing, provided scientists adhered to the 
methodological rules he advocated. His idea was that scientists 
must reach pre-scientific agreement about which part of their 
theoretical system they are permitted to revise in response to a 
later refutation, thereby limiting the extent to which it can be 
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protected from falsification. The practical possibility of 
setting out sound methodological rules of the kind Popper 
advocates is, however, compromised by the central theme of 
Duhem's thesis. This was that, in the event of a falsified 
theory, scientists have no sure way of knowing which assumption 
or conjunction of assumptions is at fault from the family of 
assumptions which constitute a theoretical system. It is 
therefore impossible to be sure that a legitimate set of 
amendments to auxiliary assumptions cannot be made to save a 
particular theory from refutation. Hence to agree beforehand on 
admissible and inadmissible ways of evading falsification is 
not, in the circumstances, necessarily helpful to the search for 
new knowledge, even if scientists agree on such an arrangement. 
As Rod Cross pointed out, Popper's methodological rules mask the 
problem of theory appraisal raised by the Duhem thesis rather 
than resolving it. 29 
A second problem of theory testing which militates against 
decisive falsification is that falsification is as much subject 
to the rules of probability as confirmation. In any statistical 
test of a hypothesis, when sample observations are used to infer 
something about the unknown characteristics of an entire 
population, there is the risk of deciding to reject a 
hypothesis that is in fact true (Type I error) and of accepting 
an hypothesis that is in fact false (Type II error). Therefore, 
as Popper himself accepted, practical falsification can be 
obtained only through a statistical methodological rule to 
regard highly improbable events as ruled out. Therefore 
decisive falsification rests on strictly non-logical method- 
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ological norms which may be accepted by scientists as 
'reasonable' but which are not demonstratively so. 
In the prescriptive philosophy of science literature, the 
tension between logical empiricists and falsificationists has 
been long and inconclusive. The central conflict is about how 
theories should be empirically tested in order to justify 
holding them as provisionally 'true by convention'. What emerges 
from the literature is that just as there is no logic of 
discovery in the strict logical sense, so in that strict sense 
is there no logic of justification. In both cases, the 
arguments that advocates make for their favoured methodology are 
logically non-demonstrative. As Blaug says, 'A study of the 
philosophy of science can sharpen our appraisal of what 
constitutes acceptable empirical knowledge, but it remains a 
provisional appraisal nevertheless. We can invite the most 
severe criticism of this appraisal, but what we cannot do is to 
pretend that there is on deposit somewhere a perfectly objective 
method, that is, an intersubjectively demonstrative method that 
will positively compel agreement on what are or are not 
acceptable. scientific theories'. 30 
2.7 SUBJECTIVISM IN SCIENCE 
A far more radical critique of the falsificationist methodology 
which also undermines positivism is the paradox which again 
Popper acknowledged but cannot be resolved. This is that he 
demands the rigorous testing of explanatory theories in term of 
their observable predictions whilst at the same time granting 
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that all observations are really interpretations in the tight of 
a theory. 
The criticism of the idea that the interpretation of data 
can be neutral is attributed to Hanson. 31 Two scientists, he 
said, apparently observing the same phenomenon, will probably 
still interpret it differently since their perspectives are 
different. 'To say that Tycho and Kepler, Simplicious and 
Galileo, Hooke and Newton, Priestley and Lavoisier, Soddy and 
Einstein, Debroghe and Born, Heisenberg and Bohm all make the 
same observations but use them differently is too easy. It does 
not explain controversy in research science. Were there no 
sense in which they were different observations they could not 
be used differently'. 32 
Later Thomas Kuhn33 was amongst others who also argued the 
subjectivist nature of observation. A change in a scientist's 
theoretical framework will, he said, bring about an entire 
reorientation to phenomena under study. And advocates of 
different theoretical perspectives may use the same words whilst 
actually referring to different phenomena. 
The emphasis on the subjectivist aspects of science can and 
has been taken further. Harre, for instance, suggested there is 
are no such things as objective facts. 'The only facts which 
seem genuinely independent of any scientific theory are those of 
the present experiences of touch, taste, smell, hearing and 
sight that each individual scientist is currently experiencing. 
... so we have the dilemma that, if facts are truly independent 
of theory they are private and do not form part of the public 
domain of knowledge and upon which their exact form and our 
confidence in them depend. At least, for science, there are no 
brute facts'. 34 
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The response to arguments of subjectivity in science has 
been mixed. 35 To over-emphasise its subjective aspects calls 
into question the very concept of science. At a minimum, 
however, it is usually recognized that the r6le of theories, 
their structure and justification is a much more complex area of 
investigation than presented either by logical empiricist 
philosophy or by falsification. 
One old controversy which reemerges in the new debate is 
over the status of the assumptions which constitute theories. 
The hypothetico-deductive model of theory structure, supported 
by logical empiricists and falsificationists alike, seemed to 
remove the importance from the controversy; since all 
assumptions real or otherwise were tested indirectly by 
comparing predictions with observations. But if the line 
between theoretical prediction and observation is blurred, then 
the validity of indirect testing is open to doubt. 
As a result most of the philosophers of science who reject 
instrumentalism as a valid goal for science, have emphasized the 
importance of realism in-theories. 36 Realism can be variously 
defined, for instance it may suggest assumptions must be the 
result of statistical-inductive exercises, or it may-mean simply 
the assumptions must be plausible. For instrumentalists of 
course no such criteria of theory choice could ever be 
significant since the concept of truth plays no role in their 
philosophy. 
Another important result of the subjectivist critique is to 
challenge decisively the idea that every scientific explanation 
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must be a potential checkable prediction. The implication of 
the hypothetico-deductive model of scientific explanation is 
that unless an explanation can at least in theory, (if all 
relevant observations were available), support reliable 
predictions, then it may not be considered as a legitimate 
scientific explanation. Clearly if scientific explanations are 
defined in terms of their precise predictive potential in this 
way, then counter-examples of explanations which cannot support 
precise prediction can be dismissed as non-scientific. But with 
the down-playing of the hypothetico-deductive model of 
explanation, alternative models may be entertained as equally or 
more legitimate, whether or not they permit precise prediction. 
Bromberger made an early criticism of the H-D model of 
scientific explanation by suggesting that to satisfy the 
conditions laid down in the model was necessary but not 
sufficient for a causal explanation to occur. 'From the laws of 
geometric optics, together with the 'antecedent' conditions that 
the distances is M feet, the angle 0 degrees, it is possible to 
deduce that the Empire State Building has a height of H feet. 
Any high school student could set up the deduction given actual 
numerical values. By doing so, he would not, however, have 
explained why the Empire State Building has a height of H feet, 
nor would he have answered the question 'Why does the Empire 
State Building have a height of H feet? '37 
Later criticism of the hypothetico-deductive model of 
explanation became more radical. Alternative models of 
scientific explanation have been suggested in the literature, 
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the argument being that the hypothetico-deductive model is only 
one of many forms of legitimate scientific explanation. 11arr6 
suggests models of explanation which aid understanding may for 
instance be scale model replicas of reduced size, and models 
whereby understanding of the phenemena whose character we do not 
understand is gained by our 'finding an illuminating analogy. 
38 
Many different kinds of model from analogies, to scale models 
and axiomatizations may aid understanding but above all, argues 
Harr6, the hallmark of scientific explanation is that they 
increase our understanding. 
In all, the various arguments against the sole legitimacy 
of the hypothetico-deductive model and in favour of alternative 
models of explanation has ensured that the direction of current 
philosophical opinion is towards seeking a broader definition of 
scientific explanation, and is accompanied by the attempt to 
devise suitable alternative or supplementary models. 39 
Early positivist ideas had eliminated explanation from 
science or equated explanation with correlation. Logical 
empiricists re-introduced the idea that the goal of science is 
explanation but still the cautious manner in which it was 
introduced ensured all explanations which could not promise 
precise prediction were ruled as unscientific. 
In the same spirit Popper introduced his own hypothetico- 
deductive model and an emphasis on falsifiability, precisely 
because he was uneasy about the number of explanatory theories 
which seemed to be confirmed by unrigorous observation. The 
theories of Marx and Freud for instance appeared to him to 
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explain practically everything that happened within the fields 
to which they referred. 40 Thus he came to entertain the idea 
that good theories forbade certain results, good theories make 
risky predictions. The difficulty now in the philosophy of 
Science - is to determine what bounds if any should be placed on 
explanatory theories if they are deemed to be worthy of the 
title scientific. 
A third important controversy which has been reawakened as 
a result of the questioning of the theoretical-observational 
distinction by subjectivists is the thesis that philosophy of 
science is concerned only with the justification of theories. 
The current approach emphasises instead that to understand a 
theory is to understand its use and development. 
41 Therefore 
the study of the discovery and emergence. of theories is a 
legitimate concern for philosophy. This new heightened concern 
with the context of discovery is taken up in the work of 'growth 
of knowledge' theorists, such as Kuhn and Lakatos. Their work 
reflects the new preoccupation with subjectivism which currently 
pervades the philosophy"of science, and the search for catholic 
criteria and a multiplicity of approaches by which to judge the 
acceptability or otherwise of theories, and to demarcate science 
from non-science. 
2.8 GROWTH OF KNOWLEDGE THEORIES 
Both Kuhn42 and Lakatos43 sought to illuminate the history of 
. science 
by bringing to it a philosophy of science perspective, 
and to enrich the philosophy of science with an historical 
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perspective. They largely relied for their history on the 
development of natural sciences, especially physics from the 
sixteenth to the early twentieth centuries. They both 
contrasted, such sciences with the 'immature' human sciences, for 
which generalized methodological lessons drawn from 'mature' 
natural sciences may be less appropriate, though they left the 
methodological position of economics somewhat obscure. 
Karl Popper had earlier suggested that Economics 'has gone 
through its Newtonian Revolution' and compared economic laws 
with those of physics. In so doing, he implied a parity between 
economics and physics as far as. methodological analysis and 
prescriptions are concerned, which would make Kuhn and Lakatos 
methodological lessons from the history of the natural sciences 
entirely valuable and relevant for Economics. Others, such as 
Hutchinson45, have considered it misleading to draw the 
parallels between Economics and Physics so tightly, enabling 
people to make the perhaps unjustified presumption that 
Economics will eventually come, or has already come, to a 
maturity resembling that of Physics. Whether or not Economics 
has developed along the same lines as the natural sciences and 
whether it should, has been explored by several methodologists 
using Kuhn _and 
Lakatos ideas as their basis, and these 
contributions are discussed in later chapters. 
The orientation towards description rather than 
prescription leads to several differences between growth of 
knowledge philosophies and previous philosophies of science. 
Growth of knowledge philosophies necessarily have an historical 
perspective in contrast with the ahistorical philosophy of 
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science of the Positivists and Popperians, they are concerned 
with the 'context of discovery' as well as the 'context of 
justification', they are aware of the extreme difficulty of 
conclusively testing the validity of theories in view of the 
Duhem thesis and the potentially intractable problem presented 
by theory-laden facts. 
Following on from the previous points, both Kuhn and 
Lakatos, and others in interpreting their theories, have tended 
to widen the limits of what is permissible in mature science 
compared with earlier philosophies. Kuhn seeks to describe 
rather than criticise actual scientific practice and comes close 
to defining science as what scientists do. Lakatos is closer to 
Popper in that he seeks to appraise past (but not present) 
science and distinguish good from bad with the aid of his own 
sophisticated falsificationist methodology. Feyerabend46 comes 
to adopt the most extreme position, that no discernible limits 
can be placed on what constitutes science. 
Thomas Kuhn used the term paradigm to describe the body of 
knowledge shared by the members of a scientific community, 
conversely a scientific community consists of people who share 
the same paradigm. A paradigm must be complete and convincing 
enough to attract scientific followers, but at the same time 
leave problems for its followers to solve. 
Paradigms are not developed in isolation from the rest of 
society. On the contrary they are influenced by the values of 
the society in which they develop and by the state of knowledge 
in other fields of scientific study. Science therefore 
influences society and society impacts on science. Indeed the 
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major novel feature of Kuhn's analysis is the emphasis he placed 
on the importance to scientific communities of external factors 
such as beliefs and values emanating from the social and 
political environment, as well as internal factors concerning 
rules about the structuring and testing of theories. 
Normal science Kuhn defines as problem solving within the 
context of the existing paradigm. The status quo is preserved 
for long periods by the practitioners, who form an 'invisible 
college' in the sense that they are in agreement both on the 
problems that require solution and on the general form the 
solution should take. Since only the judgement of colleagues is 
regarded as relevant in defining problems and solutions 'normal 
science' is a self-sustaining cumulative process of research 
within the context of the orthodox body of knowledge. 
In effect the theories about the world which comprise the 
orthodox body of knowledge are given the status of established 
laws, they are accepted as 'true' and no longer subject to 
testing. A normal scientific investigation begins by the 
statement of the scientific problem to be solved. Then to the 
accepted theories are added auxiliary assumptions about the 
world, relevant to the particular problem. A prediction is made 
on the basis of the combined laws and additional assumptions. 
Since the laws are accepted as given, then if the auxiliary 
assumptions hold, the prediction made to help solve the problem 
in hand will hold when compared with actual outcomes. If 
predictions are not consistent with outcomes it will be assumed 
that the additional assumptions did not hold. In other words, 
it is assumed there is a weakness in the theory which needs to 
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be corrected by adjusting the additional assumptions. Thus the 
'principle of tenacity', whereby fundamental theories are 
rendered immune to cirticism or refuted theories are preserved, 
which Popper considered a departure from best practice even if 
necessary at times, is central in Kuhn's explanation of normal 
scientific activity. 
The work of individual scientists engaged in day-to-day 
activity will be accepted as scientific or not, according to 
whether they practise their science in conformity with the rules 
of the particular scientific community to which they claim to 
belong. Scientific communities will have rules about the scope 
of the problems capable of solution within the paradigm, about 
the structuring of theories and about how complete theories are 
to be tested against observations. 
As long as scientists work within the orthodox framework 
they are practising science but not making scientific advance. 
The practice of normal science can be invaluable to society as a 
whole and governments, by predicting and explaining phenomena in 
a systematic way. But revolutionary scientific advances are 
almost always surprises to the majority of scientists who are 
working within the existing body of knowledge. 
It is only during periods of crisis, in which a new 
paradigm emerges, that logical and empirical anomalies play a 
major role in changing the direction of scientific activity. 
Even then, changes in 'external' beliefs and values can play as 
important a rSle as 'internal' pressures so that conversion to a 
new theoretical framework can take on the nature of a 'spiritual 
experience'. Initially (1962), scientific revolutions were 
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described by Kuhn as sharp breaks in the development of science, 
but later (1970) he described a less extreme process whereby 
scientific development is marked by a large number of 
overlapping paradigms and new ones do not replace the old 
suddenly and fully developed but emerge gradually in a long 
process of intellectual competition. 
Kuhn used the term paradigm to refer to 'the entire 
constellation of beliefs, values, techniques and so on shared by 
the members of a given community', and applied the term at 
various levels of generality. The broadest and best known 
application of the term refers to the 'way of seeing' or general 
worldview shared by whole communities of scientists. But in the 
second edition of the Structure of Scientific Revolutions Kuhn 
also emphasized the applicability of the term and the theory of 
scientific revolutions td subparadigms and to minor changes in 
subdisciplines 'which might not seem to be revolutionary at all 
to those outside a small community, consisting perhaps of fewer 
than 25 people directly involved in it'. 47 
Practitioners of different paradigms, or what Kuhns also 
described as 'disciplinary matrixes', will frequently talk past 
each other'since there is liable to be a loss of explanatory 
content-as well as gain in any new theoretical framework, and 
because arguments that are advanced to support a new paradigm 
always contain ideological elements that go beyond logical and 
empirical proof. 
Lakatos' concept of a scientific research programme and its 
constituent parts closely resembles Kuhn's analysis. Lakatos 
saw the groupings of hypotheses comprising what he called a 
scientific research programme as being divided into two 
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subgroups. One subgroup of hypotheses he termed the 'hard 
core', being theories about the world which are fundamental to 
the research programme. This 'hard core' is by agreement of the 
practitioners protected from empirical challenge by a negative 
heuristic - methodological rules which say how problems are not 
to be solved. In other words, hard core hypotheses are 
irrefutable, will be adhered to in the face of logical and 
empirical criticism, and will only be overthrown if the 
scientific research programme is overthrown. 
The rest of the hypotheses constituting a research 
programme are termed the protective belt, protecting the hard 
core hypotheses from challenge. In the protective belt, the 
'hard core' is combined with auxiliary assumptions to form the 
testable hypotheses with which the research programme earns its 
scientific reputation. Protective belt hypotheses, not shielded 
by a negative heuristic, are altered in the face of anomalies 
and represent therefore the flexible part of a scientific 
research programme. 
Lakatos deemed research programmes as theoretically 
progressive when the protective belt hypotheses present 
increasing numbers of empirical predictions, and as empirically 
progressive when those theoretical predictions are corroborated, 
using Popper's falsificationist methodology. Thus, by contrast, 
research programmes are theoretically degenerate if protective 
belt amendments reduce the empirical content in terms of 
prediction and empirically degenerate if the predictions do not 
meet with empirical corroboration. 
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According to this criteria only whole research programmes 
can be appraised as they evolve in response to challenge and not 
an isolated deduced hypothesis. Thus Lakatos's methodology, is 
based on Popper's in that falsification and high content are 
considered the hallmarks of truly scientific theories. But it 
has been described as sophisticated falsification because it 
incorporates the implication of Duhem's irrefutability thesis, 
by applying the criteria of corroborated content to the 
appraisal of a whole research programme rather than to a single 
hypothesis. 
Kuhn minimised the difference between his own methodology 
and Lakatos, considering Lakatos' hard core, work in the 
protective belt and degenerating phase as close parallels for 
his own paradigm, normal science and crisis. Moreover, Kuhn 
like Lakatos argues an essential role for Popper's methodology 
for testing hypotheses in the protective belt especially when 
normal science is in 'crisis'. 
Where the Lakatos growth of knowledge theory does differ 
from Kuhn's is its suggested use to appraise as well as to 
describe the history of science. Lakatos suggested that 
scientists would be acting objectively for 'internal' reasons if 
they abandoned a scientific research programme or in Kuhn's 
terminology, created a scientific revolution, in order to pass 
on to a superior research programme. Such a superior programme 
would account. for all the facts predicted by the rejected 
programme, and in addition make extra predictions, some of which 
would be empirically confirmed. Thus Lakatos's rational 
appraisal method requires, at least two research programmes which 
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are judged by scientists relative to each other. If there is no 
comparable research programme then it is rational, indeed 
necessary, for scientists to cling tenaciously to their current 
theoretical framework, even if it appears to be degenerating. 
Lakatos' methodology is only an ex post appraisal method. 
Apparently degenerating research programmes may be redeemed; 
there is no unmistakable sign of failure. The forward looking 
character of a scientific research programme as distinct from an 
isolated hypothesis thus defies instant appraisal. It seems 
that appraisal as to whether scientists acted rationally or not, 
that is for 'internal' reasons, in passing from one research 
programme to another can only take place after the event of a 
scientific revolution. Thus whilst Lakatos' methodology is 
normative, in that it demarcates according to his own rules good 
scientific practice from bad, it has only an ex 22st critical 
rather than a prescriptive role. It cannot be used to give 
advice to scientists about which of two rival programmes to work 
on. 
At worst, paradigms or scientific research programmes 
cannot be rationally compared at all even after one has 
succeeded another. If the concept of theory-laden facts - which 
denies the relevance of testing hypotheses by reference to 
empirical observations - is coupled with the Kuhnian idea of 
pervasive content loss in successive paradigms or scientific 
research programmes, then comparison between competing 
theoretical systems becomes impossible. A situation is reached 
where there appear to be no grounds for a rational choice 
between conflicting bodies of knowledge and this is the position 
of theoretical anarchism that Feyerabend argues. 
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Feyerabend's development as a philosopher of science was 
described by Blaug48as a journey from an ultra-Popperian Popper 
to an ultra-Kuhnian Kuhn. Feyerabend argues that the only good 
universal principle for scientists is 'anything goes', evidenced 
by the fact that in the past growth of knowledge has proceeded 
by the deliberately breaking of rules of sound procedure. 
Supposedly sound rules derived from an analysis of modern 
science are merely assumed to be excellent, he says. 
Nevertheless, there is not 'a single argument to show that they 
are better than the standards that underlie the practice of 
magic'49. Scientists have made progress in the past by 
upholding apparently misguided principles and an attempt to lay 
down strict universal rules can only inhibit progress in the 
future. Moreover, the history of science cannot be depicted as 
progressive research programmes superceding one another with 
theories of ever-increasing empirical content. The actual 
overlap between rival scientific theories, ' according to 
Feyerabend, is so small that even sophisticated falsification 
cannot be used to assess them rationally. Thus Lakatos' method 
of appraisal he says, 'has not led to a better understanding of 
science and it is even a hindrance to such a better 
understanding because of its habit of beclouding facts with 
sermons and moralising phrases'. 
50 It follows that according to 
Feyerabend there is no demarcation criterion that could usefully 
distinguish science from non science. 
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2.9 CONCLUSIONS 
A study of the philosophy of science can clearly aid our 
understanding of the possible differences between the 
perspectives of conservationists and economists. They may, for 
instance, adhere to different basic value systems and thus have 
different views about the ideal relationship between mankind and 
the physical environment. They may employ different paradigms, 
or frameworks of interpretation to explain how the world 'is', 
or predict how the world will be. And as Polanyi remarked 
'formal operations relying on one framework of interpretation 
cannot demonstrate a proposition to persons who rely on another 
framework. Its advocates may not even succeed in getting a 
hearing from these people, since they must first teach them a 
new language, and no one can learn a new language unless he 
trusts that it means something'. 
51 Moreover, the conversion from 
one paradigm to another for either conservationists or 
economists is an unlikely event and, if it did occur, such a 
conversion is likely to be due to a complexity of reasons, both 
internal to the science and external. 
The methodological rules of the different scientific 
groupings to which conservationists and economists belong need 
not be identical, therefore they may not agree on the correct 
way of structuring theories, on what constitutes scientific 
explanation, on how theories should be tested against 
observations, and on the importance of empirical evidence as a 
criteria for theory choice. To fully understand the different 
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scientific frameworks furthermore requires information not only 
on methodology but on how the perspective originated and 
developed, as well as information on the respective bodies of 
knowledge which conservationists and economists 'accept' and 
have to learn, in order- to, gain membership to the particular 
group or scientific community with which they wish to practise. 
And for conservationists and economists alike policy proposals 
will depend on their interpretation of how the world 'is' and 
'will be', in comparison with their 'ideal' of how the world 
'should' be. Perhaps, however, the major message from modern 
subjectivist philosophy of science is the possibility, even 
necessity at present, for a tolerant attitude by both 
conservationists and economists about what constitutes 
scientific endeavour. Removal of concrete 'objectivity' creates 
difficulties for defining science and for comparing claims and 
counterclaims. But at the same time the current 'permissive' 
stance can also create the kind of atmosphere which encourages 
exploration of alternative paradigms and promotes a desire to 
understand if not to accept alternative perspectives. It is on 
this basis that subsequent chapters seek to explore the 
differing perspectives of conservationists and economists on the 
actual and proper relationship between mankind and the physical 
environment, the overall objective being to understand better 
their differing points of view. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE CONSERVATIONISTS - 
UNITY, DISUNITY AND THE ECOCENTRIC PARADIGM 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The Conservation movement comprises an array of groups at all 
levels of society, some primarily concerned with local issues, 
some national or global and variously concentrating on 
short-term, long-term or very long-term matters. What unites 
them all in common cause is their intention of changing 
attitudes and action of individuals and governments towards the 
physical environment. 
Behind the organized movement is conservationist thought, 
encompassing ideas as diverse as the organized movement that 
embodies them. Conservationist thought is a set of beliefs 
about the individual's relationship to the natural world and to 
his or her fellow human beings. The beliefs encompass ideas 
about what these relationships should be, what they are, and in 
general terms or sometimes more explicitly, what individuals and 
governments should do to affect change from the present 
imperfect state of the world towards the conservationists' 
ideal. 
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The predominant unifying factor in conservationists' 
thinking is the idea that the basic values they propose for 
societies, their theories of how the world is, and their 
policy recommendations for governments and individual action, 
all conflict with the worldview shared by the majority of the 
members of western societies and incorporated into the theory 
and policy proposals of most present day economists. 
However, though Conservationists are united in criticizing 
present day society much divides them at an analytical level. 
They do not all share the many elements that a comprehensive 
compilation of the conservationists' worldview would contain, 
nor do they all emphasize the same elements as being most 
important to them. Hence individual conservationists and 
subgroups also highlight different aspects of the present world 
in their theoretical frameworks and their policy 
recommendations. 
In this chapter and the following two chapters we seek to 
convey a sense both of what unites and what divides 
conservationists. Our approach is an historical one which 
concentrates on the views of individuals who have been 
influential in shaping conservationists' thought, and who often 
have also played an important part in the organized movement. 
3.2 UNITY AND DISUNITY 
For analytical purposes we have divided conservationists into 
two groups. One group, the ecocentric conservationists, suggest 
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an alternative 'man-in-nature' vision of the idealized 'good 
society' and their theories and proposals give weight to 
non-material values. The second group of conservationists, the 
homocentric conservationists or neo-Malthusians, are principally 
concerned with resource availability and with the effect of 
resource scarcity on the material welfare of distant 
generations, consequuently their- theoretical framework and 
policy suggestions reflect these concerns. 
In a general sense, conservationist thinking pervades the 
organized movement but the political activists among the 
conservationists tend to narrow their focus. They often 
concentrate on defining a specific problem, such as a need for 
more open, space in a specific area, or the curtailment of the 
use of nuclear power, and set up public interest groups to 
agitate for the desired changed. Theorists may also be 
activists of course and vice versa but often the theorists and 
activists comprise two different groups of people, and sometimes 
there is tension between them. The radical theorist, Raymond 
Dasmann, for instance, condemns professional 'eight to five 
environmentalists' and piecemeal policies as detrimental to a 
radical transformation of societyl. Active reformists such as 
Bond, on the other hand, argue that visionaries are of limited 
use since whilst discussion remains at the theoretical level it 
runs the risk of being both unrealistic and irrelevant as the 
basis of an effective conservation movement. 2 
A tension between theorists and activists is probably 
inherent in the very notion of Utopia. As David Bell has 
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pointed out, Utopia is by definition a 'fruitful impossibility', 
a conception of the desirable which mankind should always strive 
to attain but which in the nature of things, could not be 
achieved. He considers that to attempt 'to cross the gap and 
embody the ideal in the real' is to diminish the usefulness of 
the perspective of the ideal3. 
A similar defence of and a current need for Utopian visions 
is scattered throughout writings of the conservation theorists, 
especially in the more radical literature where the writers seek 
an ecocentric (man-in-nature) orientation of society. The 
philosopher, Henryk Skolimowski, for instance, writes that 'the 
need for a new philosphical framework is felt by nearly 
everybody. It would be lamentable if professional philosophers 
were among the last to recognise this. ' Such a new framework 
would need he says to 'challenge the limits of the analytical 
and empiricists' comprehension of the world'4. Sibley also 
calls for 'more Utopia visions from contemporary intellectuals 
... without Utopian visions ends cannot be stated as wholes; and 
even a discussion of means and strategies will be clouded unless 
ends are at least relatively clear'5. 
To the extent that conservation ethics are explicitly or 
implicitly incorporated into the aims of the activists they may 
emanate from ecocentric perspectives, homocentric perspectives 
or both. This means also that whilst often conservationists 
with different perspectives may be united in their call for a 
specific action, sometimes their views on issues of current 
policy may conflict. 
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Professor Berry6 attempted to outline an eclectic 
environmental ethic intended to unite in common cause all 
conservationists. His attempt to expound a united environmental 
ethic is premised on the notion that such a unification is both 
possible and necessary. 'There is no doubt that goodwill 
abounds; equally there can be no question that both 'sides' in 
the environmental debate believe the success of those who 
disagree with them would be disastrous for the future 
development and survival of humanity. '? 
Berry, like many conservationists, is thus concerned to 
minimize and reconcile the differences between conservationists' 
viewpoints in order to help produce a deep united commitment 
amongst them to action. Ashby endorses Berry's objective. 
'Until we have a strategy for managing the conflict between 
homocentric and ecoqentric aspirations of humanity', he said, 
'our good resolutions about the survival of the earth will 
remain precarious'. 9 
The idea that policy recommendations require real 
motivation to implement them and that a united environmental 
ethic is required to provide that kind of commitment is the 
message of both Berry and Ashby. Our purposes in analysing 
conservationsist attitudes are different. We wish to identify 
both the differences and the similarities of conservationists 
as well as to highlight what differentiates conservationists as 
a whole from the traditional economists whom they jointly 
criticise. Thus we have proposed to highlight the distinction 
between the two conservationist subgroups. 
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However, as Berry pointed out, currently 'environmental 
ethics are crude. and immature'. 10 The foundations of 
conservationism, especially the 'ecocentric' strand, do not as 
yet comprise a coherent body of thought, but are scattered still 
in the writing of a diverse group of thinkers11. These radical 
theorists have become more numerous in recent decades with the 
upsurge of the post-World War II interest in quality of life 
issues, though elements of the ideal can also be traced back and 
be seen to underlie partially the raison d'etre of the early 
American conservation movement as well as modern environment- 
alism. 12 Similarly those whom we call 'homocentric' theorists 
have increased in the post-war period but again their ideas have 
a long history originating with Thomas Malthus13, and equally 
the 'Malthusian' approach was influential in the early American 
Conservation Movement as well as being pertinent to current 
concerns. 
14 
We distinguish between ecocentric conservationism and 
homocentric attitudes because in important respects they 
represent different and sometimes conflicting world views. 
But often the attitudes are implicit rather than explicitly 
stated and just as Berry tried to join them in common cause, so 
often other authors will sometimes explicitly but more often 
implicitly adopt both lines of thought in their writings. 
Though both streams of conservationist thought are critical 
of present day industrialized economies and traditional 
economics, as we said earlier, the radical 'ecocentric' 
conservationist critique questions prevailing social values to a 
greater extent than the 'homocentric' conservationists. In the 
rest of this chapter we touch upon this wider social critique 
b3 
and the derivation and main features of 'ecocentric' 
conservationist attitudes. In chapter 4 we take a closer look 
at 'homocentric' concerns. For much of conservationist 
theorizing we need to look to America, since the international 
conservation movement originated there and much of the writing 
is American. 
3.3 AN ECOCENTRIC SOCIAL PARADIGM: SOME SOURCES OF INSPIRATION 
Modern ecocentric social critics use Thomas Kuhn's theory of 
paradigms where paradigm is used as a shorthand description of 
the world view, the collection of values, beliefs, habits and 
norms, which form the frame of reference of a collection of 
people. Kuhn emphasized the dominance of paradigms in modern 
science, but these radical writers tend to consider a wider 
grouping of people comprising whole societies of whom the 
scientists are only one, albeit important element. Many of the 
radical critics of the prevailing social paradigm have 
generalized still further to the extent that the cumulative 
impact of their work has been described as providing 'a profound 
critique of the dominant social paradigm and the 'single vision' 
of science in the modern (post 1500) west'. 15 
The historian, Lynn White, in an influential article 'The 
Historical Roots of Our Ecological Crisis', (1967)16 suggested 
the dominant Western social paradigm derives from Judeo- 
Christian origins which foster the view of man versus nature or 
man dominating nature. In similar vien one stream of thought 
influencing the development of an alternative ecologically 
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conscious paradigm is a different religious influence, that is 
the influx of Eastern spiritual traditions into the West. 
During and of ter the 1950s notable writings on the matter began 
to emerge, for instance by Alan Watts17 and Daisetz Suzuki". 
Eastern religious traditions, they claim, provide a very 
different, much less aggressive man/nature relationship. 
During the late 1960s and 1970s social critics began to 
compare not only Eastern and Western religions but also Eastern 
and Western traditions as they relate - to science and 
technology. The 'scientism' of the modern Western nations has 
been criticized in the emphasis it places on dominating 
nature21. Joseph Needham meanwhile is particularly notable for 
his investigations of the high level of science, technology and 
civilization achieved in the East in centuries -past, and for 
suggesting that Western scientists should take the philosophies 
of the East as an ethical basis for modern science. 
19 
There are several other posited contributions to the-'man 
versus nature' social paradigm that so many critics-identify as 
dominant in western societies. Notable among them is the 
structure of traditional western market economies20, which is 
seen as encapsulating and at the same time reinforcing 
prevailing values. Equally there are several other claimed 
sources of inspiration for the formation of an alternative 
ecocentric 'man-in-nature' social paradigm, for instance certain 
artists are claimed as a source of inspiration, that is those 
that have attempted to display a 'sense of place' in their 
work. 21 
It is obvious even from a brief' review of the literature 
that radical writers such as those we have mentioned are indeed 
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seeking a paradigm shift, a change in the predominant 'world 
view' of western societies. It is within this wide critique 
that contributions from radical 'transcendental' conservat- 
ionists and the scientific discipline of ecology are most 
meaningful. 
3.3 AMERICAN TRANSCENDENTALISM 
There has been a minority philosophical tradition in the western 
nations, deriving from the writing and lives of a few 
individuals which has consistently stressed the ideal of a 
different balance between man and nature from that perceived by 
them äs currently prevailing. The philosopher, George Sessions, 
has claimed 'This minority tradition, despite differences, could 
have provided the west with a healthy basis for a realistic 
portrayal of the balance and interconnectedness of three 
artificially separable components (God/Nature/Man) of an 
untimely seamless and inseparable whole. i22 Certainly more 
recent radical conservationists have tended to see themselves as 
part of a longstanding counter-tradition. Rachel Carson, tor 
instance, is said to have habitually used the writings of 
Thoreau as bed-time reading when writing her own books. 
23 
It has been claimed24 that the Puritan settlers of New 
England justified the advance of the frontier westward across 
America on the basis of the domination over nature that God has 
given to man at Creation (Genesis 1: 28). Since Eden was 
depicted as a garden then the reduction of wilderness to garden 
could be seen as a God-given duty and action to' control 
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wilderness or exploit natural resources as Christian tasks. 
From this point of view the 'minority tradition' encapsulated in 
the Transcendentalist wilderness cult of Thoreau, Emerson and 
later radical conservationists, like Muir, Brower, and Carson, 
does indeed provide a contrast. 
Thoreau and Emerson are both associated with founding the 
American Transcendentalist 'wilderness' ideal. The ideal is 
based on the idea that lonely self-forgetfulness within man's 
physical environment can lead to self-enhancement. This kind of 
Transcendentalism is a deeply-rooted and long-standing input 
into the current conservation movement and hence has received 
considerable attention in the literature. 25 Thoreau perfected 
the idea of alleviating his own anxieties by identifying with 
other animals as they lived to a tempo of their own. By 
definition, the creature most likely to obstruct the Transcend- 
entalist encounter with nature was another human being. Thus 
Transcendentalism puts a positive value upon solitude, and there 
is a potential common resource problem whereby the aggregation 
of individual self-interest via the seeking of solitude may 
render such solitude impossible. 
In the conservationist literature the idea that the 
individual pursuit of self interest may conflict with the common 
interest has been given prominence via Garrett Hardin's essay on 
the 'Tragedy of the Commons'. 26 In that essay Hardin described 
the situation in which all have access to resources held in 
common which each uses to maximize his or her immediate interest- 
with the resultant destruction of the common resource to the 
mutually recognized disadvantage of all. Hardin (Professor of 
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Biology and later of 'Human Ecology' at the University of 
California), applied the metaphor in particular to problems 
arising from human population growth. But he valued the 
preservation of the transcendalist encounter with nature 
advocated by other radical conservationists and in his personal 
circumstances he applied the 'tragedy of the commons' approach 
to wilderness areas. Though physically handicapped, he lobbied 
against the roads that would give him and others like him access 
to an unspoilt environment, preferring to settle he said for 
'knowing that the mountains were there'. 27 
Much earlier John Muir (1838-1914) effectively applied the 
same 'tragedy of the commons' principle to Wilderness areas32. 
He was not predominantly a theorist but effectively lived the 
Transcendentalist ideal preached by Thoreau and Emerson by 
seeking solitary communion with nature in the mountain ranges of 
the far west of America. In the Sierra Nevada he promoted the 
institution of national parks and fostered the radical 
wilderness ideal as the only adequate way of defending the 
national parks against incursions, which would have the effect 
of annihilating the solitary transcendentalist experience. Muir 
founded the Sierra Club in 1892 to propogate 'wilderness' 
values. The Sierra Club was the first public interest 
conservation group to be established in the United States and 
from within its auspices Muir attempted, unsuccessfully, to 
oppose the building of the Hetch Hetchy Valley dam in the 
Yosemite National Park, a battle which was finally lost in 1913. 
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The defeat illustrated that whilst America established the 
world's first national park and hence pioneered a new form of 
land use, the concept of national parks was never as clearly 
related to the Transcendentalist 'wilderness' ideal as John Muir 
and others wished. 29 From the beginning there was, in effect, a 
clash between conservationists holding very different attitudes 
towards the natural environment. The Transcendentalist 
'perservationists' advocating a 'pure' unmanaged environment, 
led in their generation by John Muir, and who favoured a system 
of inviolate national parks were confronted by conservationist 
'managers' such as Gifford Pinchot (1865-1946)30, the first 
chief forester in the United States, and to whom we shall refer 
again in chapter 4. Gifford Pinchot upset John Muir first by 
permitting sheep grazing in forest reserves and then by 
supporting the Hetch Hetchy dam project. 
Foresters were frequently criticized by naturalists as 
exemplifying a narrowly utilitarian ('The greatest happiness for 
the greatest number') stance towards nature which would 
eventually lead to many plausible inroads upon the National 
Parks. Perhaps the most telling difference between the two 
groups was over the installation of tourist facilities. The 
so-called utilitarians considered one way to ensure the survival 
of National Parks was to show that scenery had value, and hence 
encouraged increased use by promoting the parks as major tourist 
attractions, a policy totally opposed by those who valued the 
solitude of the wilderness and who considered the only 
acceptable human intrusion was a hard-fought struggle on foot to 
get there. 
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Whilst Thoreau valued the wilderness for the tranquility it 
provided for him, later conservationists in the 
Transcendentalist tradition tended not to present their ultimate 
position as that of valuing solitude but rather as valuing 
nature for its own sake. Thus David Brower, a direct inheritor 
of John Muir's wilderness ideals and the executive director of 
the Sierra Club from 1952-1969 wrote 'I believe in wilderness 
for itself alone. I believe in the rights of creatures other 
than man. '31 
The danger of a 'human-centred' conservation ethic, as the 
'nature-centred' theorists see it, is that it is not an argument 
which can support the interests of nature against those 'of man. 
It is for that reason that radical conservationists like John 
Muir and David Brower sought a conservationist ethic that was 
not human-centred, a nature rather than a mankind-centred 
approach. Recently Eric Ashby articulated his own idea of a 
'man-in-nature' conservation ethic by suggesting we think in 
terms of valuing natural processes for their own sake, rather 
than for the ends they provide. Then he suggests, to permit a 
river to be damaged by pollution would be the same kind of 
negligence as to permit a Renaissance mural to fall 
into 
disrepair. 32 
Leopold, the first professor of wildlife management (at the 
University of Wisconsin) and who founded the Wilderness Society 
in 1935, advocated a kind of nature-centred 'thought 
experimenti33 somewhat similar to Ashby's more recent proposal. 
He suggested that to begin to build a new Utopian ecologically 
conscious vision of the 'good society', we should begin not with 
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a statement of human needs but by trying to 'think like a 
mountain'. 
Though he was initially in favour of a managed wilderness 
rather than the purist ideal of unmanaged areas favoured for 
instance by Muir, Leopold later changed his position. He became 
opposed in particular to agricultural science, seeing virtue 
instead in small farms and rural living. It is because of his 
radical re-orientation and his advocacy of decentralization and 
individual responsibility for pursuit of conservationists 
ideals, that his most influential book, cast in the form of an 
almanac for the 'Sand Country' farm that he purchased in the 
early 1930s, became one of the 'gospels' of the revived 
Conservation Movement of the 1960s and 1970s. 
A concern for all living things as well as the physical 
environment of mountains, rivers, etc was an implicit feature of 
American Transcendentalism from the beginning. In this 
respect, the early preservationists found a group of, 
'human-centred' people, the big game hunters, whose 
self-interest coincided to some extent with their own. Under 
their collaboration the National Game preserves were set up to 
save endangered species and to prolong the possibility of 
hunting. 34 Several of these early experiments in wild life 
preservation, however, became disasters as the protected species 
multiplied in favourable conditions and then died for lack of 
food. It was to some extent the inquest of the 1920s upon the 
fate in particular of the kaibab deer who first multiplied and 
then died by the thousands in the Grand Canyon National Game 
Preserve, that directed conservationists' efforts towards an 
ecological orientation. 
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3.5 TRANSCENDENTALISM AND ECOLOGY 
Transcendentalism engendered visions of infinity, of timeless 
and vast distances of earth and sea, it valued and encouraged 
the preservation of an unspoilt physical environment and 
implicitly the animal and plant life therein, for solitude and 
for its own sake. These basic values attract their proponents 
to the hard core of the science of ecology. Modern ecocentric 
conservationists thus tend to combine transcendentalism and 
ecological theory, a combination which explicitly highlights and 
values 'the great chain of being'35 and encourages human 
responsibility for maintaining life in all its forms. 
In the broadest sense modern ecological thought originated 
with Darwin, who gave in The Origin of Species (1859)36 an 
example of the relatedness of apparently unconnected organisms 
by correlating the red clover crop in England with the 
prevalence of the cats that killed the mice that plagued the 
bees that pollinated the clover. Building on Darwin's base 
Ernst Halckel sketched a new science concerned with 'nature's 
economy', in which neighbouring organisms interact particularly 
by competing for or constituting each other's food, and named it 
Ecology. 37 By the 1930s ecological theories, about how living 
things affect each other and what determines their distribution 
and abundance, and evidence from ecological research was 
available to a wide audience. 
Aldo Leopold was the first radical conservationist to cite 
ecological theories and evidence to bolster what was for him an 
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ultimately aesthetic protest against anything that diminished 
the variety of the living world. He disliked efforts to ground 
the case for saving threatened species on their direct utility 
to man, in A Sand Country Almanac he wished to save all species 
on an extreme man-in-nature perspective, as a 'biotic right'. 
The survival of all species for their own sake, to maximize 
the earth's diversity, was Leopald's aim. From Darwin's Theory 
of evolution came the realisation that species could and had 
become extinct. Leopold's newly revised man-in-nature 
'ecological' ethic constituted an effort to reverse the 
complacency that Darwinism induced about the extinction of 
species and he harnessed the science of ecology, selectively, in 
support of his values. Ultimately he did also harness support 
from human-centred conservationists by suggesting that ecology 
might eventually prove that the 'economic parts of the biotic 
clock would not function without the uneconomic'. 38 
Looking back from an ecological perspective on the 
disastrous attempts by earlier conservationists to preserve 
endangered species, Leopold concluded that their basic error had 
lain in supposing that an individual species could be salvaged 
in isolation from its total environment. He generalized, using 
the ecologist's food chain argument, from the single instance of 
the 1920s kaibab deer disaster, to the idea that mankind could 
and frequently did impoverish the diversity of living things. 
He then went on to theorize that all species would eventually be 
shown to comprise a single intricate web of life which could not 
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be severed at any point without endangering the whole; 
effectively the survival of humanity itself, he intimated, 
depended on preserving the 'web of life' intact. 
Aldo Leopold's importance lies in the fact that he was 
both a transcendentalist and an ecologist. As such he used 
evidence from ecology to support his own values, theories and 
policy suggestions, and he also sought to point ecologists in a 
particular direction. According to Leopold, scientific evidence 
from ecology provides apparently a powerful sanction against 
tampering with nature. And it may be that the holistic approach 
to the environment, which is in keeping with preservationist 
values and urges a sense of responsibility towards other 
organisms, is a necessity for human survival. 
3.6 ECOCENTRISM AND HUMAN SURVIVAL 
Of all the ways available to them to persuade their fellows to 
'live according to nature', probably the most powerful tool the 
ecocentric Conservationists have used has been to take the step 
that Leopold took only reluctantly, that is to present reasons 
for preserving natural environments in 'man-centred' terms and 
to quote scientific evidence from the discipline of ecology in 
support. Radical ecocentric conservationists who are often also 
radical ecologists are committed to a movement towards a 
'sustainable economy' from ethical principles of harmonious 
integration of mankind with nature but also, many of them claim, 
because such a move is essential for the long-term survival of 
the human race. 
/4 
Since Leopold, many radical conservationists, and perhaps 
most notably Rachel Carson, have cited the science of ecology in 
support of their values, and have sought also to evoke a 
response from homocentric conservationists. As a zoologist, 
Carson's first ecologically-oriented books39 were concerned with 
understanding nature for its own sake, but in Silent Spring 
ecology was used by her to attempt to change government policy, 
by persuading and arousing the interest of the general public in 
the detrimental use of chemical pesticides. By providing 
confirming instances in the form of case histories she drew the 
conclusion and hoped to convey a general warning that it was 
dangerous to human survival to tamper with any part of the 
biological environment. 
Like Leopold she pivoted her theory largely upon the 
concept of food chains, treating them as transmission lines for 
chemical pesticides as well as nutrient, and cited ecological 
research findings to this effect. A principal example Carson 
used was the killing of grebe in Clear Lake (California) in the 
1950s by the spraying of the lake with DDD to kill gnats. The 
food chain, claimed Carson, concentrated the pesticide and the 
grebes at the top of that particular food chain died, but it 
could, she said, have been mankind at the top. Her message 
overall was that by various routes, including food chains, new 
and potentially harmful pesticides were being absorbed by human 
being and other animals. 
t 
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One possible answer to the problem, Carson advocated, was 
an attempt at 'biological' control, whereby a balanced ecosystem 
ensured that such insects were controlled by their natural 
enemies and competitors. The idea was not to eliminate pests 
but to control them sufficiently to reduce the problem to 
manageable proportions. An added bonus would be that in 
substituting ecological control for chemical pesticides man 
would be working with nature rather than dominating over it. 
Carson's advocation of biological pest control was in line 
with her Transcendental preoccupations. Like Muir, Brower and 
Leopald before her, she was a strenuous advocate of wilderness 
areas. Her visions of a 'timeless' spirit of the earth and sea 
included time 'before ever man stood on the shores of the ocean' 
and 'long vistas of time to come in which man did not 
exist'. 40 Carson's training as a biologist confirmed her 
concern for the living as well as the non-living natural world. 
Silent Spring was dedicated to Albert Schweitzer and Carson 
quoted him as saying, 'Man has lost the capacity to foresee and 
to forestall, he will end by destroying the earth'. 
41 The 
inference she drew from her own values and Thoreau and 
Schweitzer's teaching, was that man's relation to man was less 
important than the relation of man to all life and of life to 
its physical environment. 
42 
t 
In Silent Spring, Carson deliberately subordinated her 
concern for 'the basic ecology of all living things' in order to 
highlight the menace 'to human health'. 
43 Her aim was similar 
to Berrys, to enlarge her constituency to include 
'human-centred' conservationists who perhaps set little store by 
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the Transcendentalist encounter with nature, but who could 
interpret the message of Silent Spring as a call to defend the 
more immediate interests of mankind. 
Another conservationist with ecocentric values, drawn to 
the science of ecology, and making a human-centred appeal for 
the adoption of both was Rena Dubos. 
44 As a microbiologist, 
Dubos early in his career contributed significantly to the 
emergence of antibiotics, but subsequently he became more 
sceptical about their importance and whether in the long run 
they would be as unequivocally good for humanity as they 
appeared. 
Dubos increasingly dwelt on the phenomenon of latent 
infection, where the germ was present but not the disease and 
concluded that it was possible to live with many germs and bring 
them substantially under control by improving the general 
environment. He instanced the case of tuberculosis where in 
nineteenth century Europe many people harboured the tubercle 
bacillus without contracting tuberculosis, and where mortality 
rates from the disease began to fall before the bacillus had 
even been discovered. 
Two policies which Dubos associated with the original 
'misguided' use of Darwin's theories were the extermination of 
germs and the eradication of infectious diseases. Under the 
early Darwinian aegis, men and germs were seen as locked in a 
struggle for existence; hence the campaigns for the complete 
eradication of many historic diseases, particularly malaria and 
other fevers transmitted by insects. Dubos by contrast 
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suggested the aim should be control but not eradication, hence 
his caution about an unbounded enthusiasm for antibiotics. 
At a scientific level, Dubos' quarrel with the concept of 
eradication rested on his commitment to ecology. Biologists of 
the eradicationist school failed to grasp, he said, the basic 
ecological wisdom that 'different living specimens can reach a 
modus vivendi compatible with their co-existence'. 
45 The 
neglect of ecology by bacteriologists he considered could prove 
dangerous to mankind because one microbial community could only 
be eliminated by making room for another with unpredictable 
consequences. To support this possibility Dubos, like Leopold 
and Carson, quoted the case of the kaibab deer, where man 
had 
created difficulties by eliminating the deer's natural 
predators. 
Dubos' objection. to the 'illusioni46 that insecticides and 
drugs could beneficially eradicate vectors of microbes was based 
not only on the impracticability and potential danger to mankind 
of such a pursuit but also on the arrogance towards nature that 
he felt such ideals disclosed. Dubos preferred the idea that 
man should hold germs and insects in check rather than seek to 
eliminate them, partly because such a target was probably 
achievable by the judicious (but not unbounded) use of vaccines, 
insecticides and antibiotics, but also because it implied a 
different, less aggressive man-in-nature approach. Like Rachel 
Carson, Dubos considered the ambition to achieve 'almost 
complete mastery' over nature, the worst flaw in the modern 
temperament. 47 
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3.7 ECOLOGY AS A HOLISTIC PERSPECTIVE 
Because they claim all interconnections cannot be quantified, 
indeed cannot be known, man-in-nature ecologists also claim that 
the science of ecology cannot provide a sound basis for 
piecemeal action by those who would manage the environment. 
Leopold was only the first of many prominent naturalists- 
cum-scientists who used ecological evidence to challenge the 
idea of man-managed environments. Donald Worster in his history 
of ecology highlights its idealogical scientific status by 
saying, 'the continuing environmental crisis makes it obvious 
that man's visions and utopias are little more than empty 
enterprise when they depart too far from nature's way. This is 
the major lesson we have learned from studying the effects of 
men's hands' on the environment. An ecological ethic of 
interdependence, man-in-nature, may be the outcome of a 
dialectical relation between scientist and ethicist. i48 
Clearly the radical conservationists' approach to ecology 
is in keeping with their holistic perspective on mankind's 
proper relationship to the natural world. It is, after all, 
conceivable that interventionist ecologists might be able to 
develop reliable techniques which could provide a set of 'rules' 
of the kind needed to control the environment. It is an 
orientation, of course, which radical conservationists would 
deplore since the value of all science they see as lying in the 
enhancement of understanding of both self and creation49, not in 
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the quantitative prediction and hence possible control of 
human-induced disruptions of ecosystems. 
Mumford made the point about the 'correct' orientation of 
ecology forcibly in The Pentagon of Power50 in which` he 
reiterates many of the concerns of the radicals. He depicted 
Darwin as the ideal scientist5i, anti-reductionist, anti- 
mathematical, a wide-ranging generalist, but claimed that Darwin 
misinterpreted his own significance. his great accomplishment, 
Mumford said, did not lie as Darwin supposed in the doctrine of 
evolution through natural selection which is consistent with 
man's domination over nature. Rather his major contribution, 
which he did not have the self-awareness to perceive, was a 
fresh vision of the entire cosmic process in which living things 
interacted with one another and with the physical environment. 
Mumford was an urbanite but a loyal supporter of Emerson's ideal 
of communion with nature and also of Ebenezer Howard's garden 
cities. 52 He thus valued the 'organic' paradigm that he saw the 
science of ecology as commending, and saw virtue in 'natural' 
limits to the growth of economies and the exploitation of 
natural resources. 
Barry Commoner is another well-known biologist-cum- 
ecologist. He perceived a 'crisis in biology' expressed in the 
conflict between two radically different approaches to the 
'theory of life'. The 'reductionist methodology', prevalent in 
molecular biology, that sought to look beneath the living 
organism and where the discovery of DNA was hailed as a great 
success, was opposed by holistic biologists like himself. 
Commoner challenged the scientific evidence that the molecular 
biologists used to support their theories. But more than that 
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he saw in such reductionism a source of contemporary ills in 
that it led them to 'exaggerate our power to control the potent 
agents which we have let loose in the environment. '53 
Thus Commoner's quarrel with the molecular biologists was 
not only technical it was linked with a basic value system that 
held as its ideal the notion of mankind becoming more humble 
before nature. Ecology by contrast he saw as holistic rather 
than analytical in aim, the ultimate end of which was to grasp 
all the stresses upon a 'total ecological web', and of this 
perspective Commoner saw Dubos as the leading advocate. 54 
However, Commoner's system of values seems not to have the 
anti-materialistic bias engendered by Transcendentalism, thus 
confounding any necessary link between transcendalist values and 
ecology. Commoner's major contribution to the conservation 
debate is discussed in Chapter 5. 
3.8 IMPLEMENTING A MAN-IN-NATURE PERSPECTIVE 
What is required, according to ecocentric conservationists, is a 
change in personal value systems towards a man-in-nature 
orientation. Roberick Nash asked 'Do rocks have rights? ' 'If 
the time comes when to any considerable group of us such a 
question is no longer ridiculous we may be on the verge of a 
change of value structures that will make possible measures to 
cope with the growing ecological crisis. One hopes there is 
enough time left. '55 The idea is that with a different social 
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paradigm there would be spontaneous adoption of a 'steady-state' 
or 'conservor' society with a move towards non-materialistic 
values and the adoption of technology which is less intrusive as 
far as the physical environment is concerned. 56 
To help achieve the change they consider desirable, radical 
conservationists have suggested alternative methods to alert the 
public's attention. Dasmann57 favours providing the example of 
exemplary lives. Others have suggested the pursuit of 
'ecological resistance' in order to dramatize the perceived 
ecological crisis by direct but peaceful action58. The 
Greenpeace Foundation has sponsored incidents of ecological 
resistance, for instance with France over atmospheric atomic 
testing in the South Pacific, and with Britain over radioactive 
waste emissions into the Irish Sea from Sellafield. 
However, such examples of ecological resistance are not to 
be seen primarily as the exercise of co-ersive power. They are 
meant rather to have the character of ritual action to bring to 
people's attention the importance of appreciating nature. The 
notion that radical conservationists are mainly concerned with 
persuading others of the correctness of their ideals rather than 
forcing them is conveyed by Robert Nisbet's description of the 
ecological tradition in Western social thought. Ile describes it 
as 'not concerned with capture and forced adaptation, it is non- 
co-ersive and seeking fulfilment through example or vision 
rather than through revolutionary force and centralization of 
power. '59 
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In their battle to convince others, undoubtedly amongst the 
most potent weapons used by radical conservationists are the 
ecological theories and evidence relating to the survival of the 
natural world, especially if they are linked to human survival. 
By citing ecological evidence to support their case, Leopold and 
other conservationists ensured that scientific 'facts' emanating 
from the discipline and scientific disagreements in the domain 
of ecology, would become politically sensitive issues. It may 
be that their scientific stress on the unquantifiable in 
ecosystems is the most powerful political tool that radical 
conservationists possess. 
Mumford voices an opinion shared by many radical 
conservationists when he condemned the idea of scientific 
knowledge as power to control, and depicted scientists as a 
priesthood subserviant to rulers and enhancing their power. 
6o 
Yet radical conservationists would see the science of ecology as 
very powerful, as central to the organisation of societies6l, 
and are keen to use the authority of the scientific community to 
authentiate their case. 
If the power ecocentric conservationists would exercise 
is 
basically non-coercive, in the interim before the conservor 
societies are voluntarily instituted, it has been suggested that 
more widespread direct action is called for. For example, 
that 
areas of the earth should be zoned 'off limits' to 
further 
industrial exploitation and large-scale human settlements. The 
World Conservation Strategy urged that for Britain the Scottish 
Highlands should be a priority protected area. 
62 
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3.9 CONCLUSIONS 
Ecocentric basic values derive to a considerable extent from 
transcendentalism. However, in the course of time a trans- 
formation occurred from a philosophy which was man-centred 
though emphasizing 'quality of life' aspects of human existence, 
to one that is 'nature-centred' concerned in an altruistic way 
with preserving nature and all life forms for 'their own sake'. 
Currently mankind's relationship with nature is seen to be 
intrusive, destructive of aesthetic aspects of human existence 
and threatening life forms. This vision of how the world 
'is' 
is derived from the science of ecology. Ecocentric 
conservationists interpret the ecological hard core as 
incorporating the idea that 'natural laws' keep the universe 
operating smoothly, but no longer does science have the 
predominant r8le of discovering 'connections' between phenomena 
that will enable human beings to control nature. Instead the 
natural laws governing all form of life are perceived as being 
delicate and finely balanced, so much so that mankind's 
presumption _ 
that it is otherwise, that nature can be 
scientifically controlled, is an ignorance so dangerous that 
it 
might endanger the continence of life on earth including 
human 
life. The r8le of science thus becomes to understand and not 
control, quantification is no longer so desirable or necessary. 
This body of knowledge ecocentric conservationists apply to 
particular aspects of the physical world and find numerous 
instances to confirm their theory. Their prescriptons for 
individuals and governments derive directly from the gulf 
perceived between how the world 'is' and how it ought to be. 
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CHAPTER 4 
EARLY CONCERNS OF 
HOMOCENTRIC CONSERVATIONISTS 
In this chapter and the next we are concerned to analyze the 
main aspects of the homocentric conservationists' prespective 
and to show how it resembles and contrasts with that of the 
ecocentric conservationists. 
4.1 MALTHUSIAN SCARCITY 
A human-centred concern for the environment which is derived 
from the realization that mankind is dependent upon physical 
resources as well as on the proper functioning of many intricate 
reactions within the environment has a long history', but the 
work to which particular importance is attached is that of 
Thomas Malthus. The controversy between Malthus and his critics 
resulted in the publication in 1798 of his now famous pamphlet, 
An Essay on the Principle of Population, as it Affects the 
future Improvement of Society; with Remarks on the Speculations 
of Mr Godwin, M Condorcet, and other Writers2. 
In arriving at his principle of population, which he 
elevated to the 'natural law of population' so sure was he of 
its truth and universality, Malthus practised Newton's 
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scientific methodology. He began with his first principles. 
These were: 'First, that food is necessary to the existence of 
man and secondly, that the passion between the sexes is 
necessary and will remain nearly in its present state'. 3 From 
these principles he proceeded to his deduced hypothesis, 
'assuming then my postulata is granted, I say, that the power of 
population is indefinitely greater than the power in the earth 
to produce subsistence for man'. 
4 Then he went on to his 
reasoned fact, ie that there was a 'strong and constantly 
operating check on population from the difficulty of subsistence 
and the impossibility of the perfection of mankind'. 
5 
Malthus was concerned to establish a general theory which 
captured the essence of a situation where a high birth rate was 
inconsistent with what seemed to him to be an obvious limit to 
expansion of the means of subsistence. He therefore took no 
serious account of variations in the quality of agricultural 
land, nor paid attention to natural resources other than land. 
He also abstracted from change in the technological and 
institutional framework. In so doing, he hoped to ensure the 
theory included all the important variables, but only those 
variables relevant to the general problem it was meant to 
address. This was consistent with his assertion that, 'It is 
certain that we cannot too highly repeat and venerate that 
admirable rule of Newton, not to admit more causes than are 
necessary to the solution of the phenomena we are considering; 
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but the rule itself implies, that those which really are 
necessary must be admitted. '6 
In keeping with the requirements of a careful 
scientific investigation Malthus also was concerned that the 
experience against which his 'reasoned facts' were to be tested 
was general experience, condemning the theorizing from 
particular experience which he associated with 'practical men'. 7 
Malthus supported his analysis with empirical facts collected 
from many different times and places, the second and subsequent 
editions of the Essay being particularly concerned with the 
empirical evidence. 
But Malthus also warned that actual events would probably 
vary from the tendency indicated by his 'natural law'. A 
failure to take account of countervailing tendencies he 
considered might give misleading results in the short run since 
'the laws which regulate the movements of human society ... have 
effects that are continually modified by human interface'. 8 On 
the other hand, not to recognize that countervailing tendencies 
were of short-run duration could mean that sound general 
theories were naively rejected because they were only 
superficially understood. 9 
The future awaiting humanity, according to Malthus' theory, 
was grim. Unable to restrain their own appetites, human 
populations would increase until there was no longer food enough 
to go around. Societies are unable to regulate themselves 
except through the unwilled mechanisms of famine, pestilence, 
plague, disease and war. This 'principle of population' Malthus 
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considered fully confirmed by experience. He believed the 
theory was a 'Just' theory being both validly deduced and 'true' 
by repeated confirmation with empirical facts. The 'natural law 
of population' was, he said, a general principle of human nature 
which we can have no reason to expect will change, even though 
the consequences would at particular times and places be greatly 
modified by other circumstances. '° 
Malthus's critics accepted the validity of the potential 
problem that he raised, the problem of human existence on a 
fixed, limited resource base in the face of growing population. 
They stressed, however, that the crucial questions were: when 
would this point be reached and could mankind voluntarily limit 
its numbers and act in other ways to ensure not only the long- 
term survival of the human race, but also the maintenance of a 
standard of living for the majority beyond a mere subsistence 
level? To these related questions they answered optimistically. 
Technological improvements resulting from the Industrial 
Revolution were pushing the carrying capacity problem further 
into the future and population control might be both desirable 
and possible. 
The controversy between Malthus and his critics continued 
unabated until his death in 1834. Malthus consistently 
maintained that overpopulation was a serious current problem and 
would always be so. It would not go away as Godwin and others 
assumed since it was based on an indisputable 'natural law'. In 
the sixth edition of his Essay, he- backed his belief An the 
urgency of the problem by insisting that the principle of 
population should be used in determining Poor Law Policyll. In 
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1830 Malthus published a succinct Summar 12 of his views as a 
final contribution to the public argument that during his 
lifetime had continued for over thirty years. 
4.2 PHYSICAL SCARCITY AND THE EARLY CONSERVATIONISTS 
Malthusian scarcity assumes an absolute limit to resources, 
beyond which they will cease to be available, and in somewhat 
similar vein, the American geographer, George Marsh, pursued a 
macro investigation into the impact of man throughout history on 
his physical environment. He was concerned with the total 
physical environment, woods, dunes, water, etc, that supported 
civilization and not only with the fossil fuels and other 
natural- resources which powered an industrial economy. In Man 
and Nature13 he first linked the fall of the ancient Roman 
Empire to a decrease in its resource base and then generalized 
from the example of the Roman Empire to the whole of Western 
Civilization. 
Whereas Malthus's work was a scientific and detailed 
investigation in line with the orthodox methodology of the day, 
Marsh's work was that of a generalist and addressed to 
nIon-specialists. He was American minister to Turkey from 1849 
to 1854 and to Italy from 1861 to 1882. He drew upon his 
acquaintance with the Mediterranean area to portray the 
devastation allegedly wrought upon the earth by unwise farming 
and timber practices which brought about man-made deserts. 
Marsh believed the same process was occurring in his native 
Vermont where he had been personally involved in the 
deforestation on the Green Mountain. 14 
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Marsh depicted mankind's dependence upon nature as a much 
more complex relationship than Malthus's simplification of a 
flow of food from agricultural land. He conceived of mankind 
upsetting the ecological balance of nature, bringing about a 
resource scarcity problem by accident and before population 
pressed upon ultimate limits. Ile concluded therefore that man's 
actions, though individually negligible, may in the aggregate 
inadvertently alter the destiny of the earth and inhabitants. 
Marsh was a key figure in articulating the conservation 
ideal in America and his analysis attracted wide attention. 
Since he was concerned that mankind depended upon nature both 
for material welfare and for intangible services, his message 
appealed to both 'ecocentric' conservationists and 'homocentric' 
conservationists, the latter led by the foresters. 
That fundamental differences existed between these two 
groups of conservationists despite Marsh's unifying influence, 
can be glimpsed from their respective attitude to national 
parks, mentioned in the previous chapter. Both were committed 
to a policy of forest reserves, the establishment of which was 
one of the early successes for American conservationists, but 
they were in disagreement on how forests should be preserved and 
why. The naturalists, concerned to preserve environments and 
species 'for their own sake' and for the 'quality of 
life' 
aspects of human welfare that nature provides, supported 
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a system of inviolate national parks and forest reserves. The 
foresters tended to subordinate the aesthetic to the material, 
preservation of natural scenery and every species was less 
important to them than increasing industrial productivity. The 
business of the new profession of foresters was to maintain the 
supply of timber by orderly cutting and planting. The trees 
that were cut down did not have to be replaced by their own 
kind, rather there was a presumption in favour of a few species 
in maximum demand as a productive resource. 15 
The forests were the first of the natural resources in the 
United States to be depleted rapidly enough to attract attention 
and cause alarm. Hence the establishment of the Division of 
Forestry in 1882 and the setting aside of forest reserves. 
Concern over timber resources was, however, only the first of 
many such concerns. In 1896 Nathaniel Shaler, Professor of 
Geology at Harvard, re-emphasized Marsh's message about the 
importance of soil fertility and warned that America's fertile 
soil resource would wash away if farmers continued to abuse the 
land. 16 
By the time the popular conservation movement of the 
Theodore Roosevelt era was at its height the emphasis had 
shifted to the physical scarcity of all natural resources within 
the national boundary. The justification for the first 
Governors' Conference in 1908 on resource use, organized 
principally by Gifford Pinchot and Theodore Roosevelt, was fear 
of exhaustion of the natural resources upon which the national 
economy was based, and concern that policies should be 
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implemented that would postpone or alleviate the effects of such 
exhaustion. '7 In his letters to the Governors calling the 
conference, President Roosevelt wrote, 'it is evident the 
abundant natural resources on which the welfare of this nation 
rests are becoming depleted, and in not a few cases, are already 
exhausted ... . There is no other question now before the 
Nation of equal gravity with the question of the conservation of 
our natural resources. '18 
Fear for the future because of exhaustion of natural 
resources was a recurrent theme throughout the conference. 
Prediction came from various speakers that, without a change in 
policy, supplies of iron ore, timber, agricultural products, oil 
and gas, anthricite coal, phosphate supplies for fertilizer, and 
water-power, would become physically scarce or exhausted in a 
relatively few years after 1908.19 
A follow up to the conference was an inventory of American 
natural resources undertaken by , 
the National Conservation 
Commission. By 1910 Gifford Pinchot was outlining the limited 
physical availability to America of what he considered 'the five 
indispensably essential materials in our civilization - wood, 
water, coal, iron and agricultural products'. 'We have timber 
for less than thirty years at the present rate of cutting ... we 
have anthracite coal for but fifty years, and bituminous coal 
for less than two hundred. Our supplies of iron ore, mineral 
oil and natural gas are being rapidly depleted, and many of the 
great fields are already exhausted. Mineral resources such as 
these when once gone are gone for ever. '20 But Pinchot also 
emphasized the potential problem of ecological scarcity when in 
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introducing the 1912 Forest Protection Bill, he stressed the 
need for forests, not only for timber but to preserve watersheds 
and the land from erosion. 21 
The spectre of Malthusian absolute scarcity of individual 
natural resources, and Marsh's idea of ecological balance - 
whereby mankind may induce a scarcity effect inadvertently from 
upsetting that balance before population pressed upon ultimate 
limits - were pillars of the conservationists' doctrine. 
However, in contrast to Malthus, most early conservationists 
were optimistic about the future, if and only if, man's stance 
towards the earth's resources changed immediately. 
4.3 'WISE USE' 
In the background of the 1908 Governors' Conference, though not 
strongly emphasized there, was the question of who should 
benefit from the exploitation of natural resources. The Report 
of the Inland Waterways Commission which led to Roosevelt's 
letter to the Governors called for 'the equal opportunity of all 
our People' to share in the heritage of natural resources, 
whilst at the same time drawing attention to an unprecedented 
rate of consumption. 22 However, the potential dilemma between 
future and present use remained in the background at the time, 
precisely because the early conservationists were optimist on 
the issue of availability, if there was a'change of attitude and 
policy towards resource use. 
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Optimism about future resource availability if resources 
were 'used wisely' was a message passed on to later 
conservationists by Marsh, though he stated what was to become 
basic conservationist philosophy, that less wasteful use would 
require not only more information about how human action 
affected the physical environment but more essentially a change 
in values involving a love of the earth and a respect for 
posterity. 23 
However, the idea of a complete community of interests 
between man and nature and between mankind's material and non- 
material needs was repeatedly shown up as an impossible ideal as 
the early organized conservation movement progressed. When the 
popular conservation movement of the Theodore Roosevelt era was 
at its height, in 1907-1908, homocentric concerns seemed to 
predominate policy proposals. 
By then conservation had come to imply the use of 
'foresight and restraint in the exploitation of the physical 
resources of wealth as necessary for the perpetuity of 
civilization, and the welfare of present and future 
generations'. 24 The greatest good for the greatest number over 
the longest possible time was the characteristic slogan of the 
movement as led by Gifford Pinchot. The values behind the 
slogan ensured a clash of views with the ecocentric 
conservationists. It was not only that Pinchot and those of 
like mind put the human species at the centre of their concerns, 
more important was the emphasis the homocentrics placed on 
material welfare and their use of applied science to 'manage' 
the natural environment. 
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Indeed, it was their willingness to put newly acquired 
scientific knowledge to work in order to 'manage' environments 
and promote 'efficient' use in the interests of human welfare 
which perhaps most separated the homocentric from the ecocentric 
conservationists. The naturalists, such as the Harvard 
botanist, Charles Sargent24, instinctively wished to preserve 
the species that they made a life's work of studying. In 
contrast, the scientific fields of the homocentric 
conservationists were, for instance, hydrology, forestry, 
geology and geography. 25 From the records of the 1908 
Governors' conference, it seems that many of the men who 
assisted Gifford Pinchot and Theodore Roosevelt in its 
organisation, were scientists and engineers from these fields 
who were concerned to overcome the problems that arose with the 
rapid exploitation of America's natural resources, such as 
deforestation and soil erosion. For instance, WJ McGee, who 
was a member of the Inland Waterways Commission and made a 
special study of America's water resources, and FH Newell, 
Commissioner of the Inland Waterways Commission, both of whom 
were members of the Geological Survey, are two men who 
apparently played major roles in assisting Pinchot to organize 
the 1908 meeting. 26 
Pinchot, himself trained as a professional forester and 
holding the position of chief forester in the US Forest Service, 
described forestry as involving scientific sustained-yield 
timber management. 27 He preached the twin philosophies of the 
indispensability and physical scarcity of natural resources and 
the responsibility of government aided by experts such as 
himself, for their 'wise use'. 28 
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For much of his life Aldo Leopold, who joined the US Forest 
Service in 1909 when Pinchot was still chief forester, shared 
the view that conservation meant scientific management of 
resources and environments by professional applied scientists. 
29 
In the 1920s he effectively founded a new profession of 'game 
management' later broadened and renamed 'wild life management', 
becoming the first professor of wild life management in 1933. 
Leopold said of wild life management that it sprang from the 
realization that game is 'crop', and he advocated 
sustained-yield cropping of the wilderness for game in much the 
same way as Pinchot advocated cropping forest reserves for 
timber. The essence of prudent cropping, or 'wise use', was 
scientific management which worked man's will upon nature. The 
idea of managed wilderness or managed forests was, of course, 
quite contrary to the ideals behind the Transcendentalist 
encounter described in the previous chapter. However, it was 
only later in his life that Leopold turned from the 
interventionism of scientific conservation. Then he framed a 
critique of his own profession - and narrow specialization in 
general - which defined conservation as a specialized and 
official activity conducted by experts, an approach he came to 
regard as erroneous, not least because it relegated basic human 
responsibilities for the physical environment to a corps of 
experts. 30 
Though the early conservationists shared with Malthus the 
idea that physical limits could have a constraining effect on 
human welfare, they did not dwell on Malthus's idea of unending 
population growth being inevitable nor on the arguments of 
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Malthus's critics who suggested that population control was both 
possible and desirable. It was not that they necessarily 
considered the Malthusian equation which saw an inevitable clash 
between resource limits and population growth as untrue. 
Rather, it did not focus on the aspect of reality they wished to 
highlight, namely the countervailing effect of science and 
technology. Clearly the personal and professional interests of 
Pinchot and other 'homocentric' conservationists who were 
concerned with the effect of natural resource scarcity on 
material human welfare, were in the application of science to 
resource use and management. To concentrate on the 
inevitability of unending population growth could defeat 
interest in careful resource management whilst successful 
population control (or control of consumption) could make 'wise 
use' less necessary. r Thus these conservationists 
high-lighted 
man's foolishness in unnecessarily aggravating an already 
existing situation of natural resource scarcity by wasting 
resources. To waste natural resources was to use them 
physically inefficiently and therefore foolishly. Attempts to 
reduce physical inefficiency in resource use meant the 
encouragement of 'wise use'. 
Scientific managers like Pinchot exerted a primary 
influence over the early conservation movement and over the 
organisation and content of the 1908 Governors' Conference. It 
is therefore hardly surprising that, at that meeting, the 
pessimistic theme of impeding resource scarcity was twinned with 
the optimistic (if subordinate) theme that the application of 
science and technology could alleviate the potential problem. 
- 101 - 
Edmund James's address emphasized the need for 'so organizing 
and utilizing our natural resources as to produce in the large 
and in the long run the greatest return in the form of material 
wealth to the Nation' and he went on to say that 'we shall add 
far more to our natural resources by developing our ability to 
increase them than we can ever do by mere processes of 
saving. i31 Similarly, Andrew Carnegie urged 'research into and 
mastery over Nature'. 
32 
It is important to emphasize that the 'gospel of 
efficiency' which Marsh, Pinchot and other conservationists 
preached at the time as 'wise use' was not the economist's 
notion of efficiency. In their analysis of the early 
conservation movement Barnett and Morse (1963) observed that 
'the conservationists were seriously concerned ... with values 
involving a holistic conception of man and nature, obligation to 
future- generations, so-called scientific management based on 
physical values... . They were not concerned with the 
professional economists' maximizing of the present value of the 
stream of real income over time, based on consumer sovereignity 
- which professional economists frequently term 'conservation 
economics'. 33 Barnett and Morse went on to say that the lack of 
economic knowledge by conservationists undoubtedly helped create 
the- long-standing confusion and misunderstanding between 
conservationists and economists since 'it made possible the 
inference that their (the conservationists') ultimate objective 
with respect to the shape of welfare overtime was economic 
efficiency rather than ethical revision based on physical 
efficiency' . 
34 
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It is not surprising that as far as the physical scientists 
and engineers were concerned 'wise use' or conservation involved 
a preoccupation with physical concepts and involved practices 
that would, for instance, provide a physically sustainable yield 
from renewable resources, or develop known non-renewable 
resources with a minimum of physical waste. It included also an 
emphasis on the kind of research by physical and biological 
scientists and engineers that would aid location and recovery of 
new deposits and develop alternative substances to supplement or 
replace resources where physical exhaustion seemed most 
imminent. However, if conservation implied physical rather than 
economic efficiency it was not, in the early years of the 
century, widely associated with policies of population control, 
control of consumption or with reserving resources from current 
use, all of which came to be associated with conservation when 
the more pessimistic 'new conservation movement' emerged with 
strength in the 1960s. 
4.4 THE INTERVENING YEARS 
The American conservation movement lost much of its popular 
support around World War I and after. Amongst other things, as 
conservation issues became clarified in public discussion the 
superficial unity of the movement became apparent and the 
popular support, which reached its height between 1908-10, 
receded as leaders quarrelled amongst themselves. 
Within the group broadly supporting Pinchot's , approach 
there were disagreements over which specific issues should be 
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brought to the public's attention and resentment over the extent 
to which Pinchot dominated the choice. In 1909 Pinchot formed 
the National Conservation Association and used it to promote his 
then primary interests of water power and mineral leasing. For 
the next ten, years or so those issues were considered, in the 
public mind and in Congress, to be 'the conservation problem'. 
35 
The disunity which the public became more clearly to 
perceive, however, was the persistent conflict between 
Pinchot-type conservationists who favoured efficient resource 
development, and those whom Pinchot called the 
'preservationists', who argued that wild areas should be 
preserved from commercial use. 
It was the Hetch-Hetchy dam controversy, which became a 
national issue, that brought the conservationist-preservationist 
conflict to public attention, and also led to a severing of 
relations between the leaders of the two rival movements. The 
cleavage between the two groups took an institutional form 
within the federal bureaucracy, when a National Park Service was 
created in 1916. The creation of the separate service was a 
move rigorously opposed by Pinchot. He wanted the Parks to be 
administered by the Forest Service, already responsible for the 
National Forests, and which favoured a development rather than a 
preservationist perspective. 
It was not until 1914 that a bill authorizing the 
Hetch-Hetchy dam was finally passed. By then, said Hays '... 
conservation as an organized force had shrivelled to a small 
group of men dominated by the influence, personality and 
interests of its leading figure - the former Chief Forester, 
Gifford Pinchot. '36 Though the preservationists obtained 
measures to serve their ends - not least the Support of Congress 
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in 1916 to establish the National Park Service and to have it 
placed in the Interior Department, rather than the development- 
orientated Department of Agriculture - they did so mostly in the 
face of opposition from Pinchot conservationists. 
Something of a revival of interest in conservation issues 
in the United States marked the middle years of the 1930s, when 
once again Presidential leadership became a major factor in 
conservation policy. Earlier in his life the President, 
Franklin D Roosevelt, had been chairman of the Committee on 
Forestery in the New York State Senate and was greatly 
influenced at that time by Gifford Pinchot, whose forest 
protection bill he introduced in 1912.37 
Just as the early conservation movement was in part, and 
part of, a larger revolution of Western Society against the 
market economy38, so also did the revival of interest in 
conservation in the 1930s coincide with the wider preoccupation 
with planning, which was the keynote of the second Roosevelt 
era. As Ernest S Griffith describes it in his overview article 
on conservation 'in the end what emerged - in the resources 
field no less than in other fields - was a type of mixed, 
regulated, and even rigid economy quite different from the 
orthodox picture of a competitive, anti-monopolistic capitalism 
.. e the role of government itself - in resources, as well as 
elsewhere - was basically transformed in the popular mind from 
that of a policeman to that of a weapon in the economic 
struggle. '39 
Stress was once again placed on the need for government 
intervention in the production and use of natural resources, and 
once again the idea prevailed that what the government, guided 
by experts in applied science, should encourage was 'wise use'. 
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'Wise use' was meant to guide the Soil Erosion Service of 1933 
(later the Soil Conservation Service of 1935), the depletion of 
fertile topsoil through both water and wind being the main focus 
of natural resouce concern in the 1930s 'Dust Bowl' era. In 
1933 planning took a new departure when the Tennessee Valley 
Authority was created, and established the river basin as a 
natural unit for comprehensive multi-purpose development. More 
ambitiously, in 1934 the Natural Resources Board was 
established, to be succeeded in 1939 by the National Resources 
Planning Board (which was finally abolished in 1943). 
The preservationist values of the naturalists were also 
represented in the reawakening of interest in conservation 
during the recovery years. Earlier, following the founding of 
wildlife and game refuges soon after the turn of the century, 
and the establishment of the National Park Service in 1916, some 
progress had been made in this direction. National Park acreage 
had grown from nearly 5 million acres in 1916 to over 15 million 
acres in 1936. Stimulated by Aldo Leopold, the Gila Wilderness 
Area was established in 1924, and in 1929 the United States 
Forest Service instituted protective regulations on its wild 
areas. In 1935, Aldo Leopold and Robert Marshall, both at one 
time career foresters with the Forest service, led the launch of 
the Wilderness Society. The first Federal Wildlife Conference 
was held in 1936, followed by the creation of a national system 
of wildlife refuges in 1937. A growing awareness of a potential 
population pressure in the United States was a dimension largely 
absent earlier in the century, and one which gave the 
preservation of the aesthetic value of the natural environment 
for succeeding generations a new urgency in the 1930x. 
40 
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By the 1950s the large quantities of resources used during 
World War II, and the new military involvement in Korea, ensured 
that the scarcity of strategic vital materials and sources of 
energy became a major preoccupation within the USA, as 
elsewhere. By then nuclear technology for military and civil 
energy purposes ensured that uranium had been added to the 
category of basic resources. 
It was against this background that the President's 
Materials Policy Commission (The Paley Commission) was 
established in 1951, to be succeeded in 1952 by the Ford 
Foundation financed Resources for the Future organisation, set 
up to research into the many-faceted nature of the conservation 
problem. The Paley Commission, looking ahead one generation 
concluded that scarce resources could be obtained by increased 
foreign trade and the indigenous resource base could be expanded 
by new technology. 41 
The Report, however, was only guardedly optimistic. It 
noted the United States was using natural resources on a vast 
scale, the product of a rapidly increasing population and a high 
and increasing material living standard. The President's 
Materials Policy Commission pointed out that US consumption of 
raw materials was half that of the non-Communist world with 
about 10 per cent of its populaton, and that since World War I 
the country's consumption of most materials exceeded that of all 
mankind through history before that time. 42 
This high rate of use became a centre of attention in the 
new conservation movement which emerged in the 1960s. In the 
more immediate post-World War II years, however, effort was 
concentrated on renewal and economic growth, and faith in 
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technology ensured that fears about an absolute shortage of 
resources remained in the background. 
In 1958 to mark the fiftieth anniversary of Theodore 
Roosevelt's 1908 Governors' Conference, Resources for the Future 
organized a forum 'to shed light on some of the resource 
conservation problems of the next fifty years from the vantage 
point of a critical review of the past fifty'. 43 
Optimism was expressed by several contributers to the Forum 
concerning the past achievements and future possibilities 
offered by the 'inexhaustible resource of technology'. Thomas B 
Nolan, in a paper of that title, stated that 'research and 
technologic development have to a large extent eliminated from 
the conservation movement concern over the adequacy of our 
resource base' ... 'I believe that the prospect of impending 
shortages or unsuitable supplies will continue to inspire the 
research and technical advances that will make it possible to 
resolve such problems well in advance of the doom we often are 
prone to foresee'. 44 Nolan concluded his article by, quoting as 
follows, and approvingly, from Edward Teller's article 'Atomic 
Energy in the Year 2000', 'of all long-run prophecies, the 
theory of Malthus may well be the most plausible and the most 
inaccurate'. 45 
Ernest Griffith also had an optimistic belief in the future 
possibilities of scientific conservation and prophecied 'that, 
at least for the United States, science will rout Malthus'. 
46 
John Kenneth Galbraith's contribution to the Forum had as its 
major theme the idea that the United State's appetite for 
resource-intensive consumption may need curbing, but he prefaced 
this argument by suggesting that 'in the future, as in the past, 
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substitution nurtured by science will be the major hope of the 
conservationist'. 47 
Samuel Hays, however, in the same Forum, detected a change 
of emphasis in the conservation movement as a whole from a 
prevailing optimism that 'wise use' would provide a resource 
base for unlimited growth, to a pessimism based on a fear for 
human survival. He wrote 'the conservation movement of 1908 was 
intensely optimistic ... If one could bring about sustained- 
yield management of biologic resources, multiple-purpose 
development of rivers, and less wasteful utilization of 
minerals, the future held untold possibilities ... some of this 
outlook persisted in the 1930s ... But on the whole the 
atmosphere of the years since World War II has shifted, I 
believe, from optimism to a guarded pessimism. We think less of 
possibilities and more of limits; we think less of human 
betterment, and more in terms of human survival. The unlimited 
horizons of technology are less often in our minds today than 
the compulsive use of technology in a race towards world 
suicide'. 48 
The guarded pessimism Hays detected in the late 1950s was 
indeed a notable element in the new popular interest in 
conservation issues which developed in the succeeding decade, 
and which is the subject matter of Chapter 5. 
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CHAPTER 5 
ENVIRONMENTALISM 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
A popular interest in conservation issues which had laid dormant 
for the most part since the 1930s arose once again with 
considerable intensity in the United States in the 1960s, and 
the new movement continued to have much public support through 
the 1970s. 
Once again widespread concern was expressed about the 
inherent conflict between a finite physical environment and an 
ever-increasing demand on that environment by growing material 
development and population. This time, however, concern over 
the degradation of the environment and exhaustion of resources 
was termed 'environmentalism', described by one observer as 'the 
set of ideas which emphasizes the inter-relationship between 
humans and the ecosystem and the various threats human activity 
poses to its continued viability. ' 
As the name implies, a major concern of environmentalists 
in the 1960s was the possible harmful effect of environmental 
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pollution on aspects of human welfare, such as human health, and 
on environmental resources such as the air and the oceans. The 
publication of Rachel Carson's Silent Spring in 1962 which, from 
an ecological perspective, highlighted in particular the dangers 
of chemical pesticides, is often quoted as marking the beginning 
of America's re-emerging concern with the depletion of resources 
and corresponding abuse of the environment. 2 
Environmentalism like earlier conservationism is of course 
not just a 'set of ideas' about mankind's impact on the natural 
environment, but also the policy proposals which are developed 
from them, and the organized social and political movement which 
embodies the ideas and presses for action. Also whilst 
environmentalism, (enveloping ideas, policies and pressure 
groups), is in principle a 'politics of survival', uniting 
mankind in common cause, in practice, once again, diverse ideas 
at the analytical and policy levels, ensure an equally diverse 
'environmental movement', encompassing ecocentric and 
homocentric perspectives. Aspects of environmentalism, the 
popular movement, theory, values and policy recommendations are 
considered in the following sections. 
5.2 THE ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT 
A media event in America entitled Earth Day 1970, publicized and 
confirmed the arrival of the upsurge in popular support for the 
new environmental movement, in much the same way as the 
Governors' Conference in 1908 had publicized the early 
conservation movement. At it happens, Earth Day also marked the 
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beginning of the 'environmental decade' of the 1970s. 3 
Evidence which alerted theorists and activists alike to 
consider seriously the damaging effect of environmental 
pollution on human health and ecosystems came from both local 
and more global projects. Often it was incorporated in books 
designed, like Silent Spring, to appeal to a wide audience. 
Anthony Tucker, for instance, published The Toxic Metals4 in 
1972. Written in a popular style, it concentrated on a narrow 
subject matter and studied in particular the discovery of 
Minamata disease in Japan, a form of poisoning by organic 
mercury. The source of the mercury, it was, eventually 
discovered, was the fish which formed the staple diet of the 
villagers of the fishing community of Minamata. The fish had 
been contaminated by industrial waste dumped into the bay by a 
local chemical plant. Tucker used this and other case studies 
to emphasize the problems of ignorance, monitoring and vested 
interests which often complicate pollution. control, ; and, to 
highlight that the long-term effects of chronic exposure to low 
doses of any toxic metal, such as mercury or lead, will become 
evident in an experimental way when people breathe, drink or eat 
the substance, with or without their own consent. 
In terms of global projects Man's Impact on the Global 
Environment (1970)5, an intensive month long study by 
I 
specialists, sponsored by MIT, is notable for the amount of 
information it gathered together on levels of pollution and 
their likely repercussons. It documented -possible global and 
long-term effects of pollution in triggering change in, for 
example, climate and ocean ecosystems. 
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However, the most publicized and criticized global report 
to be published during the 'environmental decade' was 
undoubtedly the Club of Rome's interdisciplinary study, Limits 
to Growth6 (1972), which presented a comprehensive integrated 
index of global constraints to development. The Report was much 
criticized in particular by economists who decried the value of 
The Limits on various grounds, including that its model did not 
involve prices, assumed exponential growth, assumed (implicitly) 
that pollution is proportional to output, and over all sought 
'an aura of scientific' authority' by using a model and 
computerized simulation.? Beckerman called the study 'a brazen, 
impudent piece of nonsense'8 and Solow said that he, like 
everyone else was 'suckered into reading the Limits to Growth'9. 
The Report also, though, was criticized from within the 
body of committed conservationists. The conclusion - that at 
most one hundred years separate mankind from an ecological 
catastrophe - was derided by Georgescu-Roegen as lacking a 
scientifically solid basis. 10 The reason was, he said, that 
whilst 'there is hardly any room for quarrelling about the 
general pattern of relations assumed in the various simulations 
covered by the report ... by their very rigid nature, the 
arithmomorphic models used are incapable of predicting the 
evolutonary changes these relations may suffer over time'. 
11 
Georges cu-Roegen's main criticism, however, is that The Limits 
focussed attention exclusively on the effects of exponential 
growth and did not point out that even a steady-state economy 
cannot go on forever, a criticism deriving from his main thesis 
(discussed below in 5.3), that in the very long run terrestrial 
energy, materials and environmental space are all exhaustible. 
12 
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In general the main line taken by environmentalists on The 
Limits to Growth was that, whatever the details, the main 
conclusions were incontrovertible and the publicity surrounding 
publication of the Report was useful in drawing attention to 
future problems for the world economy from population growth, 
pollution and resource depletion. 13 It is hardly surprising 
that economists not committed to a world view which emphasizes 
finiteness are scathing about the Report. Or to find proponents 
of a finite worldview seeing virtue in even a presentation 'that 
is rather half-baked'14, since it seeks to illuminate an aspect 
of reality with which they are particularly concerned. 
Following publication of Limits to Growth, and more 
especially after the Energy Crises of the 1970s, 
environmentalists' worries came to encompass the scarcity not 
only of environmental resources, but also of the natural 
resources which had traditionally caused concern. The energy 
intensity of materials' recovery and the materials' intensity of 
large-scale solar energy technologies, helped to ensure that 
environmentalism sought to conserve materials, energy and the 
environment, all of which were seen as essential inputs into the 
achievement and prolongation of a high standard of living. 
15 
In addition, and to an extent which had not occurred 
before, amenities such as wilderness and open-space were seen by 
environmentalists as important elements in the overall quality 
of modern life. During the hey-day of the early conservation 
movement this was not the view which prevailed. In 
correspondence over the Hetch-Hetchy dam controversy, J Horace 
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McFarland, a leading and disappointed preservationist, wrote to 
Pinchot, 'I feel that the conservation movement is now weak 
because it has failed to join hands with the preservation of 
scenery. i16 By the 1960s the environmentalists were indeed 
incorporating scenery into their demands, but their orientation 
was by no means 'pure' preservationist, in line with Aldo 
Leopold's concept of 'ecological conscience' where the physical 
environment is viewed from within a man-in-nature paradigm. 
That perspective requires the preservation of natural 
environments from human intrusion, whereas many environment- 
alists feared for the physical scarcity of a valued recreational 
resource. - 
Post World War II, as population growth and industrial 
development reduced the supply of open space, rising material 
living standards and increased leisure time expanded its amenity 
demand. In 1958 Luther Gulick had expressed fears about 
increasing physical scarcity of this particular vital resource 
as follows 'It is the urban man added to the natural local 
recreational activity, that over-fishes, over-hunts and 
overcrowds the facilities ... we are already, at times, turning 
our great parks, like Yellowstone and Yosemite, into crowded 
wilderness slums'017 
Thus, changing circustances ensured that, whilst ecocentric 
and homocentric environmentalists are as divided as were the 
earlier preservationists and conservationists at a fundamental 
level over land use, they have more frequently found a common 
enemy against which to unite. From a study of 366 disputes over 
industrial facilities in the United States between 1970-7818 a 
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pattern emerged of 'the fighting arm of the environmental 
movement' including groups espousing conserving and preserving 
ideologies, being involved in increasing number of conflicts 
with would be developers. Evidence showed a shift in focus from 
existing, to greenfield projects as targets of environmental 
concern. It showed also that a heterogeneous group of non- 
governmental opponents comprising 'the environmental movement' 
assumed an even more central role in the process of opposition; 
they were usually involved in prolonged conflict and used 
'social conflict' tactics, such as demonstrations, lobbying and 
press campaigns to confront new planning proposals. The paper 
concluded 'our survey has focused on the 1970s. But the trends 
suggest that the country may be entering an even more difficult 
era in which growing demands and diminishing resources will 
increase the frequency and intensity of the 'social' breed of 
environmental conf lict'. 19 
But, of course, the United States was not the only country 
to experience environmental conflicts in the 1970s. In 
separating the US data from the rest Gladwin reported 'many 
thousands of sites around the globe where major battles over the 
environmental impacts of existing or proposed industrial 
facilities were fought during the 1970s'. 20 Certainly a notable 
difference between the early US Conservation Movement and the 
new Environmentalism, linked to the latter's perception of a 
wider range and wider-ranging issues of concern to them, was the 
global and international orientation of the environmental 
movement. The new United States movement itself looked further 
afield, being concerned with global resources rather than merely 
with indigenous supplies, which was the purview of the early 
conservationists. 21 
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However, the environmentalism of the 1960s and 1970s was 
also an international movement, the internationalism being 
marked in Britain by the formation, for the first time, of 
public interest environmental pressure groups. 22 The early 
conservationists in Britain had little natural wilderness or 
public lands rich in resources to protect from private 
exploitation. The Victorian social benefactors thus had more 
limited horizons, such as protecting ancient buildings and 
attractive landscapes. They regarded it as part of their civic 
duty to protect the Nation's heritage for posterity, and they 
attempted to achieve their aims mostly be purchasing 
properties. 
The National Trust for Places of Historic Interest and 
Natural Beauty, which has by far the largest membership of any 
environmental group of the United Kingdom, began in 1895 its 
practice of buying, or being given, property of architectural, 
historical and landscape value and opening them for public use 
on a fee-paying basis. 23 By the 1960s, however, growing alarm 
over pollution and the possibility of major environmental 
catastrophe, brought to the British conservation scene a number 
of organizations whose members were more willing to take direct 
action, pressure governments and seek publicity for their 
cause. Friends of the Earth, for instance, was founded in 
Britain and in the United States in 1969.24 
Behind the formation of environmental pressure groups in 
Britain was something of the alientation felt in American 
against established environmental government agencies and 
interest groups. Between 1966 and 1976 seven major new 
environmental public interest groups were formed in the United 
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States. 25 These new groups continued the pressure groups 
tradition of the early conservationists, but they are evidence 
that the new environmental movement evolved only in part from 
the old conservation interest groups and, in some respects, in 
opposition to them. 
The broadening public awareness of the inter-relatedness of 
environmental problems ensured that environmentalists were 
differentiated from traditional conservationists in the emphasis 
they placed on the total environment rather than on single 
issues. This meant that in America in the early 1970s, the 
then existing institutional arrangement, seemed no longer 
appropriate. Nine federal agencies and aligned conservation 
interest groups had major missions in the management of the 
physical environment, with little or no effective coordination 
between them. This structure was perceived as a hindrance to 
new goals. 26 
But also the powerful federal agencies and their interest 
group clients came to be seen as acting against the public 
interest, which the new groups claimed to serve. The leaders of 
the early movement, of course, argued along 'public interest' 
lines when they put forward the case that the nation's 
environment was a public heritage, to be used for the greatest 
good for the greatest number in the long run. In their view, 
the greatest good could best be judged by 'neutral' experts, 
such as themselves, working with government agencies set up for 
specific tasks. The same faith in government was shared by the 
conservation movement of the 1930s. 
Congress duly delegated broad authority to the 
administrative agencies which, with no real accountability for 
their judgements and no guides to action, developed their own 
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political ties with specific interest groups, to their mutual 
benefit. Thus what the earlier conservationists thought of as a 
solution, namely powerful alliances with government agencies to 
manage the environment, the later environmentalists perceived as 
a problem; the problem of alliances between the agencies and 
narrow client interests which ignored any wider public 
interest. 26 
An immediate solution to this newly perceived problem, 
practised by activists in the Environmental movement in the 
United States, and elsewhere, when involved in local or national 
disputes, has been to demand more open access to administrative 
decision processes. A major tool has been the publication of 
relevant information different (or differently interpreted) from 
that developed by agencies or their informants. 
28 As to the 
broader, issue of effectively implementing apparently desirable 
global and long-term 'public interest' policies, opinions range 
from the need for some form of world government, to a global 
shift in individual values. The controversy over global 
policies and their implementation is discussed in section 5.4 
below. 
Popular support for environmentalism appears to have waned 
somewhat since the 1970s. A symposium in the United States, 
held in 1980 to mark the tenth anniversary of Earth Day, both 
celebrated the success of the 'environmental decade' and 
recorded some lessening in public support as the decade 
closed. 29 On entering the 1980s environmental concerns appeared 
to take lower priority in the public's scale of values than 
issues such as high inflation, high unemployment and low 
economic growth, which threatened living standards more 
immediately. 
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Even so, in America the organized environmental movement 
seems reasonably assured of a continuing high level of support, 
even if that support is below its peak. Many of the 
organizations comprising it are well funded and staffed by 
professionals and have considerable influence on decision 
making. 30 In Britain the position appears less favourable for 
environmentalism. Less well-funded and supported, with fewer 
points of access to those in authority, the movement survives, 
says Timothy O'Riordan, 'more by dedication than as a result of 
general public support ... the British environmental lobby will 
survive - just - but its influence may remain limited until 
changes in the economic circumstances of the country bring about 
more radical shifts in political thinking'. 
31 
Behind environmental politics lies environmental thought. 
Both ecocentric and homocentric environmentalists tend to share, 
explicitly or implicitly, a similar ecological 'world view' or 
paradigm, which sees the world as physically finite and 
ecologically balanced, and humans as having to come to terms 
with both. Inevitably, however, writers employ a variety of 
conceptual frameworks and make differing policy proposals. 
It is to modern-day environmental thought and policy 
recommendations which we now turn. 
5.3 NEO-MALTHUSIAN THEORY 
Conceptually the scarcities which trouble environmentalists can 
be understood in terms' of Malthusian scarcity and Marsh's 
similar but not identical concept of ecological scarcity. The 
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former encapsulates the notion that eventually there will be an 
inevitable clash between physical resources and population with 
predictable adverse effects on human welfare. It invites 
solutions which will postpone such a clash or mitigate its 
effects. The latter can be adapted to emphasize that mankind, 
either in depletion of natural resources or by environmental 
pollution, may inadvertently upset a delicate balance of 
nature. The consequences of such an upset could possibly be 
catastrophic for sections of mankind, possibly even threatening 
the survival of the species. Again the theory invites 
suggestions for appropriate action to avert such disaster. 
Useful though the theoretical insights of earlier writers 
can be, more recent developments in neo-Malthusian theory have 
provided valuable new insights, which have inspired many 
participants to the Malthusian debate, seeking to understand the 
basic conflicts, to popularize concern for the physical 
environment, or derive tenative solutions to the problems posed. 
A major feature of more recent neo-Malthusian theory is the 
application of thermodynamic principles to economic systems. 
The leading advocate of the thermodynamic approach to economics 
is Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen whose most detailed exposition, 
developing ideas formulated by him over the previous twenty 
years, is The Entropy Law and the Economic Process (1971)32. 
However, Kenneth Boulding also used a generalized notion of 
entropy in his conceptualization of the earth as a spaceship in 
196633, and similar ideas are behind Ayres and Kneese's approach 
to environmental pollution, which they view as a materials 
balance problem of the entire economy. 34 Georgescu-Roegen has 
pointed out that entropy is a concept so involved that it is not 
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easily understood by physicists35, even so it is a term that has 
been increasingly used by natural scientists, and by a few 
economists who are principally concerned with the relationship 
between mankind and the physical environment. 
Thermodynamics 36 and subsequently a new physical law, the 
Entropy Law, originated in the early nineteenth century, when 
Sadi Carnot developed the theory of the steam engine and the 
principle, that for energy to be applied to doing work - that is 
the movement of matter through space - there must be temperature 
differences between parts of the machine, and the act of 
performing the work reduces those temperature differences. In 
any 'isolated' thermodynamic system the amount of energy and 
matter 'remain constant (the First Law of thermodynamics), 
nevertheless acccording to Carnot the energy, whilst remaining 
constant in amount, dissipates and becomes less available to do 
work. The concept of the unavailability of energy for work was 
formalized by Clausius in 1865 into the concept of entropy. As 
entropy was defined as unavailability, his definition of the 
Entropy Law (the Second Law of Thermodynamics) states that in 
any isolated system there is a constant increase in Entropy. 
In physics the Entropy Law conflicted with the mechanistic 
theory of Newtonian Classical Physics, since the latter held 
that everything which happens consists of locomation alone, 
indicating no irrevocable change in nature, whereas the former 
proclaims its existence. The analytical conflict was resolved 
within the relevant scientific community by accepting the 
validity of the entropic process - the irrevocable and 
irreversible tendency of temperature to become equalized and of 
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available energy to dissipate into unavailable energy - but 
combining it with probabilistic theory, thereby effecting a 
compromise with the laws of mechanics. Boltzmann's 'mechanical 
theory' of thermodynamics or the discipline of Statistical 
Mechanics resurrects the idea that locomotion alone could exist, 
by suggesting that time may yet indicate that entropy itself is 
reversible. Whilst Georgescu-Roegen admits Probabilistic 
thermodynamics became the 'accepted theory' he joins forces with 
those natural scientists who reject the compromise. He argues, 
'According to this new discipline a pile of ashes may very well 
become capable of heating the boiler. Also, a corpse may 
resuscitate to lead a second life in exactly the reserved order 
of the first. Only the probabilities of such events are 
fantastically small. If we have not yet witnessed such 
'miracles' - the advocates of statistical meachanics contend - 
it is only because we have not been watching a sufficiently 
large number of piles of ashes or corpses'. 
37 
As his tone implies, Georgescu-Roegen rejects the accepted 
compromise because he sees it as irrelevant to the real world. 
He also rejects, for similar reasons, the notion that time 
itself is only man's illusion, which would mean there is no 
sense in speaking of reversibility or irreversibility of natural 
phenomena. Instead he contends, Clausius' concept of entropy 
says something about the physical world, which is in opposition 
to the principles of Classical mechanics, and which is neither a 
reflection of mankind's imperfect knowledge, nor some kind of 
temporal illusion. 
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For the most part thermodynamics has stopped short of 
considering what happens to matter in the transformations which 
go on continuously in nature. Georgescu-Roegen suggests this is 
because the dissipation of matter has proved, so far, impossible 
to represent'in some general analytical laws. In any event, he 
says, with matter outside the theoretical edifice of physics 
some natural scientists and economists have been induced to 
think that energy alone is important. In the words of Harrison 
Brown et al, 'All we need do is to add sufficient energy to the 
system and we can obtain whatever materials we desire'. 39 This 
'energetic' theory does not indicate the possibility of 
perpetuating material economic growth with the use of energy 
alone. It does suggest though, that some kind of stationary 
economy may be sustainable without tapping the environment for 
new material resources because matter can be recycled, however 
dissipated. Georgescu-Roegen refutes this notion by claiming 
that in reality 'Matter Matters Too'. 40 
A 'closed'' thermodynamic system, by definition, is one 
which can exchange only energy with the environment, an 'open' 
system is one which can exchange matter as well, and an 
'isolated' system can exchange neither energy nor matter. The 
economic process is an 'open' system, which can exchange both 
energy and matter with its wider earthly environment, but the 
earth itself is a thermodynamically 'closed' system, which can 
to all intents and purposes, exchange-only energy not matter 
with the universe. 
The analysis of 'closed' thermodynamic systems thus seems 
to be the applicable analysis as far as thinking about global 
resources is concerned. However, says Georgescu-Roegen, whilst 
- 127 - 
a theoretically closed system is often assumed to perform 
mechanical work and produce a constant qualitative conversion of 
energy without any such effect on matter, what the model really 
does is exclude consideration of matter. When matter is 
included in the theory it becomes obvious that matter, in bulk, 
just like energy, exists in two qualitatively different forms, 
as available and unavailable. 
Thus he claims, the entropy law can be interpreted, in 
actuality, as saying no mechanical work can be obtained without 
using energy and matter, and no actual mechanical work can be 
obtained without some energy and matter being degraded into 
unavailable form.. The inevitable conclusion Georgescu-Roegen 
comes to is that the scarcity of some kinds of available matter 
is likely to become the crucial environmental limiting factor in 
the very long run. 'If we abstract from, other causes that knell 
the death bell of the human species, it is clear that natural 
resources represent the limitative factor as concerns the life 
span of that species ... By using these resources too quickly, 
man throws away that part of solar energy that will still be 
reaching the earth for a long time after he has departed'. 41 
Georgescu-Roegen points out the consistency of his theory 
with Malthusian economics and also, like Malthus, explicitly 
considers the issue of human population. Malthus's theory 
argued an interconnection between the biological growth of the 
human species and the economic process. Georgescu-Roegen, 
drawing on the work of the biologist Alfred Lotka42, illustrates 
that the entropy law governs evolution and that, broadly 
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interpreted, the economic process is a continuation of the 
biological one, both being embedded in the entropic 
deterioration of the physical environment. 
The argument is that the physical entropic process is 
automatic, in that it goes on without human intervention and 
every living form is also subject to it. In addition, the 
maintenance of life can be defined as the ability to evade the 
entropy law and to keep going a process of so-called negative 
entropy, upgrading disorder into order. However, a living being 
can only, for a time, evade the degrading of its own structure. 
It cannot prevent the entropic degrading of the whole system, 
which includes its own environment. On the contrary, according 
to 'Lotka's principle' of natural selection, life not only 
conforms to the entropy law but also accelerates its operation. 
This is because those 'life forms that give rise to a more 
extensive degrading of energy have a selective advantage over 
others and will outstrip their' competitors. Thus the human 
advantage over other life forms devolves from the human activity 
of sorting and directing low entropy, for the joint purpose of 
maintaining 'endosomatic' human instruments (mankind's 
biological constitution), and exosomatic human instruments 
(extra-human extensions), which allow mankind to capture energy 
and degrade it more rapidly and effectively. 
Whereas Malthus used his theory to predict population would 
increase to take up the available food supply, Ceorgescu-Roegen 
uses his to point out the opportunity cost to potential future 
generations, from the rapid consumption of terrestial energy and 
materials. 'If we stampede over details, we can say that every 
baby born now means one human life less in the future. But also 
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every cadillac produced at any time means fewer lives in the 
future ... Population pressure and technological progress bring, 
ceteris paribus, the career of the human species nearer to its 
end only because both factors cause a speedier decumulation of 
its dowry. '43 
Whilst Georgescu-Roegen is clearly concerned, as was 
Malthus, with the relationship between natural resources and 
human welfare, it is perhaps the problem of waste, to which 
Malthus did not refer, which the entropic nature of the economic 
process highlights to greater effect. To see the standard 
economic process as embedded in the entropic process facilitates 
the distinguishing of the end product of the one as opposed to 
the other. The end product of the economic process is the 
maintenance and enjoyment of life, whereas the end product of 
the entropic/economic process is physical waste. Waste is an 
automatic, inevitable and pervasive result of the physical 
entropic process, and the accelerated production of waste and 
the production of waste in particular forms, is an inevitable 
and pervasive result of the economic process. 
Taking Georgescu-Roegen's very long-run view, the 
exhaustion of environmental resources is as inevitable as the 
long-run depletion of available terrestial energy and 
materials. Because the waste assimilative capacity of 
environmental resources is limited, and the exhaustion of 
environmental resources is directly linked to the use of 
materials and energy. The finitude of space, he says, renders 
very dangerous wastes which persist and thus require isolating 
for a very long time, such as highly dangerous radio-active 
waste, and wastes which are completely irreducible such as 
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thermal pollution, particularly problematic. More specifically, 
'since "The Entropy Law" allows no way to cool a continuously 
heated planet, thermal pollution could prove to be a more 
crucial obstacle to growth than the finiteness of accessible 
resources '. 44 
As a respected mathematical economist, Georgescu-Roegen 
acknowledges the place for mathematics in economics, but he also 
emphasizes its limitations. Rather, he argues the scope of 
economics should be widened, endorsing Marshall's definition of 
the discipline 'the study of mankind in the ordinary business of 
life'. 45 The scope of the subject should be widened because, 
says Georgescu-Roegen, seen in its evolutionary aspect economic 
life 'consists of a continuous struggle, which comes not so much 
between one individual and another but as between man and 
nature. The struggle between individuals is only the result of 
the other struggle'. 46 Thus, he claims, economists may improve 
and broaden their understanding of the economic process by 
taking a less narrow view of the discipline boundaries, and 
effectively setting the Entropy Law at the disciplines centre. 
When the economic process is viewed as part of the physical 
entropic process it cannot be properly analyzed within a 
theoretical framework which assumes only mechanical change which 
is completely reversible. Instead, some kind of organic 
analogue is required. Furthermore, the way is clear for 
economists to make such a move because already natural 
scientists have led the way. The comprising of the mechanistic 
dogma of Classical physics, triggered by the entropy law means, 
says Georgescu-Roegen, there is no longer a solid base for 
arguing scientific economics should develop in anology to 
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classical, mechanistic physics. 'Classical mechanics accustomed 
us to the power of science to determine 'exactly' where and when 
a definite event will take place. Later, quantum phenomena 
taught us to be content with the weaker position in which 
scientific laws determine merely the probability of an 
occurrence. But the Entropy Law ... determines neither when (by 
clock time) the entropy of a closed system will reach a certain 
level nor exactly what will happen ... though it does determine 
the general direction of the entropic process of any isolated 
system'. 47 
In a similar fashion contends Georges cu-Roegen, Entropy 
economics indicates the general long-term direction as far as 
exhaustion of accessible natural and environmental resources are 
concerned, but not when limits will be reached. Technology may 
increase availablity in the nearer term and thus hasten eventual 
depletion, or mankind may slow depletion. Also entropy 
economics, which emphasizes 'process', must acknowledge the 
emergence of novel situations as the entropic/economic process 
takes place. Thus, Georgescu-Roegen writes, 'in a domain where 
prediction is impossible it is foolhardy to believe that there 
are means by which man can achieve some chosen ends and only 
these' ... 'We ... are becoming increasingly aware of the fact 
that the problem of the ecological balance, even if limited to 
that between man and micro-organisms, is so complex that no 
human mind can comprehend it. Any cure of an infectious disease 
vacates an ecological niche for other micro-organisms, which may 
turn out to be much more dangerous than the dislocated one'. 
48 
We can see that, in general, Georgescu-Roegen defends 
broadening the scope of economics by suggesting that a narrower 
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perspective ignores physical realities. And the reason why it 
is so important not to ignore them is because, according to his 
theory, the essential elements of the physical aspects of the 
economic system are ultimate finiteness and nearer term 
unpredicitability. How then does he justify this view of the 
entropic/economic system? He does so essentially by suggesting 
that the assumptions on which his theory is based are 
'elementarily obvious'. Much of the defence of this position is 
outlined implicitly and explicitly in Chapter XI of The Entropy 
Law and the Economic Process. Some of the points he makes are 
as follows: To those who would accuse him of using an 
unscientific methodology he retorts that 'contrary to what 
Pareto and numberless others preached, there is not only one 
method by which to know the truth'. He defends unempirical 
scientific endeavour by remarking that 'science emerged from 
undirected observation', and the use of non-mathematical theory 
by pointing out that classical economists discovered the 
significant features of the capitalist economy before the 
abstract analytical concepts which we now associate with 
economics. And, whilst Georgescu-Roegen acknowledges that 
Mathematics can aid understanding in economics, he also denies 
that 'mathematics is language' as Samuelson claimed. 
49 Even in 
standard economics mathematical models do not represent a 
blueprint of how the economy actually functions. They are not 
'operational' representations of how the economy works but only, 
in Georgescu-Roegen's words 'analytical similes'. Moreover, if 
the future is not only unknown, but unknowable, no analytical 
device can purport to describe the course of future action. 
In all then, whilst accepting the unempirical nature of his 
theory Georgescu-Roegen denies that it is thereby unscientific. 
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Instead he declares those scientists are anti-scientific who 
'interfere with the life processes without caring an iota about 
the unforeseen incalculable consequences of their actions' and 
'as long as the validity of the objections, such as those 
formulated in this section is elementarily obvious they cannot 
be set aside with the remark that a layman does not know all the 
technical details. No technical details can do away with 
fundamental obstacles of a lasting nature'. 50 
Georgescu-Roegen has called his economic analysis based 
around the Entropy Law Bioeconomics. 51 The term is intended, he 
says, to make us bear in mind continuously the biological origin 
of the economic process and thus spotlight the problem of 
mankind's existence with a limited store of accessible 
resources, unevenly located and unequally appropriated. lie 
acknowledges his economics does not 'aid us in managing a given 
economy better. What it does is in my opinion much more 
important. By improving and broadening our understanding of the 
economic process it may teach to anyone willing to listen what 
aims are better for the economy of mankind'. 52 
It is clear that Georgescu-Roegen's paradigm contains the 
salient elements of the general ecological 'worldview'. It 
emphasizes the finiteness of the human environment, that human 
beings are not exempt from the ecological principles which 
govern all forms of life, that the intricateness of the 
ecological balance and especially the novelty associated with 
the evolutionary process, of which the economic process is a 
part, means mankind cannnot be all-knowing. Thus human 
mechanisms will not necessarily operate to ensure human 
populations will adapt successfully to their biophysical 
environment; instead humans may fail to adapt to changing 
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environmental conditions, including changes brought about by 
human impact. 
But Georgescu-Roegen's orientation also differs from that 
of the ecocentric conservationists in several respects. The 
most obvious differences are that he perceives the earth's 
physical and environmental resources as being available for 
human use, and they should be so used. He is principally 
concerned for the welfare of future human generations rather 
than for life forms in general, and he is concerned for their 
material welfare and not primarily with spiritual aspects of 
their human lives. 
Kenneth Boulding's Neo-Malthusian Theory, though not 
identical, has many similarities to Ceorgescu-Roegen's 
Bioeconomics. Like Georgescu-Roegen, Boulding sees his own 
Evolutionary Economics53 as itself evolving from a line of 
thought implicit in classical economics, especially in Malthus's 
work. He, like Georgescu-Roegen, also makes use of later 
developments in thermodynamics and biology. Thus Boulding's 
model is explicitly evolutionary and entropic whereas these 
aspects were only implicit in Malthus' classical system. 
In Boulding's conceptual 'spaceship earthi54, he suggested 
that materials' residuals from production and consumption 
activities must always and increasingly be with us, because the 
earth is, like a spaceship, a closed system with respect to 
materials. At the same time he says 'there is, fortunately, no 
law of increasing material entropy, as there is in the 
corresponding case of energy, as it is quite possible to 
concentrate diffused materials if energy inputs are allowed'. 
55 
This represents a" point of departure with Georgescu-Roegen's 
ideas, in that Boulding is more optimistic about the physical 
possibility of recycling essential materials. 
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Boulding accepts anti-entropic processes, which take 
diffuse materials and concentrate them, require inputs not only 
of energy but also of information. But 'the Law of Evolution' 
is evidence 'that information or knowledge does not obey the law 
of conservation'. 56 The possibilities of expanding knowledge 
from biological and social evolution (that is, the evolution of 
human artifacts) means, he claims, we cannot simply think of the 
future in terms of entropy - in terms of the exhaustion of 
existing potential. 'We have to think of it also in terms of 
recreation of potential, that is, evolution'. He goes on to 
remark that whilst it is quite possible the required human 
knowledge and hence resources may not be available far into the 
future he is nevertheless 'something of a long-run optimist 
about the future of the human race, mainly because of its 
enormous and still largely unused, cognitive capacity. Because 
of this, the entropic processes of using up potential can be 
used to create further potential'. 57 
Looking at economics from an evolutionary point of view, 
Boulding sees the traditional categorization of the factors of 
production under the headings of land, labour and capital as 
unsatisfactory. It is more accurate, he says, to identify the 
factors of production as know-how, energy and materials, because 
all processes of production involve the direction of energy by 
some knowledge structure towards the selection, transportation 
and transformation of materials into the product. 
Economic Development, he then perceives, as primarily a 
process in the increase of human know-how with materials and 
energy as limiting factors. The increase in know-how has 
continually pushed back the boundaries at which these limiting 
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factors come into play, and the future will depend to a large 
extent on whether an increase in know-how can continue to push 
back these limits. However, environmental pollution and the 
'possibility that production may exhaust stocks of materials and 
energy 'within the next 100 or 200 years' means that space and 
time are also limiting factors with which human ingenuity must 
cope'. Thus Boulding has characterized the present period as 
the moment in the history of the planet when exhaustible natural 
resources have to be turned into enough knowledge to enable us 
to do without them. 58 
Boulding's optimism about the physical possibility of 
recycling materials and more importantly his optimism that the 
evolutionary process will produce growth in human knowledge, 
leads him to visualize the attainment of a sustainable 
stationary state. The stationary state would represent the 
coming to terms by the human race with Boulding's 'spaceship 
economy', and it would be sustained for the most part by 
increasing inputs of information. He envisages a global economy 
in the long run 'in which all materials must be recycled and in 
which ultimately the sun is the only source of energy. The 
development of fusion power, of course, might postpone this 
condition for a very long time, but we are by no means sure of 
this, and even the development of fusion power would not exempt 
us from the necessity of using energy in ever increasing 
proportions for the recycling of materials as easily available 
concentrated resources are used up, and as the progressive 
accumulation of waste products becomes an increasingly serious 
problem. It would not exempt us either from the necessity of 
dealing with waste heat'. 59 
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Boulding contrasts his 'spaceman economy' which recognizes 
terrestrial energy, materials and environmental resource limits 
with the current 'cowboy economy' which envisages infinite 
reservoirs from which materials can be obtained and into which 
waste can be deposited. A major difference between the two 
types of economy is that, whereas in the cowboy economy 
increasing production and consumption are regarded favourably, 
in a 'spaceman economy' throughput would be minimized rather 
than maximized. 'The measure of success would be the extent, 
quality and complexity of the total capital stock including in 
this the state of the human bodies and minds included in the 
system'. 60 
Boulding accepts the charge that his evolutionary economics 
contributes little to the understanding and solving of more 
immediate environmental problems, such as atmospheric 
pollution. There standard economics, he says, has a role to 
play in determining causes and offering solutions relating to 
the nearer term. The problems highlighted by evolutionary 
economics, he argues, are longer term but also of a larger scale 
and perhaps much harder to solve than the more practical and 
immediate ones. Interest in long-term and nearer-term 
environmental problems may also be complementary. 'Unless we at 
least make a beginning on a process for solving the immediate 
problems we will not have much chance of solving the larger 
ones. On the other hand, it may also be true that a long-run 
vision, as it were, of the deep crisis which faces mankind may 
predispose people to taking more interest in the immediate 
problems and to devote more effort for their solution'. 
61 
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Another feature of evolutionary theory is that it does not 
have very much predictive power. This, Goulding points out, is 
inherent in the nature of the process itself and is not simply a 
remediable defect of human knowledge, since prediction is 
possible only in systems that have stable parameters. 
Evolutionary systems are dynamic disequilibrium systems, where 
unstable parameters and predictions themselves are part of the 
parameters of the system. We cannot predict the future without 
changing it. 'What power of prediction we have in evolutionary 
systems depends on the probability that at least some parameters 
will not change. The further we look into the future, however, 
the more the parameters will change and ordinarily, the greater 
the uncertainty'. 62 
A- related 'weakness' of the evolutionary model of the 
economic system which Boulding discusses is that 'it resists 
simple mathematization, partly one suspects because the 
mathematics for it has not been written'. 63 Newton's numerical 
mathematics which has dominated economics, is simply unsuitable 
to the relations of evolutionary systems, but that does not 
mean, he says, evolutionary economics will not be criticized 
because it does not fit the language of mathematics. 'The 
numerologists who are obsessed with quantification often far 
beyond the point where it is meaningful, will find evolutionary 
theory vague and 'literary', for this may reflect the present 
state of its mathematical development'. 64 
In the introduction to Evolutionary Economics, Boulding 
discusses the justification of theories. He points out belief 
in a particular image of the world may come merely from those in 
authority telling us it is true. Alternatively it may arise 
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from empirical evidence which confirms the image or fails to 
contradict it. Evidence by experiment he accepts is 
particularly important in science, but is only applicable to 
systems which are stable, repeatable and divisible. How then 
does Boulding justify his evolutionary perspective which is none 
of these and for which, he acknowledges, empirical evidence in 
its support is 'extremely meagre and biased'. 65 
The answer is that, like Georgescu-Roegen, he relies on his 
assumptions being truisms or near-truisms. An empirical truism 
he defines as a proposition which, if it were not true, would 
lead to absurdity. The Conservation laws, he says, are a good 
case in point, and the entropy principle has the quality of 
being a near-truism. The principle of ecological interaction, 
which Boulding describes as the foundation of the evolutionary 
perspective, he claims, is in structure very close to being a 
truism as is the notion of ecological balance since 'if it were 
not so for any species, its population would expand forever 
until it filled a continually expanding universe'. 66 
Boulding acknowledges others before him have tried and 
failed to incorporate an evolutionary perspective into 
mainstream economics, and that Alfred Marshall in particular 
regarded his equilibrium mechanical models of supply and demand 
as stepping stones towards a dynamic evolutionary theory, which 
never actually materialized. 67 Now, with developments in 
evolutionary models in other sciences, especially in biological 
sciences, Boulding believes it is time for economists to make a 
new attempt. Mechanical economic models would remain useful for 
periods when parameters are fairly stable and can aid 
understanding of the larger and more complex evolutionary 
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system. But Evolutionary Economics 'is a mutation which would 
strengthen the whole ecosystem of economic thought and make it 
richer and more varied'. 68 The strength it would bring to 
economic thought according to Boulding is in providing a 
framework for considering problems with a long time horizon. 
In the introduction of Volume I of his collected papers 
(1971) Boulding refers to himself 'as a voice crying in the 
wilderness to which nobody has paid much attention'. And, 
because his papers have apparently not influenced to any great 
extent his mainstream. colleagues he refers to his as 'in a sense 
arecord of failure'69. If in this sense Boulding has failed, 
then so too has Georgescu-Roegen. They have both been prominent 
amongst the economists who have argued, so far not very 
successfully, for the use of theories about the physical 
environment to be incorporated in, and thus improve, standard 
economic theory. Serious attempts to incorporate such 
environmental variables into economics -require on the part of 
economists a learning investment in the natural sciences. Such 
a change would also simultaneously widen the scope of the 
discipline and inevitably alter accepted methods and 
methodology. 
But, if the philosophy of science literature has a message 
it is that such a major change in outlook is likely to be 
exceedingly difficult to achieve, and therefore Boulding may 
well have been expecting too much from his own efforts. The 
growth -of knowledge theories imply economists, like other 
scientists, are likely to be unconscious of their own paradigm 
until their theories fail repeatedly to accommodate empirical 
anomalies, or seem not to be able to address what are perceived 
by the scientific community as the most urgent problems. 
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Moreover, the narrowly delineated paradigm of mainstream 
economics is embedded in the largely unconscious 'way of 
seeing', or worldview, of the whole society and epoch. Each 
scientific community and each society is rooted in some 
fundamental beliefs and assumptions which are acted upon as if 
they were true, until something fundamental occurs which calls 
for rethinking, and possibly the adoption of a new paradigm. 
An essential part of the ecological critique of the 
prevailing social paradigm is that it is centred too much in a 
belief that solutions to problems lie in the promotion of exact, 
specialized sciences. It is natural then that those few 
economists who have come to embrace, in some form, this new 
ecological worldview 'see' human societies, and their own 
discipline within it, differently from their fellow mainstream 
economists. Inevitably, they will argue the need for a more 
holistic science to answer the large long-term problems and 
questions they raise about the relationship between mankind and 
the physical environment. At the same time it is probably 
always going to be difficult to convey the nature of a new 
paradigm in a convincing way, especially to non-adherents, since 
new paradigms emerge in a partial fashion not as complete 
detailed descriptions of the alternative perspective they are 
offering. And it may be unrealistic to expect any large-scale 
radical re-thinking to occur within mainstream economics unless 
the sciences in general and the societies in which they are 
embedded adopt a different perspective. 
The introduction of thermodynamic principles into economics 
does not have to imply a radically new approach. Ayres and 
Kneese's70 concept of materials' balance is closely related to 
Boulding's idea of 'spaceship earth'. It is based on the First 
- 142 - 
Law of Thermodynamics, the Law of Conservation of Matter and 
Energy, which suggests that residuals will be equal, in mass, to 
the' total amount of terrestial fuels and materials entering the 
economy. They use their model to highlight the social problem 
of pollution given that it will be pervasive, associated with 
most economic activities, and growing if the economy is 
growing. But whereas Georgescu-Roegen and Boulding sought to 
use thermodynamics laws and other theories from the natural 
sciences to improve economic theory, Ayres and Kneese use 
standard economics to understand and improve the environment. 
An' investigation of the mainstream economic paradigm and 
how standard economics is used to analyze natural resource and 
environmental problems is conducted in succeeding chapters. In 
the next section of this chapter we consider the primary issues 
which environmentalists see as arising as a consequence of their 
analysis and the 'solutions they suggest to the problems they 
pose. 
5.4 ULTIMATE ENDS WITH LIMITED MEANS 
The choice of a theoretical system to explain the working of 
economic processes depends to a large extent upon the questions 
considered most important to answer. Since Neo-Malthusian 
scientists are primarily concerned with long-run and global 
resource issues their theoretical system is naturally 
constructed accordingly. To the factual questions they pose, 
namely, are the physical resources on which mankind depends 
finite and if so, do we know their limits, Neo-Malthusians will 
answer yes in general they are limited, but no we do not and 
cannot know precisely how scarce. 
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Policy judgements are non-basic in that they depend on the 
facts and will change if the facts change. But they also depend 
on basic judgements. Neo-Malthusians accept as a fact that 
ultimate means are limited. That both the availability of 
resources and the capacity of the environment to cope with a 
growing throughput of matter and energy are limited. However, 
they also ask the basic value question - what should be our 
ultimate ends? Their idea of economics conforms with the 
textbook definition -a study of the allocation of scarce means 
among competing ends where the objective of the allocation is to 
maximize the attainment of the ends - but their focus is wider 
than standard economics. Not only in terms of the means, as 
discussed in detail in the previous section, but also in terms 
of the ends of the economic system. Concern is not with 
individual means and ends, or even with the means and ends of 
one nation or one generation, it is rather with the means and 
ends of human existence. The problem with conventional 
economics says Daly, 'is that it focuses only on the middle of 
the ends-means spectrum where limits are not apparent. If we 
expand our vision to the whole ends-means spectrum and include 
ultimate means and ultimate ends as well, limits become 
visible'. 72 
What should we use our limited resources for? Just as 
Neo-malthusians are united in their identification and belief in 
limited means so they tend to be united in their ideas about 
ultimate ends. They are succinctly summarized in a short 
article drafted by Nicholas Georges cu-Roegen, aided by Kenneth 
Boulding and Herman Daly and signed by more than 200 economists, 
'we must have an economics of survival, still more, of hope - 
theory and vision of global economy based on justice, which 
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would make possible the equitable distribution of the earth's 
wealth amongst its people, present and future. ... we call on 
economists to join in framing the new vision that will enable 
man to use his wealth in his own interests, disagreeing, 
perhaps, on details of method and policy, but agreeing 
emphatically on the goals of survival and justice'. 73 
Daly argues for agreement on the prolongation of human 
survival as an ultimate end of human existence as follows. 
'Only a kind of minimum answer to such a maximum question would 
be likely to command consensus. As a minimum answer, let me 
suggest that whatever the ultimate end is, it' presupposes a 
respect for, and the survival of, the evolutionary process 
through which God has bestowed upon us the gift of 
self-conscious life. Whatever human values are put in first 
place, their further realization requires the survival of human 
beings. It may be a noble thing to sacrifice the remaining 
years of one's own personal life to a higher cause, but to 
sacrifice the whole evolutionary process to some 'higher cause' 
is surely fanaticism. '74 
Boulding, more circumspectly, considers it is always a 
little hard to find a convincing answer to the man who says 
'what has posterity ever done for me? '. The only answer, he 
says, 'is to point out that the welfare of the individual 
depends on the extent to which he can identify himself with 
others, and that the most satisfactory individual identity is 
that which identifies not only with a community in space but 
also with a community extending over time from the past into the 
future. If this kind of identity is recognized as desirable, 
then posterity has a voice, even if it does not have a vote. ' 
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He goes on to say, however, that even if we identify with future 
generations, what constitutes 'justice' remains a matter of 
controversy. 'We can argue, of course, that the ethical thing 
is not to discount the future at all, that time-discounting is 
mainly the result of myopia and perspective, and hence is an 
illusion which the moral man should not tolerate. It is a very 
popular illusion, however, and one that must certainly be taken 
into consideration in the formulation of policies. 05 
Whilst arguing for an economics of survival and inter- 
generational equity, on the basis of re-educating ourselves so 
as to feel some sympathy for our future fellow humans, 
Georgescu-Roegen seems less than fully convinced that something 
like a global consensus on such ultimate ends will emerge. 'One 
thought', he says, 'has persisted in my mind ever since I became 
interested in the entropic nature of the economic process. Will 
mankind listen to any program that implies a constriction of its 
addiction to exosomatic comfort? Perhaps, the destiny of man is 
to have a short, but fiery, exciting and extravagant life rather 
than a long, uneventful and vegetative existence. '76 
Much earlier Jevons posed a similar Malthusian conundrum 
and inclined to favour the route of short-lived extravagence 
that Georgescu-Roegen and other conservationists reject. In The 
Coal Question Devons considered not the use of all global 
resources for all of time, but the dependence of one country 
upon a particular resource at a particular time. The source of 
British Industrial supremacy said Jevons was the use of large 
amounts of coal. It was a supremacy that could not last because 
British coal was becoming more difficult to mine, as the coal 
mines went deeper the economy would slow down. Thus he 
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envisaged a stark choice for Britain. 'If we lavishly and 
boldly push forwards in the creation of our riches both material 
and intellectual, it is hard to over-estimate the pitch of 
beneficial influence to which we may attain in the present. But 
the maintenance of such a position is physically impossible. We 
have to make the momentus choice between brief but true 
greatness and longer continued mediocrity. ' » 
That some people may accept Daly's 'impossibility theorem' 
yet still choose different ultimate ends for national or global 
societies only serves to accentuate what we said earlier 
concerning the definition of Neo-Malthusian conservationists. 
The latter accept 'as a fact' global natural resource scarcity. 
But they also agree that recognition of absolute limits compels 
the moral imperative, by current generations, to use the limited 
resources in such a 
. 
way as to give priority to the material 
welfare of far distant generations and to promote the long-run 
survival of the human race. 
The linking of a particular view about how the world is 
with a particular view of how the world should be in order to 
justify policy proposals is not of course unique to 
Neo-Malthusian economics. Within standard economics normative 
economists similarly strive to delineate a few value judgements 
likely to command consensus which can form the basis, not of 
value-free, but value-agreed normative economics. And this view 
within traditional economics of what economic aims should be, 
when linked with economic knowledge of how the world is, helps 
guide economists' policy proposals. 
To accompany Neo-Malthusian global and very long-run 
economics the consensus on ultimate ends too must be necessarily 
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wide-ranging. Conversely wider-ranging ends requires a 
consistent wide-ranging model of how the world 'is'. Viewed 
within this context, as a striving towards the articulation of 
an acceptable global moral consensus it seems plausible to 
present prolonging the existence of the human species as an 
ethical principle on which most individuals and nations could 
agree. Inter-generational 'justice' might also reasonably be 
added to such an agenda, though the difficulty of agreeing on 
what constitutes such justice is likely to make agreement on 
this aspect much less meaningful. 
Within the conservation movement itself the continuation of 
the human race is an aim which unites ecocentric and homocentric 
conservationists in common cause. But the extent to which 
future human material welfare should take precedence over other 
human values and over the welfare of other species divides them. 
How and by what means should the global use of resources be 
constrained so as to promote the homocentric conservationists 
desired ends? On these questions there is less agreement 
amongst them. 
5.5 POLICIES FOR SURVIVAL AND EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION BETWEEN 
GENERATIONS 
One notable difference between earlier conservationists and the 
conservationists of the 1960s and 1970s is that the latter paid 
much more attention to the population side of the Malthusian 
equation. 
The question as to whether mankind needed to, and could, 
voluntarily limit its numbers and in that way maintain a 
standard of living above subsistence level for the majority, 
formed part of the debate between Malthus and his critics. For 
the most part his contemporary critics considered population was 
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not a problem. What was required in order to herald an era of 
widespread prosperity was the application of improvements 
resulting from the Industrial Revolution. Malthus disagreed, he 
considered overpopulation to be a serious current problem and 
placed little faith in the ability of mankind to practise 
effective population control. Other classical economists were 
not so pessimistic, and John Stuart Mill, for instance, was a 
prominent supporter of population limitation by means of 
education and state regulation. 79 
For the most part the early American conservationists paid 
little heed to the question of population. The lack of 
attention was related to their professional interests which lay 
mainly in the 'wise use' of resources, the need for which might 
be viewed as less pressing if population was constrained. Also 
certain resource scarcities were seen as endangering continuing 
prosperity rather than as threatening starvation. 80 
Of the new conservationists who indicated the growth of 
population as the main cause of natural resource depletion and 
pollution, Paul R Ehrlich and Garrett Hardin are probably the 
best known. Paul Ehrlich, a professor of biology, published his 
popular book The Population Bomb in 1968, and with Anne Ehrlich, 
an expanded version in 1970.81 Garrett Hardin, also a biologist 
by profession, published a succinct statement of his position in 
1968 in the essay 'The Tragedy of the Commons', whilst a 
wider-ranging commentary appeared in 1972.82 
Like Malthus, Ehrlich did not consider the 
population-resources equation could be balanced by increased 
resource productivity, because the root problem he considered 
was the exponential growth of world population. Eventually by 
wars, famines or some sort of ecological catastrophe the number 
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of people would be halted, unless the human race had the wisdom 
to halt its own growth promptly and effectively. 
Ehrlich was not optimistic about such a possibility. The 
ideal solution would be to persuade people to limit voluntarily 
the size of their families. At the other end of the spectrum 
lay the prospect of 'world government' to wield power over human 
numbers. His most coersive suggestion was to make all girls 
reversibly sterile at puberty and thereafter obtain a fertility 
licence to have a child. 83 
The urgency of the global population problem was felt most 
by the Ehrlichs when they were in India. 
84 But they also argued 
for immediate adoption of zero population growth in the United 
States and other comparatively uncrowded countries. Their 
justification for doing so was partly that per capita 
consumption in America and other industrialized countries was 
high and thus represented a correspondingly severe strain upon 
the environment and exhaustible global resources. But also 
fertility control in such countries could serve as an example 
for the rest of the world and possibly justify putting pressure 
on other Nations to follow suite. 
The basic message of the Ehrlichs was that without 
effective global birth control the 'population bomb' would 
inevitably result in widespread hardship and death. A major 
'die-back' may be delayed, say by the 'green revolutioni85, 
which discovered and transferred around the world high-yielding 
varieties of grain, but it could not be avoided. Even if their 
prognosis was mistaken said Ehrlich, we would still gain from 
cutting the birth rate, because the quality of human life would 
have been improved. 
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Garrett Hardin was the other principal advocate of zero 
population growth. Faced with the global 'ecological crisis', 
which he together with other conservationists identified as the 
result of an inevitable clash between finite resources and 
growing populations, Hardin offered a trade-off. If world 
population could be controlled all other restraints on 
individual freedom could be avoided. It would not be sufficient 
however, to rely on'voluntary population controls to bring about 
the needed reduction in world population and keep it down. 
The dynamics of the situation, intimated Hardin, was like 
the use of a common in an old English village. The common could 
only support say, a hundred cattle in the long run, but the 
villagers were free to graze as many cattle as they liked. The 
ethical problem was that those who conscientiously keep their 
own herds low would find their cattle increasingly less well fed 
as conscienceless individuals took advantage of the situation 
and increased the size of their herds. Eventually the long-term 
carrying capacity would be exceeded and the system would 
collapse. The self-imposed costs of the individuals who were 
concerned for the common good would have accomplished nothing. 
So it would be in the context of the global population problem. 
Appealing to the public spirited to reduce their birth rate 
voluntaritly would not be sufficient. 
The only effective answer to the problem of . populaton 
growth therefore, says Hardin, is to remove from individuals the 
unlimited right to have children. The history of democracy he 
argued has been in extending the bounds of 'mutual coersion, 
mutually agreed upon', and in the circumstances there is no 
rational choice except the rigid control of family size by 
- 152 - 
governments. Such a programme, Hardin considered, would 
substitute a just coersion for the unjust moral coersion exerted 
on conscientious individuals to reduce their families 
voluntarily, in a situation where other people were free to 
render such behaviour futile. 
Hardin's next step might have been to suggest some kind of 
world government to police population control. Instead he 
considers solutions to problems should be on the most local 
scale possible, partly because there is as yet no globally 
responsible power and partly because where a problem requires a 
global solution, for example global atmospheric pollution, the 
political impediments to the application of knowledge to solve 
the problem are so large. 86 
Thus in Hardin's view population control should be the 
responsibility of nations. If the ultimate responsibility for 
supporting children now devolved upon the natural community at 
large it is reasonable, he argues, for individuals to be 
divested of the power to reproduce at will. But equally, 
population 'will remain uncontrolled if the uncontrolled growth 
of some nations is perpetually financed by others. ... we 
should return to the assumption that nations are responsible for 
their own survival'. 87 
In the typical Malthusian tradition Garrett Hardin is 
primarily concerned with the long-run implications of current 
actions, and from the ecologist's perspective distills the 
message that 'we can never do merely one thing' . 
88 Thus he says 
of foreign aid, that it may temporarily alleviate the current 
suffering of the poor but may cause permanent damage to the 
ecosphere by expanding a regional or global population beyond 
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its carrying capacity, thereby unintentionally augmenting total 
human misery. As far as foreign intervention is concerned the 
basic concept to bear in mind is not world hunger but rather 
regional carrying capacity, hence Hardin's advocacy of the 
motto, primum non nocere (first of all, do no harm). 
89 
Later Ehrlich9G broadened his analysis to include affluence 
in the industrialized nations, as well as population growth, as 
an important factor in the rapid depletion of natural resources 
and environmental resources. Again, the idea that people should 
cut back on the consumption of resources either by reducing 
demand or by restricting supply was something of an innovation 
compared with the preoccupations of most of the early 
conservationists, who were much more concerned to ensure 
increasing supplies of natural resources by 'wise use' so as not 
to impede material progress. 
Some early contributors did question to what extent true 
progress necessitated profligate use of resources. The 
economist, Lewis Gray, when considering the proper balance 
between use and conservation of resources stated that 
'utilization must not be so restricted as either to impair the 
treasured result of past progress or to handicap seriously the 
rate of progress-in the future'. But then went on to say that 
'maximum production does not necessarily mean progress is. A 
vast amount of consumption is neither based on welfare, nor on 
enjoyment, it is soley dictated by convention. The enormous 
waste of coal required for the electrical advertizing 
in our 
great cities is illustrative of this exploitative 
consumption. '91 
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Several later conservationists besides Ehrlich, including 
for example, Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen and Herman Daly92, faced 
with what they perceive as absolute biophysical shortages, have 
raised the same question mark as Cray, over the idea that all 
wants are equally justifiable. The answer to the ethical 
problem of deciding between present luxuries and future vital 
needs, Daly considers, lies in the concept of sufficiency. The 
principle driving the allocation of resources he says, should be 
'sufficient per capita product for the greatest number over 
time. Unfortunately, the rule of right action in the growth 
economy seems to be the greatest per capita product for the 
greatest number now. 93 
Daly accepts that sufficiency is not definable in strictly 
objective terms, that its definition requires a moral consensus 
about what is meant by a good life. But he argues that unless 
economics comes to incorporate some definition of sufficiency, 
instead of holding that it is definable only be each individual 
for him or herself alone, it makes no sense to concern ourselves 
much with economics. 'Why strain out gnats of marginal 
inefficiency in the allocation of means to serve ends, while 
swallowing camels of total incoherence in the ordering of those 
ends? Indeed, if our ends are perversely ordered, then it 
is 
better for us to be inefficient in allocating means to their 
service. '94 
Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen also argues that traditional 
economics cannot ensure that each current generation takes into 
account the needs of future generations, who cannot be present 
to bid for their share of available matter and energy. He 
writes, 'I hope that economists will ultimately come to see that 
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the problem of natural resources is mainly an ecological one and 
that economics, as practised now, cannot substitute for 
bioeconomics. Numberless economists - Milton Friedman, for one 
- believe in a strange alchemy by which the price mechanism 
could create energy and matter. The price mechanism cannot 
prevent bioeconomic catastrophes from happening. Nor can it 
help the distribution of natural resources in a fairly 
satisfactory way among successive generations, nor even among 
contemporaneous ones '. 95 
The task of what he calls Bioeconomics then Georgescu- 
Roegen defines as being to set up a logical framework and a 
workable system for implementing the new commandment 'Thou shalt 
love thy species as thyself'. He makes no prediction as to how 
the new scientific programme will develop, except to say that 
two principles of standard economics must be abandoned and 
replaced by opposite principles. These are the principle of 
discounting the future as proposed by Hotelling in his study of 
the economics of resources, and the principle of maximizing 
utility which should be replaced, says Georgescu- Roegen, by the 
policy towards natural resources use in relation to future 
generations, of minimizing regrets. 96 
Not all environmentalists considered that cutting back, in 
terms of population or consumption or both, was a necessary 
response to ecological constraints. Barry Commoner in 
particular carried on a public dispute with Ehrlich on this 
point. 97 He was perhaps the most notable of the new 
conservationists who in effect updated the idea of 'wise use' to 
incorporate environmental resources. Commoner was less 
concerned about the availability of natural resources than 
Erhlich since he considered substitution and technological 
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change had greatly expanded available supplies and could 
continue to do so. But in contrast he considered the limit on 
the waste absorption capacity of the biosphere was now becoming 
dangerously apparent. 
Ehrlich proposed that pollution levels are a product of 
population, affluence (goods per capita) and polluting 
technologies, but that of these population and then affluence 
were the most important factors. Commoner disagreed. His 
interpretation of the statistics was that 'most of the sharp 
increases in pollution levels is due not so much to population 
or affluence as to changes in productive technology'. 98 
If the flaw in the industrialized economies is 
technological then the fundamental remedy according to Commoner 
is to discover or resuscitate benign technologies which place 
less strain upon the environment. The transition would be 
costly in terms of society's resources, 'most of the nations 
resources for capital investment would need to be engaged in the 
task of ecological reconstruction for at least a generation. '99 
But such a transition Commoner envisages would enable a 
resolution of the ecological crisis, not through restrictions on 
consumption, nor through coercive population controls, but 
primarily by delivering similar goods by different less 
polluting processes. 
. 
Thus Commoner remains within the framework of progressive 
utilitarianism which dominated the earlier conservationist era. 
And predictably his answer to the problem of world population 
growth is to promote a demographic transition in under-developed 
countries similar to that seen in the industrialized countries, 
by increasing their standard of living and making modern 
contraceptive methods available for voluntary use. 
100 
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An important feature of Commoner's analysis, however, is 
its ecological perspective. Technological advance must take 
account of the intrinsically unpredictable nature of many 
environmental pollutants, his message being the same as that of 
most ecologists - that we are perturbing a system whose 
stability we do not understand and no one can be sure of the 
long-term prognosis. Market prices then are not in practice, 
but probably cannot even in theory, ever be adjusted to account 
fully for environmental damage. The answer is consciously to 
choose benign 'soft' technologies, rather than hope to control 
the worst effects of those 'hard' technologies which are known 
to be associated with dangerous pollutants. 
Placed in the context of other solutions we can see too 
that Talbot Page's101 answer to achieving 'permanent 
livability', is, like Commoner's, less radical, less coersive 
and has a less pessimistic stance than many. Whilst Commoner 
was mostly concerned with environmental quality and Talbot Page 
with conserving supplies of the more traditional natural 
resources, they were united in the idea that appropriate 
technological solutions could continue to make supplies 
available, rather than` being concerned about restricting 
individually determined consumer wants or the populaton 
variable. 
At the same time, from the perspective of the new 
conservationists, Page can be challenged for presenting 
'the 
conservation criterion' uncompromisingly as the goal of keeping 
resources intact from generation to generation, by the 
application of 'technology or 'wise use'. Whilst 
conservationists do unite around the minimum requirement of 
'permanent livability' there is less of a consensus that to 
- 158 - 
achieve that aim each generation needs, or indeed can, be self- 
sufficient in the sense of not reducing resources for succeeding 
generations. 
Neglecting to consider the population variable is an 
obvious omission from Page's analysis from current conservation 
perspectives. And a phasing down of population could accompany 
a reduced availability of finite resources to maintain the 
species over a longer period of time without the need of a 
'sustainable' yield. But additionally the idea that 'technology 
renews the depletable resourcesi102, is no longer in line with 
much conservationist thinking, which tends now to emphasize the 
absolute limits of global resources and the irrevocable 
dissipation of their use potential. According to Nicholas 
Georgescu-Roegen technology often hastens resource depletion, 
and for Herman Daly it can at best help us to use resources more 
slowly and more efficiently in terms of the amount of service 
derived from them. Either way depletable resources can only be 
used up, either rapidly or slowly, and thus by definition there 
can be no 'sustainable'103 yield of virgin material. 
Page urges governments guided by his 'conservation 
criterion' to apply a severance tax to a selected group of vital 
virgin materials, so as to keep constant their real composite 
price index. This would, he contends, reduce profitability and 
raise consumer prices so as to slow production and consumption 
whilst stimulating the search for substitutes, the danger in 
market decisions being that depletion of finite resources is too 
fast to allow time for technology to find substitutes. 
Again this idea does not entirely capture the essence of 
the conservationists' message. Both Georgescu-Roegen104 and 
Daly105 recommend not severence taxes but quantitative quotas to 
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control the flow of resources. The reason being that taxes may 
be paid by consumers and producers who value the resource 
sufficiently, and thus represent a stretchable limit on 
throughput. By contrast, a quota establishes a clear physical 
throughput budget constraint, set to minimize regrets as far as 
succeeding generations are concerned, and conveying the idea 
that the current generation cannot have more of all resources if 
only they are willing to pay a high enough price. Resources in 
abundant supply and whose use is not environmentally disruptive 
would have generous quotas and hence relatively low prices. 
The message that emerges from several Neo-Malthusians and 
in particular from Daly's writing is that societies should 
strive to achieve not sustainable yield from resources but, as 
near as possible, a sustainable or steady-state economy. 
106 
With absolute physical resource limits and entropy progression 
even a steady-state economy would not last indefinitely, Daly 
acknowledges. But it could help to achieve both an equitable 
distribution of material welfare across generations and the 
prolongation of the life of the species. 
Such a steady-state economy, says Daly, requires three 
institutions. First, a 'distributist institution' to limit the 
range of intra-generational income inequality. Second, 
aggregate depletion of each of the basic minerals would be 
limited by depletion quotas, to be auctioned by the governments 
to many buyers. Resource buyers having purchased their quota 
rights then confront many resource sellers in a competitive 
resource market. Third, a population institution would have to 
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provide a mechanism of population control. Daly favours the 
transferrable birth licence scheme first proposed by Kenneth 
Boulding and which is also supported by other 
conservationists. 107 
5.5 CONCLUSIONS 
The more recent concerns of homocentric conservationists differ 
in several important respects from the earlier homocentric 
conservationists' preoccupations. Their perspective is global 
rather than national, the resource base is wider and includes 
environmental resources. There is greater emphasis on the 
intrinsic uncertainty that surrounds both the availability of 
resources and the effect on the ecosystem of resource production 
and consumption. The. ultimate goal of conservation is no longer 
the progressive material prosperity of one nation, but the 
survival of the species and equitable distribution of welfare 
between generations. Policies to achieve the goals of 
homocentric environmentalists too are more varied than the 'wise 
use' consensus of the early conservationists. 
The new environmentalist orientation means there appears to 
be less of a gulf between ecocentric and homocentric 
perspectives now, than there was between the early 
preservationists and conservationists. The ultimate goal of 
preserving the human species unites them even if the predominant 
concern with human welfare by homocentric conservationists is 
not shared. Also population control and the deferment of 
resource use can promote the goals of preservationists as well 
as those of homocentric conservationists. 
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But the steady state economy of the ecocentrically oriented 
does not equate with the steady state of the homocentric 
environmentalists. This is not only because the former place 
greater emphasis on 'quality of life' issues, but also because 
even appropriate 'soft' technology does not meet the demanding 
criteria of the radicals, being based on conventional science, 
to a considerable degree, and asserting human domination over 
nature. 
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CHAPTER 6 
THE FUNDAMENTAL PARADIGM OF ECONOMICS 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter and in chapters seven, eight and nine we analyze 
the economists' approach to understanding and improving the use 
of the physical environment. First of all, we look at how 
economics has developed, from its origins with Adam Smith to the 
prsent day, and at what constitutes the fundamental paradigm or 
scientific research programme of economics. 
In chapter seven we examine economic methodology, outlining 
the different ways economists justify the theories they offer as 
scientific explanations and predictions. We consider in chapter 
eight the basic value judgements which, together with their 
positive theories, guide economists' non-basic 
prescriptive statements. - In chapter nine we focus specifically 
on the economic approach to conservation. We concentrate on how 
economists explain the relationship between mankind and the 
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physical environment, and by which means, given their ultimate 
aims, economists consider the relationship can be guided in an 
appropriate direction. 
The contrast in our investigation of the economists' 
position compared with that of the conservationists can be 
illustrated by reference to the distinction between the pre- 
scientific and scientific stages of a discipline. The 
prescientific stage of a discipline is characterized by the 
relative imcompleteness' of the body of knowledge, by the 
relative absence of a set of interacting practitioners so that 
it is possible for a writer to advance his or her own ideas 
whilst ignoring those of their rivals, and by the relative 
absence of cumulative progress. It is also dominated by the 
practical concerns of the society or subculture in which it is 
cultivated. 1 
The incipient economics proposed by some conservationists - 
ecological or evolutionary or bioeconomics - considerably 
broadened in scope compared with traditional economics, with no 
elaborate theoretical structure, no concerted discussion of 
methodology, where its outline must be sketched in by 
considering the contributions of several, largely non- 
interacting, practitioners, seems to display prescientific 
characteristics. 
But conventional economics has been prof essionalized. it 
lays claim to the title of science in that' there is an 
integrated body of knowledge which is pursued and developed by a 
group of interacting scientists. The validation and extension 
of their body of knowledge is the professional goal of the 
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scientists in question. Professionalisation according to Kuhn 
'calls for the construction of elaborate equipment, the 
development of an esoteric vocabulary and skills, and a 
refinement of concepts that increasingly lessen their 
resemblance to their usual common-sense prototypes. That 
professionalism leads, on the one hand, to an immense 
restriction of the scientists' vision and to a considerable 
resistance to paradigm change'. 2 
Prof essionalisation, however, also requires a set of 
fundamental and durable problems to study, since continuously 
changing problems requiring new methods of analysis, would 
prevent the continuity required for the cumulative growth of 
discipline - specific knowledge. Thus an established science of 
economics need not be expected to be particularly responsive to 
contemporary conditions and problems of the society in which it 
is situated, as woulda newly-emerging science. 
3 
Our study of economics as it relates to the issues of 
central importance to conservationists therefore begins in the 
study of an established discipline. When we seek the 
fundamentals of economics in the remainder of this chapter we 
have many distinguished contibuters to cite. Similarly, 
economic methodology, which constitutes the subject matter of 
chapter seven, is an area of study in its own right with a vast 
literature; normative economics too is a subdiscipline with many 
practitioners. In all these areas it is no longer necessary or 
sufficient to rely on a few individual contributions as we did 
when discussing the conservationists' paradigm. 
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In the circumstances it need not be surprising that natural 
resource and environmental economics do not take a central role 
in traditional economics, and that these subdisciplines are 
studied using the tools of analysis, and methods of validation 
etc, common to the discipline as a whole. That does not mean 
that disagreement amongst economists is less likely than between 
conservationists. In explaining, predicting and prescribing in 
the uncertain real -world natural resource and environemntal 
economists inevitably disagree. Also economists' personal 
hierarchy of ultimate value judgements will often colour policy 
recommendations. Disagreements about how physical resources are 
used and should be used mirror similar disputes in the 
discipline as a whole. 
6.2 PARADIGMS AND SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH PROGRAMMES IN ECONOMICS 
The objective of the remainder of this chapter is to uncover the 
basic assumptions, explicit and implicit, which constrain and 
channel the efforts of mainstream economists and which thus 
constitute the essence of orthodox microeconomics. Modern 
philosophy of science provides a useful vantage point from which 
to pursue this task, in that growth of knowledge theorists 
provide frameworks for describing the fundamental theories of 
different groups of scientists and their working practices. 
Of course, discussion of the basic hypotheses of economics 
and economic. - methods is as old as the discipline itself. 
However, since 1965 many writers have applied the visions of 
scientific evolution presented by Kuhn and Lakatos to the field 
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of economics or made more limited use of their concepts. Such 
studies discuss the level of aggregation of economic hypotheses 
to which the concepts of Kuhn and Lakatos are most appropriately 
applied (see section 3). They also help reveal that ambiguity 
and ill-definition are likely to be an intrinsic part of the 
common foundation of economics (section 4). 
Some authors have given their own versions of the 
Lakatosian non-testable 'hard core' and the 'positive 
heuristic', or in Kuhnian terms, the metaphysics underlying the 
orthodox economics paradigm. Their interpretations comprise 
section 5. Given that some of the basic assumptions underlying 
the economist's paradigm or research programme are likely to be 
implicit, implicitly handed down from teacher to student and 
taken for granted by most practitioners, it is hardly surprising 
that the economic historians, methodologists and economists 
quoted here differ in the way they express their 'common 
agenda'. Section 6 constitutes an attempt at constructing a 
consensus agenda for economics. 
6.3 THE DISTINCTION OF PARADIGMS AND SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH 
PROGRAMMES 
One of the problems in transferring the Kuhn and Lakatos 
frameworks to economics is determining the level of aggregation 
to which their concepts are best applied. Paradigms and 
research programmes refer to 'clusters of theories', but, for 
the present study, what are the relevant clusters? Natural 
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resource economics, and environmental economics are subfields of 
microeconomics, so that Keynesian macroeconomics, even though 
regarded as part of 'conventional' economics need not concern 
us. But should the focus of attention be the groups of 
hypotheses comprising the separate relevant specialties or the 
neoclassical economics programme as a whole? 
A wide variety of-characterisations of paradigms and 
research programmes has been made. Sometimes the whole of 
orthodox microeconomics has been characterised as one research 
programme or paradigm; sometimes specialisms and subdivisions of 
specialisms have been treated separately. Kuhn contended that 
he meant his theory of scientific revolutions to be applicable 
not only to major scientific change, but also to more minor 
changes in particular subfields. Nevertheless, in general the 
application of paradigmic reasoning to economics has tended to 
be focused on the whole discipline. 
The Lakatosian framework too has been applied to the whole 
of traditional Economics. Several authors4 suggest Lakatos' 
vision of 'more gradual transformations in science together with 
the possibility of the revival of degenerating programmes, fits 
the history of economics better than the sharp and complete 
breaks depicted by Kuhn's revolutions, though of course Kuhn 
moderated his own position over time to provide for overlapping 
paradigms. 
However, Lakatos' methodology of scientific research 
programmes has also been used to examine particular fields in 
economics. This is probably because Lakatos emphasised that a 
scientific research programme can only be appraised in 
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competition with a rival. Thus, for instance, the Lakatos 
methodology has been applied by Latsis (1976)5 to a critique of 
the theory of the firm under perfect competition in relation to 
alternative behavioural theories, and by Cross (1982)6 to 
present day controversies in macroeconomics. 
Fulton (1981)7 suggested that broad applications mis-apply 
Lakatos' ideas since he applied his own methodology to a series 
of theories within Physics, rather than to Physics as a whole. 
However, Fulton also concedes, in keeping with other writers, 
that a partial application of the kind he advocates is 
complicated in economics. This is because much of the arguments 
in branches of the discipline concern the fundamentals of 
economics as, a whole, which the application of the Lakatosian 
framework to a subgroup of theories within the discipline could 
leave unstated. Fulton solves the problem in his own case study 
of theories concerning the production function, by first setting 
out a series of pre-suppositions he considers common to all 
neoclassical economics and then a 'hard core' and 'positive 
heuristic' specific to his particular field. This adaptation of 
Lakatos system is similar to the suggestion made by Remenyi 
(1979)8 whereby the whole of the discipline is viewed as one 
scientific research programme, with a protective belt that 
consists of all the separate specialities within economics. 
Each speciality has its own core, which he calls a demi-core. 
Leijonhufund (1976)9 also emphasised the importance of 
attempting to evaluate the 'grand generalities' underlying 
economic thinking, as a necessary first step to any more 
detailed appraisal of particular clusters of theories relating 
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to specific economic topics. He made his point by 
distinguishing between a model and a theory. The latter he 
defined as a 'patterned set of substantive beliefs' about how 
the economic system works, the former as a representation of a 
theory, or a subset of it, or some aspect of it. Thus in 
addition to those hard-core propositions' that appear in (or may 
be directly inferred from) the formal model structure, there are 
likely to be additional hard-core hypotheses belonging to the 
theory from which the model derives. Leijonhufund reserved 
Lakatos's 'hard core statements' for hypotheses appearing in or 
deduced from formal model structures and pre-suppositions for 
the additional unstated hard core beliefs belonging to economic 
theory as a whole. 
Blaug (1980)10 takes a similar line when he points out that 
one of the features of Lakatos' methodology is the insistence 
that we appraise entire research programmes. In an examination 
of Latsis's indictment of the traditional theory of the firm, 
Blaug criticises the author for not at least mentioning the 
entire neoclassical research programme, of which the traditional 
theory of the firm is 'a part. Blaug asserts it is impossible to 
understand the tenacious defence of marginalism in the field of 
business behaviour without recognising that what is at stake is 
the whole of price theory. 
If we adopt the same line of reasoning then natural 
resource and environmental economics are only particular 
implementations of the' neoclassical agenda, which is the common 
foundation of many diverse branches of economics. We must thus 
seek to understand the fundamental principles of microeconomics 
as a whole. 
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6.4 IDENTIFYING THE METAPHYSICAL ESSENTIALS OF PARADIGMS AND 
SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH PROGRAMMES 
Having determined the desirability of uncovering the common 
foundations of mainstream microeconomics, we must confront the 
likely difficulty of such a task. Is, it possible precisely to 
characterise the pre-scientific value judgements of such a 
paradigm or research programme at all? 
For Lakatos, the metaphysical elements of the research 
programme comprise both the 'hard core' of irrefutable 
statements on which the programme is built and the 'positive 
heuristic', or research plan, indicating how the programme 
should unfold. The metaphysics or woridviews underlying Kuhn's 
paradigms, similarly cover the entire constellation of beliefs, 
values, techniques and so on shared by the members of a given 
community. On one point Kuhn and Lakatos are agreed, that 
certain hypotheses are 'hard core' in the sense that they cannot 
be given up in the face of anomalies whilst preserving the 
research programme or paradigm. 
However, to say that some hypotheses are 'hard core' in any 
research programme does not necessarily imply that those 
fundamental hypotheses are easy to identify or, once identified, 
are open to only one interpretation. Leijonhufund states that 
his 'presuppositions' underlying mainstream economics are 'hard 
core' in the sense that they cannot be given up, but not in the 
sense that their statement cannot be tampered with. He says 
that 'indeed, they may be apparently quite woolly ... and the 
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scientific collective may show considerable uncertainty about 
how best to put it. ' 11 The same point has been made by Loasby 
who writes, 'it is notable that for none of the research 
programmes which he cites does Lakatos define at all precisely 
the content of the hard core; nor does Kuhn specify the 
essential content of any paradigm. This should not be 
surprising, just because the hard core is taken for granted, it 
is unlikely to attract critical Attention. Often ... there is 
no authoritative text to which all can refer; and what texts 
there are will be open to interpretation. '12 
Moreover, as both Leijonhufund (1976)13 and Musgrave 
(1976)14 point out, 'presuppositions' or 'hard core' beliefs are 
likely to take a considerable time to 'harden'. Musgrave 
described hard core beliefs as 'deep and fertile hypotheses'15 
which are usually only recognisable after a number of the 
theories in the series have appeared and have been refined. 
Similar views have been expressed ' by other commentators. 
Berkson (1976)16 says in the beginning it is individual 
scientists who have ideas as to which hypotheses'are fundamental 
to research programmes, and ideas about which hypotheses are 
fundamental are likely to differ over time and between 
scientists. Feyerabend (1976)17 asserts that commonly held 
scientific wisdom is actually not very common. Cross (1982)18 
argues that, as far as economics is concerned, views as to which 
propositions are more fundamental have not been widely accepted, 
or time-invariate enough, for us to be able to draw a clear 
distinction between hard core and protective belt hypotheses. 
Summing up the message of the literature, it seems inevitable 
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that economists will disagree over the identity and 
interpretation of presuppositional 'hard core' hypotheses in 
economics. Some economists will share Cross's view that 
economics is not sufficiently mature for any of its hypotheses 
to have achieved 'hard core' status. 
Scientific research programmes are open to identification 
not only by the hard core/protective belt distinction whereby a 
negative heuristic is applied to certain hypotheses, but also by 
a set of positive heuristics. The Lakatosian 'positive 
heuristic' sets out the way the research programme should 
unfold, both theoretically and empirically. It thus outlines 
procedures for giving formal expression to hard core statements 
and for generating the series of refutable hypotheses which form 
the protective belt. In-Kuhn's terms, the positive heuristic 
consists of agreed principles. by which 'normal science' 
proceeds. Are economists more likely to agree on the research 
plan for traditional microeconomics, which guides their 'normal 
science', or their work in the 'protective belt'? In fact, the 
'positive heuristic', is likely to be even more difficult to 
identify accurately and interpret than the 'hard core', and be 
more variant over time. 
It is - because Lakatos considered that the 
'positive 
heuristic' is more flexible than the 'hard core' of a programme 
that 
-he -suggested 
they might be distinguished. 
19 He also 
acknowledged that a research plan may be unclear, either because 
it is ambiguous or incomplete, consisting of a 'partially 
articulated set of suggestions or hints. '20 
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Musgrave goes further in stating that the 'positive 
heuristic' of a research programme cannot be laid down in detail 
at the outset of the programme but 'will typically develop and 
be articulated with the programme itself. '21 Loasby emphasises 
the positive value to be derived from an ambiguous and thus 
flexible research plan. - "Paradigms ... if they are to be 
effective they must be imprecise. Since the set of problems 
faced by a group of scientists ... cannot be predicted in any 
detail, some ambiguity in the terms of reference may be 
necessary for effective response to a specific situation. 
Ambiguity may also ... be necessary to hold the scientific 
community together; the implicit contract of the research 
programme may, need to be imperfectly specified. Lakatos 
provides for imperfection in two parts of a research programme, 
in the -'positive heuristic' and in the protective belt where any 
particular hypothesis is dispensable. "22 
There is clearly linkage too between hard core statements 
and research plan statements. At the Nafplion Colloquium23, set 
up as an opportunity to test the applicability of Lakatos 
methodology to the history of economics and physics, 
discusssions revealed that even with a well-developed programme 
in physics it is sometimes difficult to decide whether a 
specific statement should be regarded as part of the 'hard core' 
or the 'positive heuristic'. It is even possible that elements 
of the research programme may be transferred over time in either 
direction as between 'hard core' and research plan. To 
summarize, with any paradigm or research programme, including 
microeconomics, it may not be possible precisely to set out 
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either the hard core, or positive heuristic, and the latter in 
particular is liable to change through time. 
Fundamental assumptions need not be well, completely, or 
uniformally articulated for several more or less important 
reasons. They may, for instance, be ill defined and stated 
differently by practitioners for the relatively trivial reason 
that such fundamentals are seldom queried or made explicit 
during the practice of 'normal science'. Moroever, since until 
quite recently the history and content of economics has not been 
structured with these growth of knowledge theories in mind, the 
authors trying to determine 'hard core' and 'positive heuristic' 
statements may draw only limited guidance from previous 
studies. More importantly, the act of articulating the 
principles underlying microeconomics exposes those principles to 
criticism and question. Thus variance in the interpretation of 
a fundamental principle, especially one that is widely and 
explicitly acknowledged, is clearly functional to the 
continuance of the programme. In short, as Leijonhufund 
remarked, 'in the absence of fixed rules attempts to 
characterise economics theories will themselves be 
controversial. '24 And ambiguity and variability of judgement 
amongst practitioners is likely to be essential to scientific 
advance, as Kuhn, Loasby and Feyeraband have all acknowledged at 
different times and to varying degrees. 25 
Understanding the role of fundamental statements, including 
the implicit but important need for ambiguity, can pinpoint 
where inter and antra paradigm/research programme argument is 
likely to be fruitless and fruitful and where misunderstanding 
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can arise. Because basic principles may be hazy and need not be 
explicit, scientists can obviously be attempting to talk across 
paradigms or research programmes without knowing it. To talk 
across paradigms can be to talk at cross purposes. Indeed, as 
Kuhn has pointed out, unless particular scientists accept the 
possibility of changing the metaphysics or 'world view' that 
informs their 'normal science', it may be that useful 
communications between adherents of different paradigms is 
impossible. If, however, there is awareness of the role of 
fundamental principles in their disputes, even scientists 
committed to different 'hard cores' may develop tolerance, even 
mutual respect, for their fellows. Within a particular 
programme or paradigm, appreciation of the relevance of 
ambiguity in interpretation of hard core beliefs and of variable 
judgement in the adaptation of a broadly accepted research plan, 
can be useful for curtailing potentially pointless arguments 
between fellow practitioners. 
For clear lines of communication within a programme and 
between programmes, it is pertinent to bear in mind that the 
axioms of a theoretical framework should not be confused with 
the 'hard core' beliefs with which those axioms must be 
consistent. In fact, when a science is mature enough to have a 
'hard core', there will never be such a correspondence, because 
if the hard core hypotheses were stated as the axioms of a 
theory or group of theories, the hard core would be exposed to 
criticism and " testing, but a testable 'hard core' is a 
contradiction in terms. It is, of course, to protect hard core 
beliefs that, as a research programme develops, the axioms of 
the theories in the programme may have to change. 
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Bearing in mind the present discussion, we seek in the next 
section the possibly only partly articulated and probably 
ambiguous structure underlying orthodox microeconomics. 
6.5 THE METAPHYSICS OF MAINSTREAM ECONOMICS -A COLLECTION OF 
" OPINIONS 
The application of Kuhn's methodology to the history of 
economics was initiated by Gordon in 196526, whilst the first 
application of Lakatos methodology to the discipline was by 
Latsis in an article on contrasting theories of the firm, first 
published in 197227. Several writers have questioned the strict 
applicability of either or both of these growth of knowledge 
theories to economics (Leijonhufund 1976, Hutchison 1978, Cross 
1982, O'Brien 1983, Hands 1985)28. Nevertheless many economic 
historians, methodologists and critics of mainstream economics, 
have incorporated the ideas of Kuhn and Lakatos into their 
writings to illuminate the study in hand. 
The basis of the science of economics is commonly held to 
be the writings of Adam Smith. As Stigler (1982)29 has recently 
commented, whilst many or all of Smith's ideas had been 
expressed by predecessors, it was Adam Smith who first provided 
a broad authoritative account of economic doctrine, to which 
subsequent economists referred and on which they built. 
Adam Smith was a student of 18th-century economic 
conditions. Casual observation led him to believe that it was 
no accident that the richest country, England, was also the 
country in which individuals were left freest to pursue their 
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own self-interest. However, English economic life was still 
exceedingly fettered by government regulation and intervention 
in the economic sphere. In consequence, Smith wrote his famous 
anti-mercantilist treatise, An Inquiry into the Nature and 
Causes of the Wealth of the Nations (1776) which outlined his 
vision of a good society. 
A''good society would result, Smith argued, if government 
would leave individuals free to pursue their own interests. 
Individuals know best their own interests, and the competitive 
social interaction of the self-motivated economic activities of 
individuals would result in a social harmony, as if guided by an 
'invisible hand'. With competition as the regulator, a 'simple 
and obvious system of natural liberty', apart from being good in 
itself, would promise the greatest possible level of social 
well-being. To be operative Adam Smith's vision required two 
basic economic institutions, private ownership of resources, and 
markets through which goods, services, and the factors of 
production could be allocated. 
In founding economics Smith emulated the most widely 
respected scientific system of his time, that of Newton. Smith 
described Newton's system -a machine running according to 
discoverable laws - as the greatest discovery that ever was made 
by man30, and the concept of natural law is an important 
cornerstone of Smith's economics. Newton claimed natural laws 
governed the universe' and John Locke claimed natural laws and 
natural rights existed 'prior to the formation of governments. 
In particular the accumulation of private property and its 
protection were natural rights, a view endorsed by Smith. He 
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thus successfully applied the idea of the universe as a 
perfectly ordered mechanism operating according to natural laws 
to economic phenomena. Harmony and balance Smith saw, as a 
natural and desirable consequence of economic expansion within 
the market system. 
O'Brien described the Wealth of Nations as providing a 
paradigm of 'self-interest pursuit and decentralised decision 
taking in a growth context viewed as producing a relatively best 
state of affairs and relatively efficient allocation of 
resources'. 31 Many contributors have maintained that since its 
emergence with Adam Smith there has been no Kuhnian revolution 
in economics. Gordon (1965) claims that an economist's way of 
viewing 'the world has remained unchanged since the eighteenth 
century, the basic paradigm being 'Smith's postulate of the 
maximising individual in a relatively free market and the 
successful application of this postulate to a wide variety of 
specific questions'32. Routh (1975)33 also maintains that the 
paradigm that provides the inner framework for economic thought 
has not changed since its emergence. Though marginalism and 
Keynesian economics he says, are important events in the history 
of economic thought, they were not Kuhnian revolutions involving 
'gestalt-switches' as new frameworks conquer old. 
Other writers, who emphasise continuity in the fundamental 
hypotheses of microeconomics have nevertheless elevated 
Keynesian macroeconomics to Kuhnian revolution status. Coats 
(1969)34 claims that economics has been 'dominated throughout 
its history by a single paradigm - the theory of economic 
equilibrium via the market mechanism'. But he singles out the 
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Keynesian revolution as a Kuhnian paradigm change involving "a 
change of psychological outlook on the part of many economists 
virtually amounting to a 'conversion experience''. 
Ward (1972)35, in his critique of economics, also calls the 
Keynesian revolution a Kuhnian: one, and claims in addition that 
the 1950s and 1960s witnessed a 'near-Kuhnian' 'formalist 
revolution', involving the growing prestige of mathematical 
economics and econometrics. Keynesian claims to 'true Kuhnian' 
revolutionary status, according to Ward, rest on the fact that 
the rethink of aggregative economics raised the status of 
macrotheory to that of microtheory, an importance he asserts, 
that has been maintained despite much controversy in 
Macroeconomics. The near 'formalist' revolution, Ward argues, 
raised the status of econometrics to the same 'class A' level of 
micro and macrotheory, to the extent that now these three high 
status fields 'define the nature of acceptable research problems 
in Economics and the appropriate procedures to use in attempting 
to, solve them, 36. However, the 'formalism' of economics, being 
a change in accepted procedures rather than substantive cannot, 
claims Ward, count as a Kuhnian revolution. Thus, 'the basis of 
theory remains the analysis of the price system, and right at 
its heart is still to be found the competitive regime of 
production and exchange'37. 
Looking beyond the most commonly quoted explicit hypothesis 
on - which the neoclassical paradigm is based, namely some 
variation of 'the maximisation-of-returns hypothesis', Ward 
sought the philosophical foundation for the economist's 
worldview. He found it in the general liberal philosophical 
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tradition which, Ward claims, feeds the neoclassical economics 
woridview in several ways. First, the neoclassical model of 
'economic man', he says, resembles 'liberal man' who in turn is 
driven by the three principles of hedonism, rationalism and 
atomism. Hedonism characterises man in terms of the 
satisfaction of the urgent demands of the body and mind, 
rationalism implies the use of deliberate choice among 
alternatives in seeking the satisfaction, and atomism asserts 
the essential separateness of each person and the consequent 
stabilisation of unique values by means of individual internal 
processes. 
Similarly the neoclassical model of the state, Ward says, 
is synonymous with the liberal model where the state is viewed 
as a device to provide certain kinds of services that are 
necessary and would not otherwise be forthcoming. It has no 
other justification. Moreover, it is likely to be a threat to 
the realisation of other needs of its citizens, thus safeguards 
are required, to be built into the state to prevent excessive use 
of its coercive power. 
Finally, the liberal philosophy of a harmony of interests 
is evidenced, writes Ward, by the fact that whilst the 
autonomous individuals of economics come into conflict, this 
conflict is transformed by the bargaining process of the market 
place into harmony. The harmony of interests fostered by the 
market place is augmented by the protection by the State of the 
private resources accumulated via the market and by state 
substitution for the market where society's welfare is fostered 
thereby. 
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Few economists will be concerned though about this inner 
framework that feeds their basic assumptions because, says Ward, 
neoclassical economics is a Kuhnian mature, 'normal science', 
with economists sufficiently confident of the fundamentals of 
their subject for there to be little substantive discussion. 
" On the research plan to guide 'puzzle-solving' by 
neoclassical practitioners, besides emphasising the importance 
of formalism, Ward adds that since neoclassical economics 
replaced the preceding classical school, the model for 
formulating' problems is the marginalist supply and demand 
framework. Also economic studies may use 'stylised facts' being 
fake or at least exaggerated assumptions about some of the facts 
of the situation under study. As far as public policy issues 
are concerned, the practice of economics as a normal science 
necessitates that current issues of the day are transformed into 
technical economic-scientific puzzles. Thus says Ward, 'issues 
of public policy can and often do 'influence the course of 
Economic discussion, but the transformation they undergo from 
the one public to the other, conditioned as it is in our case by 
the very nature of the invisible college of economists, can be 
quite substantial''. 38 
Ward's identifcation of economic thought with liberal 
philosophy is a line of reasoning that has a long history. 
According to Deane39; the linking of the discipline with 
laissez-faire principles was a major component of the 'Crisis' 
in Economics a century ago. Deane, making a parallel between 
the lack of consensus on fundamental principles which developed 
in the 1870s and current disarray in economics sought to 
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discover how far the methodological debates of the 1870s and 
1880s between historicists and the mathematical school led to 
reconciliation, and how far the issues that divided them were 
simply shelved. 
The historical economists, says Deane, 'condemned the 
hypothetico-deductive method of the classical economists as 
being hostile to empirical research, irresponsibly speculative 
and, most wounding of all, ideologically biased. In effect, the 
classical economists were accused of describing amoral (if not 
immoral) theories involving implicit presumptions in favour of a 
laissez-faire stance'. The consensus that emerged, built on 
Marshall's Principles (1890) and Neville Keynes Scope and Method 
(1891), established the scientific validity of the 'new 
political economy', according to Dean, as follows: by (1) 
tracing continuity with classical political economy; (2) 
accepting that the inductive-empirical researchers of the 
historical school and the deductive-analytical researches of the 
mathematical school had complementary roles to play in 
furthering economic knowledge; and (3) insisting that the basic 
postulates of the discipline were value-free, objectively given 
by the industrial and organisational conditions of modern 
society to which the resulting economic analysis was intended to 
be applied. 
The end result was an abstract deductive core of 'pure' 
economic science aimed at explaining the logic of economic 
behaviour in the market place, distinguished from questions of 
empirical validity, distributional justice or policy issues, 
which did not arise at the theoretical level, but were relevant 
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within the more flexible periphery of applied economics. 
Lifting the central body of economic theory out of the arena of 
ethical and political debate, says Deane, 'narrowed the scope of 
the theoretical core of the economist's research programme so 
that it was largely reducible to a theory of exchange under 
competitive conditions and at the same time it took the passion 
and point out of the debate on method that had characterised the 
1870s and 1880s'. 40 
Though the debate on whether pure economics should become 
an essentially mathematical science continued, Deane, like all 
the previously mentioned authors, saw no 'hard core' dissent 
until Maynard Keynes published his General Theory (1936) when 
'the central assumption of the self-regulating market economy 
came under fire again'. 41 The post-war superficial harmony of 
Keynesian macroeconomic theory and neo-classical microeconomic 
theory achieved by their compartmentalisation within economics, 
was finally shattered by stagflation which in turn fed into the 
professional dissent of the 1980s. 
The 'grand generalities', which according to Leijonhufund42 
lie behind all pre-Keynesian economic theories amount to three 
presuppositions. The first is that price-incentives effectively 
control the behaviour of individual transactors, and that 
transactors will respond to changes in relative prices by 
changing the quantities they desire to produce and consume in a 
qualitatively predictable manner. The second is that prices 
tend to move - and are 'free' to do so - in response to market 
excess demand or supplies and in such a manner as to induce 
transactors to alter their behaviour in the direction required 
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for all activities to 'mesh'. These two presuppositions feed 
into the third which is that a market economy is a self- 
regulating (or 'equilibrating') system. Moreover, there is 
substantive continuity with present-day economics. Not even the 
Keynesian revolution can count as a Kuhnian revolution according 
to Leijonhufund, because Keynesian economics did not decisively 
displace the pre-existing orthodoxy. Instead both survived side 
by side by splitting general economic theory into separate 
'micro' and 'macro' segments. 
Hutchison43 rejects the direct applicability to economics 
of both Kuhn and Lakatos growth of knowledge theories, the 
former because of the difficulty of identifying complete change 
in the history of economics as exemplified by Kuhn's 
revolutions, and the latter because of the difficulty of 
identifying Lakatosian 'progress' in economics. Nevertheless, 
Hutchison writes in awareness of Kuhn and Lakatos concepts and 
chooses to use a similar framework, to the extent that he 
regards feasible, in his own historical overview of the 
discipline. What emerges from his analysis is a set of 
fundamental underlying assumptions, associated with present day 
microeconomics, which like other authors he largely traces back 
to Adam Smith. 
Hutchison describes Adam Smith's 'basic model' as 'the 
simple system of natural liberty - used as an historically 
dynamic model concerned not only with a static criteria or ideal 
condition but with the progress of the economy,. 
44 It was Adam 
Smith, he says, 'who really generalised the theory of market 
self-adjustment as operating effectively, by and large, though 
with several and in some cases important exceptions, throughout 
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the economic cosmos, domestically and internationally, micro- 
economically and macro -economically'. But, Hutchison says, 
Smith's competition was not 'perfect' and self-adjustment was 
not assumed as a hypothetical abstraction but was asserted as an 
imprecise and qualified empirical theory, open in practice to 
" refutation. 
Smith's method he describes as that of an historical 
economist 'not only in the sense that he was empirical, but in 
that the theme of progress through natural stages of development 
runs all through his Inquiry'. Whilst pointing out that Smith's 
methodology has been described as both primarily inductive and 
primarily deductive, Hutchison sides with the former view, 
stating that "in the Wealth of Nation 'abstract reasonings' are 
kept on a very tight rein. Smith is certainly not one for 
taking off into the Ricardian stratosphere of 'strong cases' or 
extreme, arbitrary abstractions ... . He very much doubted that 
abstraction could provide either understanding of the real 
world or, by itself safe guidance for the legislator or 
statesmen". 45 
Since Adam Smith economics has, according to Hutchison, 
seen three important turning points. These turning points, 
associated with Ricardo, Jevon and Keynes, he describes as 
revolutionary in the sense that they caused 'comparatively 
fundamental or comprehensive and/or comparatively rapid change 
affecting ... the subject as a whole'. 
46 
To the self-equilibrating model of Adam Smith, Hutchinson 
says, Ricardo added two assumptions to the 'hard core' and made 
significant changes also to the 'positive heuristic'. The hard 
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core additions were the postulate of adequate knowledge, 'this 
keystone has ever since Ricardo, retained its essential role in 
the central body of orthodox theorising' and the assumption of 
'a stable social and political environment such that economic 
processes could be studied more or less in isolation'. 
47 
To the 'positive heuristic', says Hutchison, Ricardo added 
the directive that problems in political economy are problems of 
'determining laws', and he sought to determine these laws by 
relying solely on the method of extreme abstraction (or strong 
cases). Consequently, prior facts in the form of empirical 
investigation or historical enquiry had no place in his method 
of logic and deduction from abstract principles. With Ricardian 
heightened 'rigour', competition became perfect and whilst 
market equilibrium still introduced the 'dynamic' element, with 
adequate knowledge smooth and rapid equilibrium could be 
assumed. Thus, claims Hutchison, Ricardo was responsible for 'a 
vital change primarily in the formulation but consequently also 
in the content of the maximising self-adjusting model'. 
48 
The turning point in economics which took place around the 
1870s, sometimes described as the 'marginalist revolution' and 
the beginning of the neoclassical tradition, Hutchison calls the 
'Jevonian revolution'. The Ricardian 'hard core' was unscathed 
- 'the assumption of competition as the general 'normal' case 
in 
the main survived ... the assumption of perfect or adequate 
knowledge survived, of course, in the new analysis which was 
beginning to be constructed. In fact this, or similar over- 
simplified or arbitrary assumptions seem almost indispensable 
for the construction of abstract models of microeconomic 
behaviour of any kind of generality'49. 
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As far as the 'positive heuristic' was concerned the 
historical critics, Hutchison claims, had little effect on the 
dominant abstract and deductive approach of Ricardian economics 
(despite some movement to the contrary in Marshall's Industry 
and Trade [19191), but three important changes in method were 
heralded. The first was the introduction of the marginal 
concept, the second a gradual turn towards a narrower and more 
specific focus on 'micro' theorising and analysis which 
concentrated on individual maximising units exchanging goods and 
services, the third a pronounced emphasis on utility and 
demand. 'Each of the three key concepts was fitted together 
with the other two to give the coherent new pattern which 
emerged, of the marginal concept as the key tool and of utility 
or consumers' demand as the origin, driving force, or basic 
determinant in a system of micro-economics built around 
maximising individual*units'. 50 
The application of mathematical formulation was not 
according to Hutchison a necessary feature of the new pattern, 
though mathematical formulation and the calculus were championed 
as tools for developing and deploying the new concepts. 
The Keynesian macroeconomics revolution, Hutchison 
highlights as the episode in the history of economic thought 
which is most widely acclaimed as fully deserving the 
description 'revolutionary'. He stresses, however, that Keynes 
denied only macroeconomic self-adjustment, in terms of the 
aggregate level of activity and employment, and that certainly 
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in microeconomic terms, Keynes believed that the then system was 
more or less adequately self-adjusting'. 
Hutchison identifies no significant turning point in 
Economics since Keynes. As far as microeconomics is concerned, 
the most often quoted possibility, the post-Keynesian 
quantitive or 'formalist' revolution, he considers is 
disqualified as it hardly seems to have changed very 
significantly either the problems studied or the empirical 
content of economic theories'. 51 Thus, as implied by Hutchison, 
present day mainstream microeconomics has as its hard core Adam 
Smith's basic model as adapted by Ricardo, and Ricardo's positive 
heuristic as adapted by Jevons and the marginalists. 
The four remaining studies to be considered, those of 
Latsis52, Remenyi53, Fulton54 and Blaug55 all provide lists of 
the basic assumptions underlying the whole of the neoclassical 
Economics, (of which we make use here), before applying Lakatos' 
methodology to particular fields within the discipline. 
Latsis (1976) describes the 'hard core' of the neoclassical 
programme as follows: 'Decision-makers have-correct knowledge of 
the relevant features of their economic situation. Decision- 
makers prefer the best available alternative given their 
knowledge of the situation and of the means at their 
disposal. Given (i) and (ii), situations generate their internal 
'logic' and decision-makers act appropriately to the logic of 
their situation. Economic units and structures display stable, 
co-ordinated behaviour. 
Remenyi identified the hard core of all of neoclassical 
economics thus. Consumers and producers can legitimately be 
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assumed to be rational decision-makers who know their wants. 
Economic activity is motivated by individual self-interest. More 
is better than less. Given perfect knowledge and good government 
economic welfare is maximised by free competition. Although 
welfare and economic welfare are not synonymous, the latter is a 
good approximation for the former. Stable Pareto-efficient 
equilibrium solutions can be defined for any and all markets 
relevant to economic research and analysis. Everything has its 
opportunity cost. Abstract, reduced-form models and simplifying 
assumptions are valid tools of economic analysis'. 48 
Fulton lists 'presuppositions' common to all neoclassical 
Economics as under nine headings: 
(1) The central economic problem is that of allocating scarce 
resources among alternative uses. 
(2) Economic theories are abstract, general theories, based on 
deductive models (in contrast to the type of theory 
proposed by the historical schools who seek low-level, 
empirically provided hypotheses for certain time periods. ) 
(3) Economic theory is based on individual entities such as the 
consumer, the firm or the worker. In most theories each of 
these individual acts independently of other like units. 
(4) These individuals have full knowledge of the relevant 
circumstances of their economic situation. 
(5) Each individual acts rationally, where rational conduct is 
defined as 'that conduct which the individual can 
demonstrate (at least to himself) to be the most 
advantageous for him'. 
(6) Each individual is a maximising agent. 
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(7) Economic theory is essentially static in the sense that it 
is concerned with equilibrium states and movements between 
these states. 
(8) Economic theory is within the tradition of positive 
science. This has two effects: (a) Theories should be 
tested against facts, but how they should be tested is a 
different matter on which many economists within the 
neoclassical tradition disagree. (b) Theories are not 
concerned with ends. A clear distinction should be made 
between positive and normative economics. 
(9) In addition to verbal exposition, theories should, if 
possible, be presented in mathematical form and such 
mathematical models should be made as rigorous as possible. 
Blaug's study , 
is possibly the most authoritative. He 
refers to mainstream economics since Adam Smith to the present 
day as one scientific research programme, and points out that the 
research programme he calls 'mainstream orthodox' economics 
comprises the whole of microeconomics, but within the larger 
programme are 'satellite' research programmes consisting of 
theories of consumer behaviour, the firm, general equilibrium, 
etc. Blaug accepts that the research programme has not remained 
entirely unchanged throughout its course, but nevertheless 
essential continuity in principle and method are traced back to 
Smith. 
The principle of constrained maximisation is based on a 
'hard core', Blaug says, which consists of weak versions of what 
are otherwise known as the 'assumptons' of competitive theory, 
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namely (a) rational economic calculation (b) constant tastes (c) 
independence of decision-making (d) perfect knowledge (e) perfect 
certainty (f ) perfect mobility of factors. If these are not 
stated weakly they become refutable by casual inspection and 
cannot therefore be held as 'hard core'. 56 
The 'marginalists' after 1870, Blaug claims, adopted this 
'hard core' of classical political economy but they altered its 
positive heuristic and thus also provided it with a different 
'protective belt' of testable hypotheses. The innovations of 
Menger, Jevons and Wairas are thus suitably described, he says, 
not as a new scientific research programme but as a progressive 
problem shift in the older research programme of classical 
political economy, in that economists after 1870 reassessed the 
nature of the facts with which economics ought to be concerned. 
According to Blaug, 'what- we see is the attempt to concentrate 
attention on the problem of price determination at the expense of 
what Baumol has called the 'magnificent dynamics' in Smith, 
Ricardo and Mill, in the course of which due emphasis was given 
to the neglected demand-side, seen as an improvement rather than 
an outright rejection of Adam Smith'. 
The present day neoclassical positive heuristic, as 
bequeathed by the marginalists, Blaug describes as follows (a) 
divide markets into buyers and sellers - producers and 
consumers. (b) specify market structure (c) create 'ideal type' 
definitions of the behavioural assumptions to get sharp results 
(d) set out the relevant ceteris paribus conditions (e) translate 
the situation into an extreme problem and examine first and 
second order conditions. 
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Blaug claims that Keynes went still further than the 
'marginalists' in that he tampered with the 'hard core' of 
economics that had originated with Adam Smith, so that Keynesian 
Macroeconomics marked the appearance of a new scientific research 
programme in the history of economics. For our purposes Blaug's 
comparison between Keynesian and Neoclassical 'hard cores' throws 
further light on the latter. 
Thus, Blaug says, Keynes departed from the principle of 
methodological individualism whereby all economic phenomena are 
reduced to manifestation of individual behaviour; he concentrated 
on the short period whereas the long period has been the 
principal analytical focus of his predecessors; he tended to 
throw the weight of adjustments to changing economic conditions 
on output rather than prices; and introduced pervasive 
uncertainty and the possibility of destabilising expectations, 
not just in the protective belt but in the 'hard core' of his 
programme, whereas the classical and neoclassical 'hard core' 
always contained the idea of rational economic calculation 
involving the existence of certainty equivalents for each 
uncertain future outcome of current decisions. 'Equilibrium for 
the economy as a whole now involved underemployment equilibrium, 
and the introduction of this conjunction, an apparent 
contradiction in terms, involved a profound change in the 'hard 
core' of nineteenth century economics, which undoubtedly included 
the faith that competitive forces drive an economy towards a 
steady state of full employment'. 57 
The post war controversies in macroeconomics indicate, says 
Blaug, that economists, like all other scientists, will 
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characteristically defend their core of central beliefs from the 
threat of observed anomalies by first adjusting the auxiliary 
hypotheses surrounding that central core, they will continue to 
do so as long as it is possible and only when they have been 
repeatedly refuted will they rethink their basic 'hard core' and 
start afresh. 
6.6 THE ECONOMISTS' AGENDA AND ITS INTERPRETATION 
From the previous section it is clear that there is considerable 
agreement on the way the neoclassical framework was built up, and 
on its fundamentals. In this section we seek to summarize the 
agreed basic principles and go on further to discuss some of the 
ambiguity surrounding their interpretation within the discipline. 
It is unanimously acknowledged by the writers quoted in the 
previous section that traditional microeconomics inherits much of 
its 'hard core' from Adam Smith's basic theory, 'the theory of 
economic equilibrium via the market mechanism', as Coats 
succinctly expressed it. This was in Hutchison's words, 'a 
dynamic model, concerned not only with a static criterion'. It 
was also, at the time of its inception, a theory that was 
'imprecise and qualified ... open in practice to refutation', the 
lack of 'hard core' hypotheses being consistent with a new, 
immature science. In addition, lacking the later distinction 
betwen positive and normative economics, Smith's paradigm 
incorporated the normative notion that the 'pursuit of self 
interest and decentralised decision-making produced a relatively 
best state of affairs and relatively efficient allocation of 
resources'. 
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However, as Leijonhufund points out Smith's view concerning 
the 'automaticity' of the market system is not itself the 'hard 
core' of present day microeconomics, but is rather the outcome of 
his 'fundamental presuppositions. The most basic explicit 
assumptions being about maximising behaviour and individual 
decision making. 
The idea of maximising behaviour as one of the fundamental 
assumptions of economics is unanimously accepted by the writers. 
This is not surprising since the maximising or 'rationality' 
hypothesis is widely acknowledged and has a long history of 
prominence in economics. Nassau Senior, in 1827, was one of the 
first economists to formulate the 'First Proposition' of 
Political Economy as being 'that every person is desirous to 
obtain, with as little sacrifice as possible, as much as possible 
of the articles of wealth'. 58 
The inclusion of methodological individualism as a 
fundamental part of traditional microeconomics is also implicitly 
or explicitly acknowledged by the writers we examined previously, 
and again well established within the profession. Blaug (1980) 
identified neoclassical methodological individualism as the view 
that 'sound theories must be grounded in the attitudes and 
behaviour of individuals, as opposed to 'methodological holism' 
which asserts that sound theories must be grounded in the 
behaviour of irreducible groups of individuals'. 59 
It is Schumpeter who is credited with introducing the term 
methodological individualism into economics in his attempt to 
distinguish between methodological Individualism which is 
relevant to economics, and political individualism which is not. 
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Political and methodological individualism may mistakenly be 
considered to be the same but in fact, states Schumpeter, they 
'have nothing in common. The former starts from general 
permises, such as that freedom contributes more than anything 
else` to the progress of mankind and to the common welfare, and 
proceeds to a series of practical assertions; the latter does 
nothing of the sort, asserts nothing and has no particular 
premises. It means merely that in the description of certain 
economic processes one had better begin with the actions of 
individuals'. 60 'Machlup describes Schumpter's introduction of 
methodological individualism into economics as an innovation 
'which was fully successful in the sense that it has been 
explicitly accepted by some and implicitly by practically all 
modern economists' . 
61 
The conjunction of the proposition of maximising behaviour 
and methodological individualism produces 'Economic Man', the 
status and nature of 'Economic Man' is disputed, and has been 
throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Does the 
decision-maker, for instance, in calculating maximum advantage 
consider'only himself, or is maximum advantage desired also for 
other beneficiaries, such as family, friends? 'Economic Man' is 
an enigma and his motivation can be, and is, interpreted in many 
ways. 62 
In Smith's. theory the underlying assumption concerning the 
government, according to Hutchison, is that it assumes a 
facilitating role, 'setting and maintaining the pre-conditions 
for individual market transactions by establishing property 
rights, ensuring suitable monetary conditions and banking rules 
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and providing such necessary services as national defence, which 
the market will not adequately provide'. 63 However, whilst the 
assumption of a crucial state role underlies all market economies 
and is in that respect fundamental, spelling out that role is not 
always necessary in economic analysis. In effect, Ricardo's 
explicit hard core assumption of a 'stable political and social 
framework through time' allowed market outcomes to changing 
events, including specific policy changes, to be analysed without 
recourse to the political sphere. It is possibly because 
government had, in effect, been purged by Ricardo from economic 
analysis (a move later endorsed by the Marginalists), that few of 
the studies examined in the previous section made explict 
reference to government. 
Another hard core assumption of economics implied in 
Smith's theory but with which Ricardo is most closely associated 
is the acquisition and use of knowledge by market participants. 
As Stigler64 points out economists have always known that the 
extent and accuracy of the economic actor's knowledge has 
influenced, often decisively, his behaviour and therefore the 
behaviour of markets. Ricardo's introduction of an explicit 
assumption concerning adequate or perfect knowledge into the 
'hard core' of economics brought this important, but previously 
implicit, knowledge assumption to the fore. Used in extreme 
form, this assumption allows rapid and smooth movement between 
equilibrium states and may thus be a potent analytical device. 
However, its use in this extreme form has not been without 
criticism. Shackle (1972)65, for instance, suggested that such 
an assumption introduces 'timelessness' into economics and hence 
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effectively removes the dynamic element from Smith's theory of 
the Economy. But in any case, and inevitably, the basic 
assumption concerning adequate or perfect knowledge has been 
subject to other interpretations by practitioners besides its 
'extreme form' interpretation. According to Stigler, the usual 
mode of operation in economic model building was for the amount 
of information possessed by individuals in any market to be 
arbitrarily postulated, rather than derived from economic 
principles, and he chose to break with this tradition by applying 
the fundamental economic hypothesis of maximizing behaviour to 
the' determination of information acquisition, a move he claims 
which has been readily accepted into microeconmic orthodoxy. The 
absence of controversy in this respect Stigler attributes to the 
fact that no established scientific theory was being challenged 
by this work, 'in fact, all I was challenging was the neglect of 
a promising subject'. 66 
Nevertheless, it is highly unlikely that traditional 
economists` will unanimously alight on only one acceptable 
interpretation of the important basic assumption of adequate 
knowledge, any more than they will agree on one definitive 
interpretation of the other fundamental hypotheses. Such a move 
might introduce' greater clarity into the paradigm or scientific 
research programme, but it would at the same time introduce 
inflexibility. " 
'Another move which might introduce both greater clarity and 
inflexibility into traditional microeconomics would be to attempt 
the breakdown of the fundamental hypotheses into their logical 
constituents with each part called a separate postulate. For 
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instance, the maximising postulate could be broken down thus: 
every person has preferences, these preferences are consistent 
and can be orderly arranged, the individual wishes to follow 
these preferences in deciding on his actions, etc. 67 Such a 
breakdown of the maximising assumption does not replace it, of 
course, but merely explains it more fully. 
Very full explanations of this kind are notably absent from 
all the 'hard core' listings of the previous section. Such 
attempts to make the hard core more precise would inevitably be 
more controversial, hence less universally acceptable, as well as 
possibly being less open , to flexible interpretation by 
practitioners. Probably Blaug's summary of the underlying 
postulates of the current neoclassical research programme as 
'weak' versions of the assumptions of perfect competition is the 
best known and least contentious fuller listing of the explicit 
'hard core' assumptions as far as traditional microeconomics is 
concerned. It leaves room for considerable flexibility in 
interpretation by practitioners. 
One assumption listed as fundamental to economics by some 
of the authors of the previous section, but which we have not yet 
discussed is the notion in Fulton's words, that 'the central 
economic problem is that of allocating scarce resources amongst 
alternative uses', or as Remenyi put it 'everything has its 
opportunity cost'. Elsewhere Machlup has said that 'Perhaps the 
assumption'that only limited outputs can be obtained from given 
resources should be called fundamental: it 'underlies' all 
economic problems, but it does not always become a relevant step 
in the argument'. 68 The idea that scarcity provides the raison 
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d'etre of economics is an uncontentious statement, even if it has 
not been formally listed by all the authors as a 'hard core' 
assumption of economics. 69 
The remaining assumptions referred to in the studies cited 
in Section S concern the 'positive heuristic' or research plan of 
orthodox microeconomics, which provides guidance to practitioners 
on how to develop the paradigm or programme from the basic 
postulates. Lakatos, in suggesting that research programmes may 
be either theoretically or empirically progressive or 
degenerating, effectively divided work in the protective belt 
into two categories, theoretical development and empirical 
testing. He describes a research programme as theoretically 
progressive if each modification or addition of auxiliary 
hypotheses leads to neF predictions and as empirically 
progressive if at least some of these novel predictions are 
corroborated. 70 
As far as economics is concerned, most of the contributers 
agree that the research plan has changed significantly since the 
inception of the programme by Adam Smith. In order better to 
determine the 'economic laws' which he wished to apply to 
economic problems, Ricardo adopted a new research plan, based on 
the deductive method. As a tool of analysis Ricardo advocated 
the use of, 'strong cases' whereby previously weakly stated 
assumptions were 
, 
'sharpened'. With competition and knowledge 
perfect, the social and political framework stable through time, 
Ricardo's theories became completely generalised in form. 
It was emphasised that whilst the Marginalists retained 
Smith's 'hard core', as augmented by Ricardo, they once again 
modified the research plan. Deductive,, static equilibrium models 
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still resulted but they made the marginal concept the key tool, 
and emphasised the focus on methodological individualistic 
theorising as' maximising individual units satisfied their demands 
and exchanged goods and services. Blaug's summary of the 
positive heuristic of microeconomics after the Marginalists 
alterations, captures both the move to sharp deductive models 
following Ricardo and the new emphasis on supply and demand 
analysis. 
The growing twentieth century mathematisation of economic 
theory, which is acknowledged by nearly all the quoted authors, 
is seen as applying a 'new' mathematical language to 'old' 
subject matter. As Leijonhufund puts it, 'A very great 
proportion of what economists consider theoretical work - or work 
in so-called 'pure theory' - concerns the exploration of the 
potentialities of formal languages for ordering perceived 
economic realities. ... what the 'progressive' economist is 
usually engaged in is trying to incorporate more things that have 
been well-known for a long time (or taken to be so) into a 
logically consistent structure. And ordinarily these 'things' 
are not quantified phenomena but qualitative patterns of 
behaviour,. 71 
Another research plan directive mentioned by Fulton, and 
several others, is the necessity of distinguishing between 
positive economics and normative economics. The distinction is 
an adaptation of Neville Keynes'72 recommendations and was meant 
finally and indisputably to raise positive economics to the 
status of a science. But Fulton added that how positive theories 
should be tested is a matter on which many economists disagree. 
It is to economic methodology that we now turn. 
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CHAPTER 7 
THE METHODOLOGY OF POSITIVE ECONOMICS 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
Based on John Neveille Keynes' distinction, economists accept 
positive economics as the body of systemized knowledge about 
what is, and normative economics as the body of systematized 
knowledge about what ought to be. 1 In principle, it may be 
possible to draw a reasonably clear line between positive and 
normative economics. But if a positive economists' assumed 
knowledge of reality conflicts with another positive economist's 
view, then even with agreement on given ends, the result may be 
the advocacy of conflicting policies. In other words, 
economists' theoretical interpretations of reality and their 
ultimate objectives, both crucially underlie policy 
recommendations. 
In this chapter we outline some positive theories of 
reality which economists have built upon the common core 
outlined in chapter 6, and investigate how they justify their 
theories as scientific. The theories economists build to 
explain and predict economic situations must clearly be linked 
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to some kind of scientific consensus about which kinds of 
explanation can be deemed scientific. How economists justify 
their interpretations of reality as scientific constitutes the 
science of economic methodology. 
The term methodology is used in different ways, but it is 
used here to mean the principles underlying scientific 
procedures as opposed to the procedures themselves. Popper drew 
the distinction between methods and methodology thus 
'Methodology is the norm by which the scientist is guided when 
he is engaged in research or in discussion', which is different 
from 'a description of actual research processes, past or 
on-going and the methods actually used in such processes'. 2 
The general agreement amongst traditional economists on 
basic 'hard core' assumptions and their 'positive heuristic' 
need not imply any specific underlying methodology and thus need 
not imply that economists will always use the same models of 
economic reality. John Neville Keynes mentioned in Scope and 
Method that economists may use the same methods and yet disagree 
on methodology and hence on the nature of economic explanations. 
Many economists will use their basic hard core assumptions, 
add auxiliary assumptons and draw conclusions without apparent 
regard for or concern with methodological discussion or issues. 
But this strictly heuristic approach is inclined to bring with 
it its own unrecognized methodology. For example, economists 
who claim no interest in methodology may unwittingly adopt a 
strong methodological position by criticizing fellow 
practitioners for making 'unrealistic' or 'unverified' 
assumptions. 3 In section 7.2 below we discuss close link 
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between economic methodology and the philosophy of science and 
thereafter outline various methodoligcal positions. 
7.2 POSITIVE ECONOMICS, ECONOMIC METHODOLOGY AND THE PHILOSOPHY 
OF SCIENCE 
In Lakatos' terminology, the protective belt contains the most 
flexible part of a scientific research programme and it is here 
that the 'hard core' is combined with auxiliary assumptions to 
form the testable theories of a research programme. Positive 
economics contain all economists' theoretical attempts to 
interpret reality and hence the development and validation of 
positive economic theories is synonymous with work in the 
protective belt or normal science. But what properties do 
economists' theories need to have in order to earn the title 
scientific? Economists do not speak with a united voice on this 
issue, though some kind of consensus does exist on 
methodological matters, in that philosophy of science literature 
has a pervasive influence on economic methodologists' views 
about what does and what does not constitute scientific economic 
explanation and prediction. 
Many economic methodologists have depicted the methodology 
of economics merely as a special case of scientific methodology, 
endorsing in other words the view often expressed within the 
philosophy of science, that there should be methodological unity 
in all sciences whether natural or social. Mark Blaug, for 
instance, subtitled his important book on economic methodology 
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'How economists explain', to suggest, he said, that 'the 
methodology of economics is to be understood simply as 
philosophy of science applied to economics'. 4 
Not all economists in the past or at present subscribe to 
such a position. Ludwig von Mises5 was perhaps the most 
persuasive economic methodologist to disagree on this point, 
insisting on a methodological dualism, one for the sciences of 
nature and another for the sciences of human action. However, 
famous past methodological debates in economics, as presented 
for instance by Caldwell6, exemplify that economists have 
traditionally turned to the philosophy of science in order to 
settle differences or make their point. 
- It was the positivist philosophers of science who made a 
particular issue of the methodological unity of all science, 
seeking to demarcate. all science from non-science on the basis 
of positivist prescriptions, and economists, seeking to repeat 
the apparent success of 'hard sciences' such as physics, 
embraced positivism. 
Conventionalism was introduced into economics by- Vilfredo 
Pareto7, soon after its introduction into the philosophy of 
science " and thereafter positivism in all its variants 
considerably influenced economic methodology. Indeed, in the 
post-World War II methodological literature, positive economics 
came to be seen as largely synonymous with 'positivistic' 
economics. At the height of the positivist era, in the 1950s 
and 1960s, the linking of positive economics with positivism was 
widely acclaimed by methodologists and practitioners alike as 
highly desirable. 8 
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Popper's falsificationism has also influenced economic 
methodology though most commentators agree that falsification 
has entered the 'rhetoric' of economics but not to any great 
extent the practice of economics. 9 In other words, falsifi- 
cationism has been incorporated into economics to the extent 
that it has become widely accepted that attempts should be made 
to disconfirm rather than confirm theories. But the 
prescription to develop high content theories and test them 
vigorously using Popper's methodology has been less often 
followed. 
In recent decades, a growing disenchantment with extreme 
empiricist methodologies in economics has echoed developments in 
the philosophy of science. Post-positivist economic 
methodologists such as Caldwell10, Boland" and McCloskey12 all 
point out in one way-or another that positive economics is not 
and cannot be as objective a science as empiricist 
methodologists would have it. 
However, Caldwell suggests that it is still only amongst 
methodologists and a small band of practitioners that 'the death 
of positivism is old news'. Otherwise, for most economists, the 
positivist epoch in economics still holds sway. 'If you ask a 
working economist what science is, and why what he is doing 
qualifies as scientific his answer will be peppered with 
positivist buzz-words. The rhetoric of economics ... is still 
dominated by the phraseology of logical positivism and logical 
empiricism'. 13 
That is not to say that positivist-inclined methodologists 
ever agreed on precisely what it meant for economics to be able 
- 216 - 
to claim to be a positivist science. In his early work 
Hutchison14 effectively adopted a logical positivist position by 
claiming that the assumptions used in economic theories should 
be at least 'conceivably testable'. Machlup15 accused Hutchison 
of adopting an indefensible 'ultra-empiricist' position and 
expounded in the 1950s his own 'conventionalist' methodology 
which is in keeping with the less extreme dictates of logical 
empiricism, whilst Friedman's influential methodological 
pronouncements 16 of the 1950s defended unrealistic assumptions 
in. economic theories and has been identified with the position 
in the philosophy of science known as instrumentalism. 
In the following sections we do not attempt a comprehensive 
review of economic methodologies. However, we examine in more 
detail the methodological positions of Machlup and Friedman, and 
we begin by examining two economic methodologies which see 
subjectivism as legitimate in economic science. The 'Austrian' 
methodology discussed has probably become somewhat more 
acceptable in the post-empiricist era, though it remains 
radical,. that is outside the mainstream of economic 
methodologies. The 'moderate apriorist' methodology on the 
other hand, which contains elements of subjectivism and 
conventionalism, remains influential, though criticized in the 
past by positivists and falsificationists. 
7.3 AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS AND RADICAL APRIORIST METHODOLOGY 
Austrian economics originated in 1871 when Karl Menger's 
Principles of Economics was published in Austria. The tradition 
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was continued and developed principally by his students 
Friedrich Von Weiser and Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk, by their student 
Ludwig von Mises, his student and colleague Friedrich von Hayek 
and thereafter by students and followers of Mises and Hayek in 
Britain and the United States. 17,18 
Whilst the classical economists were primarily concerned 
with production the early Marginalists - Menger, Jevons and 
Walras - focused on demand. But whereas Jevons and Walras 
stressed the analysis of Newtonian-like equilibria amongst 
economic variables, Menger's unit of analysis was individual 
choice. The essence of economic reality, stressed Menger, 
resides with choices of individuals which determine all economic 
phenomena such as prices and profit. 
Menger's view of the role of individual choice is central 
to Mises'19 theory of human action. Mises' fundamental idea was 
that regarding human action as purposeful, yet based on an 
individual's subjective perception of knowledge, provided many 
insights into the workings of the economic system. Subsequent 
Neo-Austrian theorizing has continued to develop understanding 
of economic processes by viewing human action as individual- 
istic, subjectivistic and purposeful. 
Mises provided a major methodological input into the 
Austrian perspective by attempting to convince others of the 
scientific nature of his Austrian economics. Mises' 
methodological underpinning for his theories about economic 
systems invokes the Kantian notion that statements could be both 
a priori and empirically meaningful. Both logical positivism and 
logical empiricism denied the possibility of such statements so 
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that the ascendary of positivism in economic methodology ensured 
Mises' methodology had little support within the profession. 
Their fundamental assumptions are taken by economists to be 
a priori statements, but from a methodological point of view 
much hinges on how a priori is interpreted. In philosophical 
terms if a statement is a priori it is inherent in the structure 
of thinking, necessary for making sense of the world, rather 
than being learned by experience. A priori statements then 
divide into those that have only logical truth and those which 
are materially true. 
Propositions which have logical truth a priori are those 
which are 'taken as given' for the purpose of deductive 
argument. They therefore build into tautological statements 
that have inevitable implications, but are independent of the 
material truth. The radical apriorist methodology, most closely 
associated with Ludwig von Mises, and which he described as 
praxeological, gives to the important 'hard core' assumption of 
rationality the status not only of logical, but strict material 
apriorism. 
Mises' argument is that rational and human action define 
each other. Behaviour becomes action if it is teleological, 
that is goal-related or purposeful. Given all human behaviour 
is a matter of conscious choice and hence purposeful it becomes 
human action. At the same time, we would be incapable of 
understanding a world in which such conscious choices were not 
intended to substitute a 'better' for a 'worse' state of affairs 
in the actor's own estimation, thus human action must be 
rational. More especially, all economic action, action 
conditioned by the existence of scarcity, is rational. 
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From Mises' 'Austrian' perspective the assumption of 
rationality is an absolute prerequisite for explaining economic 
action and the` interpretation of other fundamental assumptions 
must be consistent with that interpretation if the basic 
assumptions, in combination, are to be built into a consistent 
general economic theory. Thus the 'adequate knowledge' 
assumption is interpreted within this methodological perspective 
as an individual's subjective perception of particular 
knowledge. With action taking place through time, knowledge of 
the future is always both subjective and uncertain. An 
individual's preferences are revealed only at the moment of 
choice, the notion of preference according to Mises, makes no 
sense apart from an actual choice made. 20 Preferences may 
change as information is gained and apparently inconsistent 
action over time results solely from changes in preferences or 
information. Thus, within this radical apriorist methodology, 
no state of the world can result from action that is not 
rational from the actor's point of view. 
The principle of methodological individualism takes on a 
strong' form in this perspective, which is insistent that the 
mode of economic analysis must always begin with the actions of 
individuals. For the purpose of economic analysis, societies or 
social groupings do not exist thus, for instance, society may 
not be posited with a purpose or function independent of the 
individuals of which it comprises. 
Economics becomes the objective science of human action by 
taking the ends people pursue as given, since the only person 
able to judge 'better' and 'worse' positions is the economic 
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actor. This means there is no conceivable way of objectively 
testing the rationality principle as Mises interpreted it. But 
that does not mean, according to Mises, that rationality is not 
a materially true fact. If the absence of rationality is 
inconceivable to the human mind, then rationality is embodied in 
human action and exists. It is a fact in Kant's sense of being 
a necessary category of the mind. 
To the extent that economic explanations and predictions 
follow by valid deduction from the higher-level materially true 
assumption of rationality, then they are also true beyond 
doubt. In Mises' words 'Praxeology conveys exact and precise 
knowledge of real things'. 21 
The major goal of economics from the Austrian point of view 
is explanation rather than prediction. Explanatory economic 
theories can show how purposeful human action based on an 
individual's subjective perception of knowledge can generate 
unintended consequences in the economic system through social 
interaction. The predictions derived from radical apriorist 
models are at best qualitative. Mises did subscribe to the 
technique of qualitative comparative statics to determine the 
qualitative, but not the quantitative, change brought about by a 
movement in one of the parameters of the model. More precise 
quantitative predictions cannot be made. Indeed, sometimes even 
qualitative predictions are not possible because of the 
indeterminancy inherent in human preferences, subjective 
knowledge and hence human action. 
It follows that empirical observation of past human choices 
will not necessarily yield regularities that may be confidently 
- 221 
extrapolated. And because local and time-specific economic 
information cannot be legitimately generalized econometric 
studies tend to be viewed as recent economic history. Such 
studies may be useful, if cautiously employed, to those 
requiring short-term economic forecasts, but they are not 
appropriate for testing the radical apriorist's general economic 
hypotheses. Radical apriorists' qualitative predictions are 
therefore not empirical in the accepted sense of the word 
because they cannot be objectively tested. But nor need they be 
so tested to the extent that the theories' predictions follow 
from the higher-level true generalizations. Empirical testing 
of the predictions is therefore neither necessary nor 
sufficient. Since the underlying general theory is 'true' if 
correctly deduced, then any apparent discrepancy between outcome 
and prediction following an observed economic change must either 
be accounted for by changing preferences or information, or 
because additional assumptions have been made about the 
situation facing the economic actor which did not hold in the 
real world. 22 
In all economic theorizing the 'engine of theory' used to 
explain or predict the consequences of an assumed change in the 
system comprises both the fixed fundamental assumptions and the 
additional assumptions - the conditions under which the change 
is assumed to operate - and which will vary from case to' case, 
time period to time period and country to country. 
As far as the additional assumptions are concerned, 
Austrian economists will, like other economists, differentiate 
between different categories of 'economic' good in their 
- 222 - 
analysis since accurate identification of the types of good 
under consideration, say an inferior or non-inferior good, 
private or public, durable or non-durable, may significantly 
affect the expected outcome. However, when it comes to market 
conditions Austrians tend to make their explanations and 
predictions on the assumption that markets are dynamically 
competitive. In a dynamic setting government policy alone can 
induce non-competitive market structures. Thus if predictions 
seem not to accord with outcomes Austrians will not doubt their 
'true' fundamental propositions but they may reassess the 
validity of thier conditional assumptions about, for instance, 
the type of good under consideration, and more rarely they may 
reconsider whether, in the case under examination, government 
policies are interfering with the naturally competitive 
properties of markets.. 
More recent developments in Austrian-type economics have, 
however, placed even less emphasis on the possibility of 
prediction in economics because of the subjectivity and 
uncertainty of knowledge. Hayek, for instance, has emphasized 
the major problem encountered by the rational economic agent is 
how to choose in the face of uncertainty and that the reality of 
subjective knowledge means the market for any scarce resource is 
a process of discovery which may tend at best towards a moving 
equilibrium. 23 Israel Kirzner24, using similar insights 
concerning the process of allocation, has highlighted the 
crucial role of entrepreneurs in market economies, since it is 
by their efforts to pursue unperceived or unexploited profit 
opportunities that the allocation of resources moves towards an 
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equilibrium. Shackle25 has taken the implication of subjective 
knowledge further by suggesting individuals may have such 
different future expectations that their domains of knowledge 
need not overlap. If there is no interpersonally-subjective 
knowledge then it may be invalid even to suggest that markets 
will move towards equilibrium. 
The radical apriorist line of reasoning means that normally 
the models they use will be verbal chains of reasoning, 
occasionally graphical, but rarely mathematical. Formal models 
based on 'false' assumptions, Mises said, may conceivably be 
useful in showing how the world does not work, but they are 
unnecessary for securing important knowledge about economic 
explanations or qualitative predictions, which are all 
economists can legitimately make. 
To the ultimate question, what conceivable circumstances 
could seriously undermine their general theory which explains 
economic systems by viewing human action as individualistic, 
subjectivist and purposeful, the answer for Austrians is none. 
The theory is not even relatively true, but deemed absolutely 
true. No other theory can be more true, nor more wide in its 
scope since it can be applied wherever scarcity features in 
choices. 
To follow Mises and endorse a subjective interpretation of 
economic knowledge and to minimize the relevance of objective 
evidence is to argue for methodological dualism, which insists 
on the essential disparity in methodological approach between 
social-and natural sciences. The argument is that natural 
sciences must rely on knowledge from without by means of 
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observation, but at the same time such observation may be quite 
reliable because of the stability of the parameters involved. 
Social scientists cannot be sure enough of the stability of 
their material to make justification via observation reliable 
but, unlike the natural scientists, they have available to them 
understanding of the subject matter from within by means of 
intuition and empathy and should exploit that knowledge. 
Not all Austrian or neo-Austrian economists now defend the 
radical a priori approach to the nature of economic knowledge 
proposed by Mises. Since the 1930s Hayek, for instance, has 
shifted his methodological position away from Mises. In his 
1978 Nobel lecture, Hayek stated that he considered the 
differences between the natural and social sciences to be 
'greatly narrowed' compared with his former extreme dualist 
position. Economists, he said, 'could achieve predictions which 
can be falsified and which are therefore of empirical 
significance'. 26 
More generally adherence to a severe subjectivist 
perspective appears to lead 'Austrians' away from uncompromising 
apriorism towards a pragmatic approach to methodology. 
Littlechild27 refers to prevailing methodological tolerance in 
relation to the current neo-Austrian movement, though 
Coats28 points out such tolerance might well be regarded by 
hostile critics as evidence of fundamental confusion and 
inconsistency. 
In the past Mises' methodology has been severely criticized 
by mainstream economists such as Blaug29. Recent trends in 
philosophy of science literature and economic methodology have 
possibly made the position more acceptable. 
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7.4 NEOCLASSICAL METHODOLOGY I- ROBBINS' MODERATE APRIORISM 
From the perspective of the moderate apriorist methodology the 
basic assumptions of economics in their weak 'hard core' form 
are considered self-evident propositions about reality on the 
basis of introspection, commonsense, or everyday observation of 
economic events. They are not facts prior to experience but 
nonetheless facts of immediate experience. Lionel Robbins'30 
essay On the Nature and Significance of Economic Science 
published in the 1930s is considered to be a classic statement 
of moderate apriori methodology, and in it Robbins mentioned 
that his own methodology owed a good deal to Mises. 
Machlup31 bracketed Mises and Robbins as sharing an 
apriorist methodology-, not because their views are identical but 
because they each considered the basic assumptions of economics 
are factual, even though they are not objectively testable. 
This methodological position Machlup associated not only with 
Mises and Robbins but also Frack 11 Knight, Nassan William 
Senior, John E Cairnes and John Stuart Mill. 
To the true generalisations of economics, auxiliary 
assumptions relative to time and space have to be added in order 
to apply the central assumptions to the real world. Since such 
auxiliary assumptions do not have the certainty of the economic 
generalisations, great care must be taken in applying derived 
theories to particular situations. The validity of a particular 
theory is a matter of its logical derivation from the 
assumptions made, but the applicability of the theory depends 
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upon the extent to which its concepts actually reflect the 
forces operating in the real situation under examination. 
As with radical apriorist theories therefore, when the 
basic assumptions are combined with subsidiary assumptions to 
yield the applications of economic theory such deduced theories 
should be checked both for their deductive validity and for 
their applicability. The latter is not a 'test' of the theory 
but a method of establishing the boundaries of its application. 
One obvious way in which to check the correct applicability 
of a given piece of economic analysis, is to put into action the 
policy recommendations that follow from it. If they work then 
the analysis can be considered to be a reasonably correct 
expression of the real-world situation at the time and place 
concerned. If the policy recommendations fail, then the theory 
was mis-applied. 32 
Moderate apriorists, like their radical counterparts, do 
not consider economic parameters are stable enough to enable 
quantitative prediction, though empirical studies may be used to 
test the qualitative predictions of a theory and hence confirm 
or disconfirm its applicability to a particular situation. 
Empirical studies may also be used to suggest plausible 
subsidiary assumptions to input into the derived lower level 
hypotheses. And econometric studies may additionally serve as 
short-run projections which do not claim to be forecasts of what 
will actually happen. In all of these aspects, moderate 
apriorist methodology is in keeping with the radical counterpart 
and hence also the application of moderate apriorist economic 
theories will yield explanation and at best qualitative 
predictions. 
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Another characteristic moderate apriorism shares with 
praxeology, though in less extreme form, is methodological 
dualism. This leaning is evidenced by the admissability of 
introspection and commonsense observation for establishing the 
truth of economic generalizations and for checking the 
applicability of economic theories. In 1935 Robbins wrote that 
'the procedures of economics can never be completely assimilated 
to the procedures of the physical sciences'. 33 
However, a major difference between moderate apriorism and 
radical apriorism concerns the interpretation in most applied 
work of the rationality principle. Robbins acknowledged that in 
the real world the economic actor's knowledge of present and 
future opportunities would be incomplete and uncertain. But 
instead of emphasizing the subjective nature of knowledge in 
derived theories Robbins espoused the 'expository device' of 
strong form rationality, meaning consistency in choice, 
accompanied by perfect foresight and well ordered preferences. 
These assumptions he accepted as simplifying assumptions, only 
first approximations to reality and hence in that sense 
'unrealistic'. 34 
With stable, well ordered preferences and full information 
rational economic agents will choose consistently. However, 
apparently inconsistent choice may merely reflect changing 
tastes or information. Thus the difficulty of disentangling the 
three assumptions means a strong assumption of rationality needs 
to be accompanied by equally strong assumptions about stable 
preferences and full information. 
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These strong assumptions can be defended by suggesting that 
in the real world, with trial-and-error the gap between actual 
and optimal decisions may be expected to close, and it is often 
this last element in the series of economic decisions that 
economic theory seeks to analyse. It is expected by moderate 
apriorists that the hypothesis of consistency in choice with 
stable preferences and information will be confirmed as working 
reasonably well in many situations. In other words, qualitative 
predictions from such long-run equilibrium models will accord 
with outcomes. But when the model does not fit then it is open 
to economists, as Robbins has pointed out, to create alternative 
'disequilibrium' models incorporating hypotheses about the 
decision-making process itself. 35 
However, the prominent use of strong assumptions about 
rationality, information and preferences by moderate apriorists 
means that whilst radical apriorists tend to concentrate on 
verbal models concerning market processes and are only 
marginally concerned with static equilibrium, the opposite is 
true of analytical economists. Moderate apriorists are 
consequently more ready to use mathematical models and more 
ready to transform those models into a testable econometric 
form, the latter to confirm the applicability of their model and 
to quantify parameters, although these are only ever historical 
and geographically specific propositions. 
Since the weak economic generalisations upon which all the 
moderate apriorist models are based are considered true, there 
is no conceivable circumstance which could falsify the hard 
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core, as opposed to the applicability of a particular model 
based on the hard core. The generalisations are applicable to 
all situations of scarcity. Unlike radical apriorism, however, 
Robbins' methodology is not marginal to mainstream economics. 
Stewart, for instance, notes 'that it does seem to be a strong 
contender as a 'correct' reconstruction of what is actually done 
in economic science'. 36 
Moderate apriorism suffered considerably at the hands of 
positivists, however. Hutchison in 1938 effectively used 
logical positivist arguments to criticize the methodologies of 
both Mises and Robbins and in so doing initiated the positivist 
era in economics. 
If economics is a science then, argued Hutchison, it must 
appeal to objective facts otherwise economists are engaging in 
pseudo-science. 37 Economic theory does indeed consist of a 
series of deductions from basic assumptions but the terms used 
in the framework, said Hutchinson, are only logical categories, 
they have no justifiable claim to material truth. Thus 
Hutchinson condemned the hypothetico-deductive system of 
economics built upon either unverifiable or unrealistic 
assumptions as devoid of empirical content. All assumptions in 
economics, he said, should be at least conceivably testable, and 
it was because of his suggestion that all theoretical 
(non-observable) terms should be eliminated from economics that 
Machcup termed Hutchison an ultra-empiricist. 
Hutchinson's logical positivist philosophical position was 
in fact eventually superceded both in the philosophy of science 
and in the methodology of economics. The idea surfaced that the 
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assumptions of which a theory is comprised do not have to be 
independently testable. The question of how to regard the 
assumptions of a theoretical science like economics was still an 
open question in the 1930s when Hutchinson first entered the 
debate, but later the methodological issue was resolved in 
favour of indirect testability. 
For positivists, the logical positivist prescription that 
all scientific statements require to be independently testable 
had been replaced by the 1950s by the logical empiricist view 
that theories may contain untestable statements that gain 
meaning indirectly when the theory as a whole is tested. 
Similarly, whilst Popper was concerned to falsify theories 
rather than confirm them as logical empiricists would seek to 
do, he too would look only at the predictions of a theory when 
testing. More recently in Lakatos' methodology of scientific 
research programmes propositions in the hard core of a research 
programme are not subject to independent empirical testing. 
Within the methodology of economics Machlup's 
conventionalism which emphasizes the testing of lower-level 
hypotheses is consistent with indirect testability and 
Friedman's instrumentalism stresses that theories must be 
capable of providing adequate predictions. In the Methodology 
of Economics Blaug summarized the current stance on the issue 
of direct or indirect testability thus 'Friedman and Machlup do 
seem to have persuaded most of their colleagues that direct 
verification of the postulates or assumptions of economic theory 
is both unnecessary and misleading; economic theories should be 
judged in the final analysis by their implications for the 
phenomena that they are designed to explain'. 38 
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Though they are very similar, Machlup's and Friedman's 
methodologies are not the same. It is first to Machlup's and 
then to Friedman's methodology that we now turn. 
7.5 NEOCLASSICAL METHODOLOGY II - MACHLUP'S CONVENTIONALISM 
Machlup39 describes himself as occupying methodological middle 
ground, between, apriorists and ultra empiricists, in that he 
does not hold the assumptions of economic theory as true 
apriori, but nor do they have to be independently testable. 
Machlup differentiates between fundamental hypotheses or 
high level generalisations, which have empirical meaning but 
cannot be independently testable, and situational assumptions 
(the initial conditions) which can be empirically checked, even 
if they are not. The 'strong form' fundamental assumptions 
economist make cannot be independently tested, says Machlup, 
because they are heuristic assumptions, simplifying assumptions 
which do not represent precise real world conditions. Heuristic 
assumptions therefore cannot be regarded as either empirical, 
that is independently testable or falsifiable on the one hand, 
or tautological on the other. Nor do they have to be 
reinterpreted and given the status of apriori true statements. 
Instead, they are an intermediate class of proposition whose 
function Machlup describes as serving to bring together under a 
common principle of explanation vast numbers of very diverse 
observations, masses of data of apparently different sorts, 
phenomena that would otherwise seem to have nothing in 
common. 'If these hypotheses are successful in this task and 
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give more satisfactory results than other modes of treatment 
could, then we accept them and stick by them as long as there is 
nothing better - which may be forever'. 
40 The economist's 
fundamental assumption of the 'ideal' type optimiser, choosing 
rationally with adequate information and stable preferences, is 
for Machlup just such an intermediate proposition bringing order 
to the' otherwise chaotic diversity of isolated economic 
decisions and actions. 
Developments in the philosophy of science in the 1940s and 
1950s resolved that not only economics but all theoretical 
systems incorporate propositions of this intermediate type, that 
can only be indirectly testable in the context of the complete 
theory in whch they are embedded. Thus Machlup's defence of 
economic principles are in line with logical empiricist 
philosophy. Machlup. indeed defends his position on the basic 
assumptions of economics by' reference to developments in 
philosophy. There is no reason to apologise, he said, for the 
use of such conventions, or heuristic principles, since they can 
provide explanations that are 'better' than mere descriptions. 
'For science, as it advances, does not rest content with 
establishing simple generalisations from observable facts. It 
tries to explain these lower-level generalisations by deducing 
them from more general hypotheses at a higher level - as the 
hierarchy of hypotheses of increasing generality rises, the 
concepts with which the hypotheses are concerned cease to be 
properties of things which are directly, observable , and instead 
become theoretical `concepts ... which are connected to the 
observable facts by complicated logical relationships. '41 
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Thus Machtup considers the fundamental assumptions of 
economics are not beyond challenge, but they can only be 
rejected along with the whole theoretical system of which they 
are a part. Such a rejection according to Machlup will only 
occur when a more satisfactory system is put in its place 'a 
theory is only overthrown by a better theory, never merely by 
contradictory facts'. 
A problem that arises when treating economic 
generalisations as conventions, or 'heuristic postulates' is 
whether scientists should agree on limits to the kind of 
assumptions which are to be allowed. Machlup considers there 
should be agreed limits to the effect that assumptions must be 
'understandable', because the economic facts to be explained or 
predicted, the data of 'observation' are themselves results of 
human action. This, says Machlup, imposes on the social 
sciences a requirement which does not exist in the natural 
sciences, that all types of action that are used in the abstract 
models constructed for purposes of analysis be 'understandable' 
to most of us in the sense that we could conceive of sensible 
men acting (sometimes at least) in the way postulated. Thus the 
fundamental assumptions of economic theory are not subject to a 
requirement of independent empirical verification, but instead 
to a requirement of understandibility. 
42 
The fundamental assumption of 'economic man' with his 
preferences and information as given, in other words the ideal 
type of economically efficient decision maker is, says Machlup, 
both understandable and has impressive explanatory power, in 
that neoclassical long-run static equilibrium analysis is 
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successful in making qualitative predictions of mass reactions 
to prounounced changes in conditions. The role of economic 
theory, together with the indispensibte assumption of 'economic 
man', is to trace out the predicted responses of imagined actors 
to imagined changes in the conditions they face. To test 
whether these interpretations of reality are 'acceptable' 
requires only qualitative indirect testing. Qualitative 
indirect testability, says Machlup, is an adequate and effective 
criterion of appraisal for economic theories and one which rules 
in favour of neoclassical economics. Indeed, quantitative 
rather than qualitative prediction is not possible in economics, 
a belief in line with Machlup's 'Austrian' connections. 43 
Machlup's methodology is defensive of the neoclassical 
paradigm in several respects. It defends the practice of using 
'unrealistic' assumptions against critics such as Hutchinson and 
Samuelson. 44 It defends the practice of developing theories 
with only qualitative rather than quantitative predictions, 
theories which as far as falsificationists are concerned cannot 
be properly, that is, severely tested. 45 Given that theories 
always contain both heuristic and situational assumptions 
Machlup also acknowledges the extreme difficulty of discovering 
which assumptions are not holding if the predictions of a theory 
do not conform with outcomes. In other words, neoclassical 
theories can only be used where they are applicable, though it 
is not always clear whether a theory is or is not applicable 
before applying it. Nevertheless, empirical studies can never 
confirm or falsify a theory, but can only be used to judge its 
applicability. 
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Neoclassical theories will not, according to Machlup, 
always be applicable. However, the neoclassical paradigm can 
claim many instances of qualitative predictive success, and it 
is applicable to many problem situations. Thus Machlup is 
protective of the whole paradigm. In the absence of a 'better' 
paradigm addressing the same problems as addressed by 
neoclassical economics, there is no justification, for 
overthrowing it. 46 
7.6 NEOCLASSICAL METHODOLOGY III - FRIEDMAN'S INSTRUMENTALISM 
Undoubtedly, the best known and most influential post-World War 
II essay on economic methodology was published by Friedman in 
1953.47 Blaug called Friedman's essay the 'centerpiece of 
post-war economic methodology' and summarized it as conveying 
the idea that unrealistic assumptions are acceptable in a theory 
provided the theory deduced from them culminates in falsifiable 
predictions. He also adds that 'so subtle is Friedman's 
argument that even now it is difficult to find two economists 
who will agree on precisely what it was that Friedman said'. 48 
Boland claims Instrumentalism is the primary methodological 
point of view expressed in Friedman's essay, and that Friedman 
has since supported this proposition49, though Friedman was not 
aware that he was advancing an instrumentalist position when he 
wrote his original article. 
Boland stresses that Friedman's methodology in fact 
combines elements of conventionalism, as supported by Machlup, 
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and instrumentalism. It is conventionalist in the sense that it 
stresses the organizational function of theories, but Friedman's 
most controversial statements, that the purpose of science in 
prediction and that the 'realism' of assumptions is irrelevant, 
are instrumentalist. If a number of competing theories meet the 
most important criterion of predictive adequacy, then says 
Friedman, additional 'arbitrary' criteria of theory choice must 
be used to choose between them, the criteria most favoured by 
Friedman being simplicity and fruitfulness. 
Caldwell50 emphasizes that even though instrumentalism has 
been largely rejected within the philosophy of science on the 
grounds that the goal of science is the discovery of explanatory 
theories not merely theories which are predictively adequate, 
still it is possible to support instrumentalism on 
methodological grounds. Methodological positions, he says, can 
only be evaluated given a certain view of the purpose of 
science. If Friedman clearly states that the only goal of 
economic science is to find theories that are predictively 
accurate then his methodology can be defended on those terms. 
Blaug finally summarizes Friedman's stance as suggesting 
that assumptions are 'largely' irrelevant to the validation of 
theories, which ought to be judged 'almost' solely in terms of 
their instrumental- value in generating accurate predictions. 
51 
Individual statements by Friedman are, however, consistent with 
a more extreme instrumentalism. Friedman's assertion that to be 
important a theory must be descriptively false in its 
assumptions Samuelson later called 'the extreme version of the 
Friedman twist'52, and condemned him for holding such a view. 
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Another aspect of Friedman's irrelevance-of-assumptions 
thesis is highlighted by Blaug. This is Friedman's contention 
that it is useful and acceptable to impute 'as if' motives to 
economic actors which they do not hold consciously, for example 
'individuals behave 'as if' they were seeking rationally to 
maximize their expected returns ... and had full knowledge of 
the °data needed, to succeed in this attempt'. 53 One of the 
implications of 'as if' reasoning, Blaug54 points out, is that 
Friedman's thesis repudiates methodological individualism, 
commonly held to be embedded in the neoclassical approach to 
economics, whereby testable predictions are derived from the 
rational action of individual economic agents. As far as 
Friedman is concerned, the predictions of microeconomics are 
instead derived from a dynamic selection process rewarding 
economic actors who act as if they were rational maximizers. The 
as-if formulation of economic theories offers no causal 
mechanism linking economic behaviour to the maximization of 
returns and means that it becomes pointless to debate the 
realism of as-if assumptions, which are by definition neither 
true or false. However, Friedman was not alone in advocating 'as 
if' reasoning. Machlup also supported its use, both in relation 
to the fundamental assumption of rational action with knowledge 
and preferences given, and in relation to the situational 
assumptions incorporated into economic theories. The 
fundamental assumption he said, 'may be understood as an 
idealisation with constructs so far removed from operational 
concepts that contradiction by testimony is ruled out, or even 
as a complete fiction with only one claim: that reasoning as-if 
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it were realized is helpful in the interpretation of 
observations'55 
As far as the additional situational assumptions are 
concerned, Machlup supported as if reasoning as follows. 'After 
listing the many examples of the various types of assumed 
conditions it will probably be agreed that a rigid verification 
requirement would be out of place. Usually the judgment of the 
analyst will suffice even if he cannot support it with more than 
the most circumstantial evidence or mere 'impressions'. ... 
Lacking the relevant information, he may first try to work with 
a model of perfect polypoly (ie perfect competition) - although 
he knows well that this cannot fit the real situation ... lie may 
find the results reasonably close to the observed data and leave 
it at that. ... When a simpler hypothesis, though obviously 
unrealistic, gives consistently satisfactory results, one need 
not bother with more complicated, more realistic hypotheses'. 56 
Reder57 points out that Chicago neoclassical economists, 
including Friedman, similarly apply 'as if' reasoning to the 
situational assumptions. Reder suggests in particular that in 
applied work such economists "have a strong tendency to assume 
that, in the absence of sufficient evidence to the contrary, one 
may treat observed prices and quantities as good approximations 
to their long-run competitive equilibrium values. Call this the 
'good approximation assumption'". 58 Use of the good 
approximation assumption is a hallmark of Chicago applied 
research says Reder, but the assumption is not tested directly; 
instead the Chicago style is to treat it as a 'maintained' 
hypothesis and apply it, using the resulting research findings 
as a test of its applicability of to a given situation. 
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Any apparent inconsistency of empirical findings with 
predictions of the theory are treated as anomolous, requiring in 
the first instance, re-examination of the data to reverse the 
anomolous findings. If observed behaviour is incompatible with 
rationality assuming competition, then it may imply either 
monopoly or market failure. However, both monopoly and market 
failure are treated as unusual situations to be analyzed ad hoc, 
but not requiring a shift of emphasis away from the basic 
competitive general equilibrium model with all markets 
continuously clearing. Stigler's research programme in 
Political Economy is in essence, says Reder, an attempt to 
extend 'tight prior' theorizing to applied research concerned 
with political processes. 59 
7.7 POST-EMPIRICISM 
In the positivist neoclassical era economics was regarded as 
scientific because of its empiricism. The idea that predictions 
derived from economic theories could and should be tested 
against actual outcomes was widely held by economists. But set 
against the problems of empirical testing highlighted in the 
post-empiricist literature, a growing disenchantment with 
Friedman's 'positive' economics and empiricism generally has 
emerged, deriving from recognition that what passes for 
empirical testing in economics may be only pseudo-testing. 
60 
Moreover the work of Kuhn and other growth of knowledge 
theorists has undermined confidence in traditional philosophy of 
science, by revealing that methodological rules have no absolute 
authority. Economic science and science as a whole can then be 
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seen as a kind of game, where the scientists themselves 
formulate the rules which will determine what is and what is not 
to be 'accepted' as scientific knowledge. 61 Philosophers and 
methodologists can offer their opinion, but ultimately it is the 
scientific community, or the elite of that community, who accept 
or reject demarcation criteria concerning what is and what is 
not acceptable. 
The lack of respect for any methodological authority can 
easily lead to methodological anarchism. If it is impossible to 
choose rationally one methodology over another then why choose 
any? McCloskey writes 'Economists do not follow the laws of 
enquiry their, methodologies lay down. A good thing too. '62 He 
argues instead that economists should inquire into really what 
it is that causes them to believe in a theory. It is an enquiry 
he says, that will lead back into the 'context of discovery' of 
theories which methodologists have for long considered, 
scientifically, to be of no relevance. Yet it is, claims 
McCloskey, precisely because implicitly economists accept or 
reject their theories on wider grounds, that they often 
intuitively reject the result of empirical tests. Coase makes 
the same point by saying that quantitative studies are searches 
for numbers with which to make specific a theory already 
believed on other grounds. 63 
What is alarming in the way economists really justify their 
theories, says McCloskey, is that it is largely unexamined. 
'Economists agree or disagree .. o but they do not know why'. 
His argument is that obscured by official methodology, workaday 
methodology has not received the attention it deserves. Since 
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the way scientists discover theories and the way they should 
justify them has been held for so long as being distinct it has 
been overlooked that what serves to convince scientists (as they 
do other people) are 'metaphor, case study, upbringing, 
authority,, introspection, simplicity, fashion, theology and 
politics' as well as 'the illuminating regression, the crucial 
experiment, the implication unexpectedly falsified'. 64 
To recognise that the methodology economists use and should 
use is rhetoric says McCloskey, would merely recognize the good 
health of economics disguised now under the neurotic inhibitions 
of an artificial methodology of science. A conclusion from 
McCloskey's line of argument, which he fully accepts, is that 
there is no meaningful way to separate science from 
non-science. The demarcation problem is but a pseudo-problem. 
By no means -all the reactions to post-empiricist 
methodological literature is so extremely unfavourable to 
methodology. Both Mark Blaug and Terence Hutchinson, for 
example, continue to argue that scientists should agree on 
criteria for demarcating science from non-science. 
Blaug argues that sophisticated falsificationism is the 
appropriate prescriptive methodology for economics. 65 Hutchison 
continues to advocate a methodological stance which pays more 
attention to the realism of the assumptions of theories. A 
programme of investigation that begins with statistical surveys 
to ensure that 'economists' assumptions are grounded in reality 
is a position he re-iterated in critical response to Friedman's 
instrumentalism and its accompanying 'irrelevance of 
assumptions' argument. 
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'Certain facile superficialities have become widely 
accepted as a defence of this preoccupation with over-simplified 
abstraction', says Hutchison. 'First, from the platitudes that 
some degree of abstraction is essential and inevitable in 
virtually any kind of scientific study, it seems to be presumed 
that no degree or kind of abstraction needs any defence or 
explanation ... . Secondly, there is the facile and frequent 
claim that it does not matter about the assumptions - however 
unrealistic they are - because the test comes with the 
predictions. But then one finds that the predictions, in their 
turn, are not very precisely or critically tested (if at all), 
and that there is a great deal of complacency regarded their 
adequacy for the guidance of decisions and policies'. 
66 He 
continues that 'it is not good advice to condemn induction if 
the nature of the material restricts the genuine scope for the 
hypothetico-deductive method'. 67 
Another response to the dilemma of what constitutes 
scientific appraisal of theories is that of methodological 
pluralism. Pluralists are less concerned with devising one best 
methodology than' with criticizing and reinterpreting past 
methodological positions using ideas developed in the philosophy 
of science. The question they are exploring is the same one 
addressed in one way or another by all post-empiricists and to 
which currently there seems no answer - if empiricism is dead, 
whither methodology? Both Lawrence Boland68 and Bruce 
Caldwell69 accept the label of methodological pluralists. 
The idea remains entrenched in both the philosophy of 
science and economic methodology that the 'context of 
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justification' is crucial. Theories must be justified in some 
way as an 'acceptable' interpretation of reality, or scientific 
knowledge would be whatever anybody says it is. It is not the 
need for justification per se, but what might reasonably 
constitute justificaton which is prominent in methodological 
discussions, and where currently the hallmark is lack of 
intellectual, consensus. 
In general, the recognition that there is no obviously 
superior, way of validating theories has led to better 
appreciation of the complexity of theory justification, but 
otherwise the uncertainties and disagreements presently 
expressed by economic methodologists and philosophers of science 
exude an air of 'crisis'. 70 In calling for theory validaton by 
the objective empirical methods advocated for the natural 
sciences, the positivists and falsifications exposed the 
weaknesses of subjectivism in economics. Now, in turn, the 
weaknesses of empriicism have been exposed in all the sciences. 
If anything, the air of 'crisis' in economic methodology 
seems greater than in scientific methodology generally. This is 
because in economics the methodological problems highlighted in 
the philosophy of science have been reinforced by the growing 
awareness of the significance of differences between the natural 
and social sciences, especially regarding the degree of 
complexity associated with empirically justifying theories in 
economics. 
Hutchison is amongst those who have emphasized that the 
difference in degree between economics and natural sciences in 
terms of the precision of predictability, and hence testability 
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via prediction, is more significant than previously thought. 
His change of view is particularly pertinent, since it was after 
the publication of Hutchinson's book in 193871 that empirical 
testing in economics came to constitute its hallmark of 
scientific respectability. But he later acknowledged 'important 
and ineluctable differences between economics and natural 
sciences, and by 197772, whilst continuing to defend the 
hypothetical-deductive model of explanation as the 'ideal' 
scientific standard for economics, conceded that lack of 
information and the changeability of economic variables make it 
impossible to implement successfully. 
A more extreme reaction to the present situation, when 
methodological disputes in economics can no longer be resolved 
by turning to standards prevailing in the natural sciences, is 
to advocate a different kind of methodology. Not only are 
efforts to make economics into a 'hard' science seen as 
misguided, but subjective evidence, the element of 
'understanding' in human affairs, is considered as relatively 
more valuable and more important than presented by most orthodox 
post-war methodologies. From this perspective not only may 
subjective evidence become more acceptable but possibly too the 
'Austrian' methodology gains relatively more respectability. 
7.8 CONCLUSIONS 
Economists build different general theories of economic reality 
based on their common hard core and justify the 'acceptability' 
of those theories in different ways. Equally they justify the 
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use of their situational assumptions in different ways. The 
current lack of intellectual consensus in economic methodology 
means that the 'realism of assumptions' controversy, which 
seemed largely settled on the basis of Machlup's and Friedman's 
contributions is reawakened, as is the use of subjective 
evidence and, more circumspectly, the use of 'materially true' 
a priori reasoning. 
As far as the settlement of intra-disciplinary disputes is 
concerned the pertinent point is that the present methodological 
controversy is within the mainstream and not merely represented 
by attacks on orthodoxy by non-traditional grouping. Also 
Caldwell and other methodologists claim that, at a time of rapid 
change, practitioners are not keeping up with new methodological 
developments, resulting in a tendency for economists to defend 
the scientific status of their work by professing a 
'positivistic' methodology discredited by the specialists, even 
though the professed methodology of practitioners is not 
necessarily the one they practise. 
Current methodological disputes also pose a problem for the 
credibility of positive economics as a scientific, 
non-evaluative discipline. Their methodological rules lead 
economists to endorse or reject statements that claim to explain 
or predict economic behaviour and these statements often have 
implications for economic policy. It is inevitable therefore 
that criticism will be focused on the principles of theory 
formulation and justification, on the origins of those rules and 
on how the rules are perpetuated, for instance, via university 
hierarchies and the policing of journals. 
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It is not surprising either if positive economists are 
sometimes accused of personal or group bias in their practice of 
economics. As we explore in Chapter 8, the various perspectives 
economists have on how the economic world 'ought' to be and the 
proposals put forward for achieving desired ends are influenced 
by, and influence, the 'positive' models of reality they 
construct. 
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CHAPTER 8 
NORMATIVE ECONOMICS AND THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
Normative economics is distinguished from positive economics on 
the basis that it is concerned with what ought to be rather than 
what is. In general terms, mainstream economists tend to agree 
on what society's economic objectives ought to be. Ignoring 
their own preferences and not questioning other people's values, 
the task of the normative economist, they agree, is to determine 
how accurately the economic system reflects the preferences of 
the individuals comprising society and which policies, if any, 
could be prescribed to ensure that economic processes and 
outcomes reflected those given individual values more 
accurately. 
In fact this clear distinction between what individuals do 
value and what they should value is not always maintained by 
economists, whose personal bias is sometimes reflected in their 
policy prescriptions. In particular many have a specific view 
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of the proper role of government, deriving from the close 
relationship between economics and liberal values noted in 
Chapter 6, which leads them to place a high value on individual 
freedom. Since economists accept that individual values must be 
taken as given, invariably their domain of change revolves 
around proposed government policies, and hence a bias against 
government intervention, or in favour of cerain kinds of 
intervention over other kinds, is important. 
But arguably economists' value judgements enter normative 
economics more frequently via their positive economics. 
Positive, economics, being the science of what is, supposedly 
fills a value-free gap between proported economic problems and 
their solutions. It attempts, in other words, to explain or 
predict the consequence of alternative proposals for dealing 
with the problem in hand. The discussions of Chapter 7 
highlighted the potential difficulties with this view. 
Leaving aside the issue of subjectives bias, different 
groups of economists will build different general theories of 
how the economic system works and adhere to differnt rules of 
analysis to justify those theories. Inevitably the various 
groups will 'accept' their own 'model' for explaining and 
predicting outcomes of both economic and political-economic 
processes and hence evaluate the need for, and the likely 
consequences of, government action differently. 
- 253 - 
The close link between economists' positive and policy 
stances leads us to conduct the following discussion from the 
perspective of various positive positions, so that Austrian, 
neoclassical Welfare and neoclassical Chicago normative/ 
positive perspectives are explored independently. 
As in all economic analysis there is inevitably an element 
of simplification in this classification and the 
characterizations of each position may also be perceived as 
speculative and controversial. The aim, however, is to begin to 
explore in general terms where and why economists disagree with 
each other about the formulation and solution of problems, as 
well as why and where they agree. 
Most economists would probably agree that neoclassical 
Welfare economics can still claim to be the most central 
'mainstream' perspective, though neoclassical Chicago economics 
is a strong contender. The 'Austrian' perspective is included 
because it appears to be becoming more influential and usually 
its policy conclusions reinforce those of the neoclassical 
Chicago economists. 
8.2 THE AUSTRIAN VIEW 
Both normative Austrian and neoclassical economists take it as 
given that society will wish to seek the efficient use of its 
- 254 - 
resources, that is to maximize the utility gains f rom resource 
use based on the summation of individual goals. ' To this end, 
the Austrian theory of human action and the rational subjective 
direction of limited means towards individual's ends, leads to 
the conclusion that free choice in markets will usually produce 
the best allocation of resources. 
On this perspective the involvement of government is 
limited to the protection of property rights and to the 
provision of certain public goods such as law and order and 
defence which the market will not adequately provide. The 
limited involvement of government in economic decisions is 
indeed not only desirable but necessary since otherwise 
collective interference will thwart the rational action of 
individuals. 
Austrians do not recommend the use of markets to allocate 
resources because they lead to a world of long-run equilibrium. 
On the contrary, reaching any such equilibrium requires the 
acquisition of correct knowledge which is never possible. 
Instead, Austrians justify their objective of, market allocation 
to ensure efficiency, on the basis of their positive 
interpretation of economic reality, which involves evaluating 
the market process over time. 
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According to Austrian positive economic theory, when 
individuals are free to choose they act rationally and are able 
to exploit and thereby unintentionally to eliminate errors in 
resource allocation. Eliminating error in resource allocation 
is an improvement for society. Market allocation will therefore 
ensure the continuous elimination of allocative error, and the 
best allocation of resources will occur within an institutional 
framework whereby government regulation and policies are 
designed to provide the best possible setting within which 
organic market processes can operate. 2 
Like neoclassical economists Austrians see monopolies, 
externalities and public goods as economic problems in that they 
hinder an efficient allocation of resources, but both the 
problems and the solutions to the problems are set within a 
dynamic, individualistic and subjectivistic perspective. 
As far as monopolies are concerned, within dynamic markets 
high profits in the short-run are viewed as evidence of 
entrepreneurship and play a vital role in signalling new 
opportunities for producers and resource owners and hence a 
vital role in the efficient dynamic allocation of resources. 
But long-term barriers to entry into any product or input market 
retard the dynamic competitive process so that governments have 
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a role in reducing any such entry barriers. However, Austrians 
hold that within a framework of properly defined and enforced 
private property rights markets will be dynamically 
competitive. Over time even a so-called natural monopoly (where 
economies of scale are not exhausted by a sole producer of a 
product) may face competition from new products and processes. 
Thus the main government role in respect of monopolies is 
to avoid creating or endorsing them by statute or government 
regulation, and to dismantle existing statutory monopolies such 
as those enjoyed by the professions and nationalized 
industries. 3 Statutory or regulated monopolies are difficult 
for the market process to erode even in the long run, since the 
vital profits signals to innovative producers will be suppressed 
by the state. 
The Austrian approach to externalities is not as well 
developed as its approach to monopoly. As Littlechild points 
out, 'Austrian economists have mostly been preoccupied with 
economic problems which seemed of more significance than 
externalities'. 4 In general terms though Austrians see 
externality problems as arising from loopholes in the system of 
property rights and their solution in correcting the inadequacy. 
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This definition of the externality problem and proposed 
solution was suggested by Mises5 and is fully in keeping with 
the Austrians' faith in the competitive process. The prospect 
of paying and receiving damages for costs inflicted, it is 
claimed, will encourage the people concerned to come to a 
mutually beneficial exchange, spurred by private gain and based 
on individual preferences and subjective knowledge. Moreover, 
in the absence of government imposed barriers, the emergence of 
new externalities is likely to result automatically over time in 
the emergence of relevant property rights. On this view the 
creation of property rights is an 'organic' phenomenon 'not a 
conscious act but rather the unintended consequence of a 
multitude of actions by people with control over property and by 
others trying to attain such control'. 6 
. Even Austrian economists, however, usually acknowledge a 
role for government in ensuring adequate provision of some 
public goods. Like neoclassical economists Austrians draw a 
conceptual distinction between rivalrous and excludable private 
goods and public goods, where if such a good is provided no one 
in the relevant group can be excluded from the non-rivalrous 
benefit. 
The problem of inadequate private provision of public goods 
arises when the collective value placed on such a good, say 
national defence, exceeds the cost of provision, but that cost 
exceeds the benefits to any one individual. Then the 
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consequences of individual rational behaviour results in 
inefficient group behaviour. Where public goods span a large 
part, or all, of the population of a country, as in the case of 
law and order or defence, some form of government action to 
organize production and finance it out of taxation is usually 
acknowledged as being required. In this, neo-Austrians are true 
to the dictates of Adam Smith.? 
However, for Austrians the characterization of a good or 
service as a public good may be a necessary but not a sufficient 
condition for state intervention, for it is not inevitable that 
the market process will fail to provide public goods, or that 
market failure in terms of inappropriate provision will exceed 
government failure. If the benefits received by one individual 
within the benefitting group are greater than the costs, the 
individual will be willing to pay the costs of provision and 
others may free-ride, enjoying the benefits without contributing 
to the costs. A similar situation may arise if a smaller group 
of individuals within the larger benefitting group perceive the 
good as so valuable to them as to be worth the cost of 
organizing its production for their own benefit. 
Also the benefits from public goods need not extend to the 
entire population of a country, but may be restricted to a 
smaller geographical location and a smaller group of 
beneficiaries. Where the scope of the benefits is limited, 
exclusion is possible and limited-scope ' public goods can be 
provided privately by for instance, ' a group of individuals 
getting together and forming a club, where benefits are limited 
to members only. 
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Even when the State is involved in the provision of public 
goods, Austrians do not perceive the government as perfecting 
the market by ensuring an 'optimal' level of production, since 
the rational behaviour of individuals engaged in the political 
process, subject themselves to imperfect information, is 
unlikely to result in such an optimal level, where everyone 
contributed to the cost in proportion to the benefits they 
derive. And, once again, government intervention is likely to 
impede the dynamic process whereby new entrants continually seek 
innovative, lower cost ways of producing a good, or close 
substitutes for it. 
Austrians tend to be more concerned with total welfare than 
with the distribution of welfare and envisage that seeking 
equity may well retard dynamic efficiency. The static 
allocative r6le of a market economy is, for Austrians, less 
important than the opportunities it affords for innovation and 
thus for growth in welfare. On this view profits are necessary 
as signalling devices and as incentives for risk-taking 
entrepreneurs. Public finance policies which seek to 
redistribute income more 'fairly' are therefore likely to place 
obstacles in the path of economic growth, possibly leading to 
stagnation or even decline in total welfare. 
8 
Many Austrian economists are also liberals, concerned with 
the maintenance and extension of all individual freedoms, moral, 
political and economic, where freedom is given the negative 
definition - the absence of coercion of some individuals by 
others. 9 Fundamental to this concept of freedom is the notion 
that the essence of humanity lies in the capacity to choose and 
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not solely in the ability to reason. Thus freedom for liberals 
is not an instrumental value, a means to some ultimate end such 
as the efficient use of economic resources. Instead it is an 
ethical basic value judgement, an ultimate end in itself. '° 
Freedom involves the right to choose and to recognize the 
responsibilities which are coincident with choice, where 
fallibility and the right to err are viewed as necessary 
corollaries to the capacity for self-improvement. But negative 
freedom cannot be unlimited since then a situation would arise 
in which freedoms were in conflict with each other without any 
mechanism for reconciliation. Some level of coercion is 
therefore necessary to protect the most highly valued freedoms. 
The source of the most significant threats to individual 
liberties are seen to stem from concentrations of political and 
economic power and hence liberals have a preference for a system 
of 'minimal' government, with government regulation and policies 
supporting and, encouraging voluntary exchange via competitive 
market processes. Thus, for Austrian liberals, there is no 
conflict between the ultimate objective of individual freedom 
and the efficient use of resources, since the best way of 
maintaining and extending both is by espousing entrepreneurship, 
capitalism and free markets. 11 
The personal value judgements of individual Austrian 
economists need not, of course, correspond with a posited 
hierarchy of ethical judgements which places greatest value on 
individual freedom to pursue individual ends-12 Therefore, 
Austrian positive theory about the way markets operate need not 
be associated with the normative view that a minimal state r6le 
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is desirable. There is nevertheless a kinship between Austrian 
economics and liberal political ideas and the two are often 
linked in the literature. 
8.3 NEOCLASSICAL WELFARE ECONOMICS 
Neoclassical economists, like Austrians, sugggest that one of 
the economic aims of society is efficiency, that is the 
maximization of the individual utility of all members of 
society. But, as with the Austrian perspective, the positive 
neoclassical Welfare economists' explanation of how market 
economies operate is linked to their representation of the ideal 
outcome. Austrians visualize the market as a process of search 
and discovery and set. the optimum solution in terms of the ideal 
process. Neoclassical Welfare economists analyze the properties 
of markets in general equilibrium and their idealization is set 
in the same terms. 
Pareto13 asserted that long-run equilibrium with perfect 
competition was consistent with maximum collective welfare in 
the sense that no reallocation of resources could make anyone 
better off without at least making one person worse off. For 
situations other than such a competitive equilibrium Pareto 
offered no guidance on changes that might increase or decrease 
total welfare, and Pareto optimality itself, like the set of 
equilibrium prices generated by a competitive economy, is 
defined with reference to a given initial distribution of 
resources amongst members of society. 
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In the 1930s Hicks and Kaldor developed the concept of 
potential compensation, suggesting that a resource change was 
Pareto - superior if the gainers from that change could 
potentially compensate the losers and still gain. To recommend 
actual compensation would have violated the Robbins thesis, also 
shared by the Austrians, that comparisons between the utility of 
different individuals cannot be made without introducing a value 
judgement. The new 'value-free' Welfare economics also took the 
prevailing distribution of initial resources as given, thus 
invoking no value judgement so long as compensation payments are 
not actually recommended. 
In fact Welfare economics is not so much value-free as 
value-agreed14, supposedly resting on the weakest set of 
assumptions which appeared to capture the acceptance of the 
majority of people in western societies, the three postulates 
being that most individuals are the best judge of their own 
welfare, that social welfare is the summation of individual 
welfare and that the making of interpersonal comparisons over 
matters of utility is objectively impossible and hence is 
precluded. 
By making the increase of total welfare the single social 
objective, the issue of the distribution of resources between 
individuals can be by-passed. Such 'a position depends 
nevertheless on the implicit assumption that the primary 
distribution of income, or resources, is socially acceptable. 
Attempts have been made to demonstrate the possibility of 
near universal consent for specific primary distributions. 
John 
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Rawls'S envisaged a constitutional meeting of all members of 
society gathered behind a 'veil of ignorance' which precluded 
their knowing their present or future positions in society. 
Rawls assumed all individuals bargaining in such circumstances 
would be risk averse and produced his famous 'difference 
principle', which implies a veto for the least advantaged 
members of society over any resource change. This principle 
means that justice comes close to being synonymous with equality 
in the distribution of income. An alternative approach by James 
Buchanan16 suggests that the prevailing distribution of income 
is constitutionally endorsed and therefore represents a socially 
acceptable distribution. 
Despite an extensive literature, a widely accepted notion 
of distributive justice has not been incorporated into Welfare 
economics, though it has been accepted since Pigou wrote on the 
subject, that there is likely to be a trade-off between equity 
and efficiency. '? In any event, it remains customary for 
economists to separate the sphere of production and exchange 
from the sphere of distribution. Welfare economics incorporates 
income distributional considerations only obliquely by 
indicating that there are many pareto-efficient allocations of 
resources each with a different distribution of welfare 
depending on the primary distribution of rights upon which 
willingness to pay is based. 
That any competitive equilibrium is Pareto efficient and 
any Pareto-efficient outcome can be decentralized and attained 
by a competitive market equilibrium given an appropriate 
redistribution of initial endowments, are the two fundamental 
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theorems of Welfare economics. They suggest prima facie a dual 
role for an all-knowing agent in market economies. First the 
attainment of a Pareto efficient outcome, when markets fail to 
meet the competitive ideal, either by market improving or market 
displacing policies. Second, the redistribution of initial 
resources to ensure that the particular Pareto-optimum 
allocation of resources is socially desirable. 
In practice, since neoclassical Welfare economists isolate 
efficiency considerations from distributional considerations and 
concentrate on the former they often seem to be endorsing the 
desirability of expanding total welfare over that of achieving a 
'fair' distribution. As Hahn says, 'the sloppy habit in the 
literature in speaking of a Pareto-optimum has misled many 
people into believing that their duty of serious moral argument 
has been fulfilled when they can show that some policy outcome 
is Parto-efficient. As a matter of fact, of course, this is 
just the beginning of such an argument'. '8 
As far as the aim of an efficient allocation of resources 
is concerned, some neoclassical economists have been at pains to 
emphasize the limitations as well as the policy insights 
deriving from general equilibrium analysis. Hirsch" for 
instance pointed out that certain market externalities cannot be 
corrected even by an omnipotent agent, and surmised that such 
intractable externalities are likely to become pervasive with 
increasing affluence. As people become materially richer, he 
claims, they will come to demand more and more non-augmentable 
'positional' goods. That is, many will demand the exclusivity 
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that only a few possess, yet that demand could not be met by 
giving all equal access. Thus an externality will remain. With 
absolute limits in the supply of 'positional' goods, increases 
in total social welfare could only occur with a change in 
preferences. Without assuming such a change, the scope for an 
efficient allocation of resources via markets will diminish, a 
trend which will eventually herald the end of the capitalist 
system. 
Hahn acknowledges Hirsch's theoretical contribution in 
looking beyond the traditional boundaries of economics but 
doubts the practical relevance of the issue he raises. Hirsch, 
he suggests, may have underestimated the availability of 
substitutes even for 'positional' goods; there are, for 
instance, numerous activities which provide opportunities for 
individuals to be esteemed. 20 To the extent therefore that an 
efficient allocation of resources as traditionally defined is a 
relevant and plausible aim, he says, then general equilibrium 
theory has value in that it predicts certain situations in which 
the invisible hand of the market will work imperfectly and also 
suggests some ways in which these failures may be rendered 
smaller. 
But Hahn also stresses that to demonstrate the logical 
possibility of market failure or to demonstrate that such 
failure actually occurs on a large scale is not in itself a 
demonstration of the desirability of government intervention, 
since there may not be a social device which will perform the 
allocative role more satisfactorily than the market. 
21 Ile 
acknowledges in particular, and in agreement with the Austrians, 
that in order to improve on market outcomes government planners 
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have to find means to use and to aggregate the private 
information of citizens. 
Thus, to make a really valuable contribution to policy, 
neoclassical Welfare economists must confirm or attempt to 
falsify, not only that in certain circumstances actual markets 
will fail as their theory predicts, but also that actual 
government policies will have the predicted market improving 
effects. Even on this basis, however, Austrians will argue that 
neoclassical Welfare economists miss the point, since the 
adequacy of an economic system they say, should be judged not by 
the efficiency with which' it allocates resources at a point in 
time, but by the speed with which it discovers and responds to 
new opportunities over time. For liberals, on the other hand, 
even if increased government intervention along the lines 
suggested by Welfare, economics could increase efficiency and 
hence total economic welfare such a move would not necessarily 
be desirable, since' it would imply greater coercion of the 
individual. Thus Rowley and Peacock22 have argued against the 
'dictatorship of Paretian Welfare economics' on the basis that 
it sanctions a wide range of government interventions. 
8.4 NEOCLASSICAL CHICAGO ECONOMICS 
Chicago neoclassical economists utilize static equilibrium 
analysis but do not on the whole subscribe to Welfare economics, 
to the` extent that it implies an extensive interventionist rSle 
for government. Instead, they tend to be anti-statist, a 
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perspective partly attributable to the application of 'tight 
prior' assumptions to the functioning of economic and political 
markets and partly attributable to the fact that a significant 
number of Chicago economists are also liberals. 
'Tight prior' equilibrium theorizing is based on the strong 
hypothesis that Pareto optimality is continuously achieved. 
This assumption must in turn be based on equally strong 
underlying assumptions and although this underlying theory is 
open to different interpretations the following statements seem 
to capture its essence. 23 First it is assumed that most 
transactors are price takers, second that current prices can be 
taken as market clearing prices, third that neither monopoly, 
externalities nor government action affects relative prices to 
the extent of preventing the marginal conditions relevant for a 
competitive equilibrium to prevail generally, and fourth that 
information is treated by transactors like any other commodity 
in that it is acquired up to the point where its marginal cost 
equals its price. Unknowable or unobservable changes in the 
economic system can induce transactors to make 'rational' 
mistakes. But otherwise these underlying assumptions ensure 
that individual optimization leads to overall efficiency. 
Consistent with mainstream noeclassical methodology, there is no 
suggestion that these assumptions are descriptively accurate or 
'realistic'. They are not believed to hold exactly, rather they 
are 'first approximations', their justification lying in the 
asserted predictive power of the 'theories in which they are 
embedded. 
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It is clear there is a major difference between the 
theorizing of neoclassical Welfare economists and neoclassical 
Chicago economists. The former allows for the possibility and 
probability of widespread and sizeable market failures, due to 
monopoly, externalities, public good and imperfect information, 
whilst the latter treat actual economies as good approximations 
to the ideal competitive economy in equilibrium. 
Thus Chicago economists will tend to argue that the 
presence of monopolies, though often asserted, is less often 
confirmed, that genuine monopolies are usually transitory and/or 
restricted to only one market with little economy wide 
influence. As Reder states, 'Normatively, Chicago economics says 
monopoly is bad: positively it says it is of infrequent 
occurrence and limited impact. '24 
Market failures, due to externalities or 'free rider' 
problems are similarly treated as unusual situations to be 
analyzed ad hoc, but not requiring a shift of emphasis away from 
the basic competitive model. The Coase Theorem25 approach to 
externalities is in line with the prevailing 'tight prior' 
theorizing of the Chicago school. The idea associated with 
Welfare economists that losses caused to injured parties from 
externalities, can exceed the gains to those causing them, 
implied Coase, is inconsistent with the maintained hypothesis 
that all transactors are continuously optimizing. It is as 
possible to buy and sell the right to inflict loss as 
it is to 
buy and sell any other commodity, though the property rights of 
the injurers and injured and the laws of liability will 
determine the direction and extent of compensation. 
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Similarly Demsetz's26 explanation of how property rights 
come to be assigned is equally consistent with the Chicago 
economic view. Property rights over the permissible use of 
resources, goods and services as well as the specification as to 
whether they should be used privately, by a small group, or 
collectively under management of the state are a social 
phenomenon. Where individuals are isolated from one another or. 
where goods and resources are abundant property rights have no 
meaning. Thus property rights, says Professor Demsetz, have 
evolved and will further evolve over time precisly as an 
efficient response to the emergence of new externalities. 
Moreover, transactions costs and the type of property 
rights in which trade takes place are interrelated. Changes in 
property rights will occur when the people concerned find that 
there are efficiency gains (mutual benefits) to be derived from 
such a change. These benefits must be sufficient to compensate 
for the transactions costs involved in establishing and policing 
the new structure of rights. If the costs of establishment and 
enforcement exceed the benefits then no change in the structure 
of rights will emerge. But the larger are the benefits to be 
had from a change in rights, for instance to prevent the 
pollution of a lake, then the more likely that the transaction 
costs associated with a change of rights, even if very high, are 
worth incurring. Thus, once again, everyone is viewed as 
optimizing at every point in time, and property rights will 
emerge and change over time in response to the action of 
rationally optimizing individuals. 
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An inevitable corollary of neoclassical Chicago theorizing 
is that within a suitable property rights framework further 
government intervention in the economy is unnecessary except in 
unusual ad hoc situations, and is likely to impede rather than 
promote efficiency. 
Of course, in order to claim their stylized explanations of 
how the economy operates are 'justified' explanations, based on 
the hypothetical-deductive model, both neoclassical Welfare and 
neoclassical Chicago economists are required to test their 
'reasoned' predictions against actual outcomes. Following Kuhn, 
however, we might expect 'Normal Science' within each 
sub-paradigm to explain away any contradictory, evidence; for 
instance, the data could be claimed to be suspect or the model 
wrongly applied, at most we might expect an ad hoc adjustment to 
the basic model to suit a particular real world circumstance. 
What we would not anticipate is that contradictory evidence 
would cause a significant alteration in the basic general 
theory. 
The branch of Chicago economics associated with Milton 
Friedman and like-minded economists, is in keeping with Welfare 
economics to the extent that they assume, as do Welfare 
economists, that the economic reformer could move the economy in 
a desirable direction by persuading a beneficient and omnipotent 
government to behave appropriately. Their anti-interventionist 
policy recommendations as compared with those of Welfare 
economists therefore stem primarily from the application of 
tight prior theorizing to economic markets. If within the 
'essential minimum' framework of government regulation, markets 
are perceived as operating for the most part as if competitive, 
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then more widespread government activity is unnecessary and even 
counter-productive for the efficient allocation of resources. 
Thus Friedman has combined his positive economic analysis with 
economic policy proposals which involved either increased use of 
the price system, substitution of private for public production, 
replacement of legal compulsion by voluntary - financially 
induced - private co-operation, or a mixture of all three. 
27 
Stigler's research programme within the Chicago school of 
thought takes a different approach to public policy issues and 
focuses not on reformist policies but on the positive analysis 
of political markets. By applying tight prior theorizing to 
political markets he interprets political decisions as a 
personal utility-maximizing response by politicians and 
bureaucrats to pressures exerted by their constituents who are, 
in turn, responding. to the perceived effect of possible 
government action on their own utility levels. People in 
government, therefore, will not act on advice designed to 
promote the general welfare unless it happens to coincide with 
their concern of getting re-elected or otherwise advances their 
individual utiltity, for instance, by expanding their political 
influence. Stigler defends his perspective thus 'until we 
understand why our society adopts its policies, we will be 
poorly equipped to give useful advice on how to change those 
po licies'. 28 And Stigler claims his economic theory of 
regulation is to a considerable extent in line with earlier work 
by Anthony Downs29, and Buchanan and Tullock. 
30 
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Though Stigler's positive analysis of the political market 
place has no place for the economic reformer, the position 
remains compatible with a minimal view of government activity. 
The argument goes as follows. Individuals may sometimes seek 
the agency of'the state when allocating their resources, but the 
state as a self-seeking agent is likely to divert resources to 
its own ends, and is also very difficult to monitor and 
control. The state is therefore likely to be an inefficient 
instrument for achieving any given objective. Either the 
political process will frustrate the achievement of the goals 
altogether, or will alter them in the process of achievement and 
at a minimum will waste resources. Any reformer who advocates 
more rather than less government intervention in the economy 
must therefore refute these positive claims of government 
failure or minimize their importance in relation to market 
failure. 
Chicago economists pay little attention to the social 
objective of a fairer distribution of welfare. Early, in the 
Chicago tradition, Henry Simons31 advocated the redistribution 
of income to make it more equal through progressive taxation, 
but increasingly concentration of the Chicago school on matters 
of income distribution has been predominantly positive. 
32 
Richard Posner, for instance, rejected a normative interest in 
income distribution on the part of professional economists, 
claiming that the economist's proper contribution to the debate 
over the appropriate distribution of income and wealth is 
positive rather than normative. 33 
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The positive arguments for limited government intervention 
in the economy proposed by Chicago economists, which as far as 
efficiency is concerned minimizes market failure accentuates 
government failure or both, and which considers the issue of 
'just' distribution as beyond the scope of economics, is 
separate from the normative liberal espousal of the minimal 
state outlined earlier. Those economists, of whatever school of 
positive economics, who place individual freedom from coercion 
high in their hierarchy of ultimate values will seek limited 
government per se. For Chicago liberals, however, as for 
Austrian liberals, positive analysis and basic value judgements 
frequently coincide and reinforce adherence to the ideal of 
limited government. 
8.5 CONCLUSIONS 
The economist's positive approach to normative issues outlined 
in the previous sections is an ideal that takes society's ethics 
for granted and avoids personal value judgements except when 
they coincide with society's. There is, however, also a 
'positivistic' element still in normative economics which says 
that economists must minimize their reliance on statements 
regarded as empirically untestable, in particular the utility of 
different individuals cannot be scientifically compared. This 
stance is much less defensible given more recent developments in 
the philosophy of science and economic methodology; nevertheless 
it contributes in practice to the downplaying of distributional 
issues and concentration on issues of economic efficiency. 
- 274 - 
Whilst their choice of social problems to be investigated 
may be defended on scientific grounds by economists, still the 
consequences of that focus can be normative. Attention may be 
given to problems of efficiency rather than distribution because 
the latter are deemed less 'amenable to scientific analysis. 
Nevertheless such a choice may be interpreted by others as 
suggesting distributional issues are less important. 
Economists' interpretation of the need for government 
intervention to achieve an efficient allocation of resources 
given the initial distribution of resources, is also normative, 
this time resting on the methodological value judgements 
underlying their positive interpretations of economic reality. 
Both Austrian economists, whose positive theories emphasize the 
dynamic aspects of the economy, and Chicago neoclassical 
economists minimize -the need for government intervention for 
efficiency purposes, basing their policy advice on their 
different positive perspectives. 
Welfare economists posit that actual economies can and do 
fail to maximize efficiency, allowing potential scope for 
widespread government intervention. However a competitive 
equilibrium and hence market failing departures from it, are 
being increasingly redefined by mainstream neoclassical 
economists to take explicit account of the inevitability of 
uncertainty, information and transactions costs034 It is also 
increasingly accepted by them that it needs to be demonstrated 
that government failure will in actual fact be less damaging 
that the market failure which government policies are meant to 
correct. 
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At the same time, many economists of varying 'positive' 
persuasions are also liberals who believe it is wrong to entrust 
the control of resources to the government. Even if resource 
owners reveal through the political process that they wish to 
pass resource control to government, and even if governments 
pursue'social objectives as if beneficent and all-knowing still, 
in the liberal view, such a move should be resisted. The 
strictly economic and liberal strands of thought are often 
intertwined in policy pronouncements and are not . easily 
disentangled.. 
Looking somewhat deeper into the economists' normative 
stance, . strands of thought common 
to all the economic 
perspectives outlined can be traced. one obvious implicit 
normative assumption is that the individual human being is the 
focus of attention, in that it is his or her values that count. 
The emphasis on the human, individual occurs in both positive and 
normative economics. It confirms the ecocentric conservationist 
claim that the predominant view in modern societies gives 
precedence to human beings over other life forms. If the values 
of all living things were to be given equal status in-economic 
theory, then nothing could be said about the efficiency of 
markets since transactions which benefited the human beings 
involved might damage other living things. Economists may trace 
spillover effects from market transactions on third parties but 
such third parties are only ever other human beings. 
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Rothbard defends the Austrians' insistence on focusing on 
the role of the acting individual as far as positive economics 
is concerned because 'only human beings possess free will and 
consciousness'. 35 Neoclassical positive economics similarly 
concentrates on individual rational human action to explain and 
predict economic reality, but without claiming human rationality 
as 'a priori' true. However, economists also use the concept of 
the rational human individual in normative economics. Their 
perceived truth appears to be that people count as individuals 
in determining optimal outcomes, whereas non-human animals and 
other life forms do not, because human beings alone are 
rational. 
Philosophers of science have suggested that a vision of 
what the world 'should be' is antecedent to and guides the 
selection of all a priori scientific assumptions, including 
those of economists. The mechanistic vision of nature and of 
the economic world is one such vision, which allows mankind to 
entertain the opimistic conception of reliability and control, 
the central place of mankind in the universe is another. Both 
of these are buttressed in economics by the equally optimistic 
notion of human rationality. 
A further normative implication lies behind the economist's 
stance that society as a whole is only ever interpreted in terms 
of the summation of the individuals comprising it, and their 
values are taken as given. Economists may justly claim, either 
that this is a methodological device, or that this view of 
society is positive since in market based economies the 
preferences of individuals are seen as paramount. Adopting such 
- 277 - 
a position does mean though that economists, as economists, 
cannot query the ethical desirability of social values. The 
status quo effectively becomes scientifically endorsed, whether 
it relates to the value placed on human being vis-a-vis other 
life forms or, for instance, to the value attached to the 
welfare of distant generations. The economist's position on 
these and other matters of concern to conservationists is 
further investigated in chapter 9. 
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CHAPTER 9 
CONSERVATION IN ECONOMICS 
9.1 INTRODUCTION 
Robbins defined economics as 'the science which studies human 
behaviour as a relationship between ends and scarce means which 
have alternative uses'. 1 The physical environment therefore is 
the proper preoccupation of economists both as a scarce means to 
alternative given ends and as an end in itself, in that it 
services human needs directly via the satisfaction it gives and 
indirectly, both as a source of food and raw materials and as a 
sink for waste products. 
However, the environment as amenity is only one amongst 
many ends which add to the maintenance and enjoyment of life and 
natural and environmental resources are only some of the scarce 
inputs into the production process. Natural resource and 
environmental economics are thus embedded in the wider 
discipline and subject to the general principles of economics. 
Inevitably the same unity and disunity that exists within the 
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wider discipline over the appropriateness and justification of 
positive theories purporting to explain and predict how actual 
markets and economies function, and normative policy issues, are 
mirrored in the relevant subdisciplines. 
In this chapter' we outline economists' approaches to 
conservation issues and the policy questions they provoke. In 
section 9.2 we briefly outline the general economic approach to 
conservation and in subsequent subsections of the chapter we 
develop the economic perspective on conservation issues which we 
identified as being of particular concern to present day 
conservationist, namely the 'quality of life' issue and the 
welfare of future generations. In so doing we compare the 
approaches of neoclassical Welfare economists, the neoclassical- 
Chicago and Austrian schools of thought. The latter two are 
usually related because, though they build different positive 
theories and have different methodological views, their ideas 
about the economy, government policy and the environment are 
often very similar. 
9.2 CONSERVATION IN ECONOMICS 
The central theme which runs through positive and normative 
economics is that of economic efficiency. Economic reality 
is 
explained and predicted on the basis that rational 
self-motivated individuals will, given their initial endowments, 
exchange with each other to their mutual advantage. 
The individual welfare gains from exchange will 
be 
maximized when decision-makers have so allocated 
the rights 
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under their control, that there is no alternative allocation 
such that any one decision-maker could have his or her expected 
utility increased, without a reduction occurring in the expected 
utility of at least one other decision-maker. For Austrian, 
Chicago and mainstream neoclassical economists alike this is a 
definition of Pareto optimality, an allocation of resources 
which is economically efficient. 
Any society of rational individuals, so the argument goes, 
will prefer an allocation of resources which is Pareto efficient 
rather than an allocation which is not, since otherwise it will 
be missing the opportunity of allowing at least one of its 
citizens to reach a position which he or she prefers. Therefore 
the efficient allocation of its resources is one social 
objective which any society 'ought to' seek. 
For economists therefore conserving the physical 
environment means using it in an economically efficient way, the 
focus being on gaining the greatest possible human well-being, 
based on individual evaluations, from its preservation and/or 
development. The conservation of the physical environment in 
turn becomes part of the larger issue of efficient allocation of 
all resources. 
Preserving the physical environment from direct use in the 
production of goods and services is valid if the utility gained 
from doing so exceeds the utility foregone. Similarly saving 
physical resources for later human use is valid 
if their use in 
the future is likely to be more highly valued in terms of 
satisfaction gained than exploitation now. 
2 This decision 
necessitates comparing the expected benefits 
from present use 
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with expected benefits from later use and again puts the issue 
of conservation back in the domain of efficient resource 
allocation. 
The idea of conservation as a policy of shifting the use of 
resources towards the future is traditional and familiar in the 
economic literature, as is the idea of preserving rather than 
developing the environment, mirroring the concern in the 
conservationist literature with 'quality of life' issues and 
with protecting the material welare of future generations. 
However, the rise in energy prices in the 1970s found 
economists using the term conservation in a less familiar 
context. The present and expected future rise in energy prices, 
they pointed out, required a re-evaluation of the relative use 
of energy resources as compared with use of other resources 
in the production process, in order to minimize the deleterious 
effect of high energy costs on the material well-being of 
consumers. 3 
The pursuit of energy conservation consistent with 
efficient resource allocation, seen not as a barrier to greater 
material affluence for current consumers but as a means of 
providing the maximum possible level of goods and services from 
given resources, is not predominant amongst the concerns of 
current conservationists, though it does find echo in their 
earlier preoccupation with 'wise use' to protect and ensure 
continuing national prosperity. 
The purpose of economic conservation then is to eliminate 
antra and inter-temporal economic waste in order to improve the 
well-being of the human users of physical resources. Economic 
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waste is economic inefficiency, a waste of human welfare. In 
the case of comparisons between present and future use such 
waste may arise from a non-optimal time distribution of use4; 
and resources may be 'wastefully' used up too slowly as well as 
too fast. Similarly too little or too much of the natural 
environment may be preserved for 'quality of life' purposes, 
rather than being used as -an input into the production and 
consumption process. And too much or too little in the way of 
natural and environmental resources relative to other inputs may 
be used to produce desired goods and services, for the total 
resource costs of such products must be properly counted in 
order to make efficient use of all of society's scarce 
resources. 
The economic definition of waste, and hence the economic 
definition of conservation to prevent or reduce waste, is not 
therefore the physical concept of waste familiar to many 
conservationists. 
. 
For economists, a physical concept of waste 
fails to convey that waste prevention is intended to protect or 
add to human welfare. 
Furthermore, by assuming the individual is the best judge 
of his or her own welfare, economists as economists, do not 
sanction the denunciation of various end uses to which resources 
may be put as frivolous or unnecessary. It is assumed, for 
instance, that big-car owners or big-house buyers pay the 
additional resource cost in their construction and use in order 
to achieve greater material comfort which they value. Economic 
resource conservation does not mean that any trend towards 
larger houses or cars, or increased car ownership, would or 
should stop solely because of resource considerations. 
5 
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But nor is there any reason why, if individual preferences 
indicate, more resources should not be preserved rather than 
exploited, or saved for use by future generations rather than 
used for producing goods and services that benefit those 
presently living. Always the paramount consideration for 
economists is to ascertain the extent to which resources are 
allocated to reflect individual preferences and how, if at all, 
economic efficiency can be improved to increase total human 
welfare. 
Though the term conservation carries a different meaning 
for economists than it does for conservationists clearly both 
are debating the same fundamental question about the 'proper' 
use of the natural environment. All mainstream economists tend 
to, define 'proper use' in terms of economic efficiency and thus 
ask similar conservation-related questions - do market-based 
economies allocate natural and environmental resources 
wastefully, if so, are there ways in which the government can 
and should intervene? However, economists from different 
schools of thought answer the questions in different ways. 
9.3 WELFARE ECONOMICS AND THE QUALITY OF LIFE 
Welfare economists envisage the ideal economic system as one 
where individuals acting in accordance with their preferences 
and with full information ensure that the sum total of society's 
resources, natural and human, are allocated in such a way as to 
maximize the total level of human satisfaction 
derived from 
those resources. In such an economic system, 
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individual preferences would also determine how much of the 
natural environment is preserved, how much transformed and when 
and for what purposes. 
In actual modern economies, individuals use some resources, 
including natural and environmental resources, to produce goods 
and services which they value. But is the personal satisfaction 
derived from such consumption purchased at the expense of other 
satisfactions which have not been properly counted? This is the 
general question which underlies much 'externality' analysis in 
economics and which has meant that Welfare economists have come 
to embrace many of the concerns of conservationists about the 
'quality' of modern life. 
The belief that human satisfaction can be increased by the 
use of markets to expand production and consumption of goods and 
services was a central message of classical economics. But 
early in the neo-classical tradition AC Pigou presented a 
different picture. In The Economics of Welfare6, he analyzed 
possible divergences between marginal social net products and 
marginal private net products. It was the first systematic 
economic analysis of what were later called externalities. 
Using static partial equilibrium models, Pigou expounded 
the idea that services or disservices could be incidentally 
rendered to unintended parties in the course of producing and 
supplying goods to consumers. The problem was that the 
recipients of the incidental services or disservices could not 
readily, if at all, be charged or compensated and the producer 
of the goods and services received either less or more than the 
total impact of the firms' activities upon the community 
warrented. Amongst the external disservices cited by Pigou were 
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the pollution from factory chimneys, the construction of 
buildings in already congested areas, and in general any 
structure that brought about a collective deprivation of beauty, 
light and air. 7 
Pigou considered that the government should intervene to 
remove divergences between private and social net products. 
8 
Subsidies were required when the private activities were 
undercompensated compared with the total service they produced. 
But taxes and, where necessary, absolute prohibitions were 
required where the social product was less than the private 
product. The incidental disservices, no longer 'external' would 
then be counted as a cost in the reckoning of the responsible 
party. The tendency would be for private and public interests 
to converge, though Pigou recognized that it might be difficult 
to put a monetary value upon the services and disservices in 
question. 
Initially, both in America and in Britain, the attempt to 
take all possible consequences of economic activity into 
account took place without a coherent intellectual backing. It 
was not until academic developments in the 1950s that 
cost-benefit analysis was formalized and largely accepted as the 
best, if imperfect, solution to the problem. 9 With cost-benefit 
analysis the net social benefit or cost of a project was to be 
calculated in terms of the Pareto criterion for welfare 
maxmization, augmented by the Kalder-Hicks compensation 
principle. 
Central to cost-benefit is the idea that individuals' 
enjoyment derived from unpolluted and otherwise unspoilt natural 
environments, including the various forms of 
life that inhabit 
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them, can be expressed in principle in monetary terms, as 
willingess to pay or compensation required to forego such 
alternative satisfactions. The use of money as a measuring rod 
or yardstick of the relative value of those intangible benefits 
being as David Pearce expresses it 'to anchor the measured 
economic value of things outside markets to things inside 
markets ... the economic value of 
beefburgers can then be 
compared to the economic value of a scenic vista'. 
10 
In attempting to identify various reasons why individuals 
might prefer and be willing to pay for natural environments to 
be conserved rather than exploited economists have embraced many 
of the ideas of conservationsts. Echoing the concerns of 
homocentric conservationists they have pointed out that many 
individuals might express a willingness to pay to protect 
natural environments.. not only to avail themselves of the 
satisfaction to be derived from its use in the present, but in 
order to safeguard for themselves the option of using it, say 
for recreational or aesthetic purposes, at a later date. 
11 
Economists have similarly taken note of the preoccupations 
of ecocentric conservationists by suggesting many individuals 
may value ecosystems, wilderness, animal and plant species 
simply because they exist. 12 Pearce suggested the total 
economic value individuals may place on the preservation of 
natural environments relative to the value placed on development 
equals actual use value, option value plus existence/intrinsic 
value. 13 Yet also as we intimated in earlier chapters, there may 
be competition between individuals willing to pay to preserve 
the existence of unmanaged environments and those willing to pay 
for actual use value or optional future use. 
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Economics remains, of course, essentially lomocentric in 
that it' is the preferences of human beings that count, neither 
rocks nor any form of non-human life have independent rights. 
Nevertheless, human beings may express preferences in the form 
. of willingness to pay, based on the view that human actions 
should cause least possible harm to the natural environment and 
its inhabitants, and it is to this extent that the views of 
ecocentrics have been incorporated into economic analysis. 
Concepts such as irreversibility14, intrinsic uncertainty as to 
the operation of ecosystems, and the availability or otherwise 
of substitutes would all determine the extent to which natural 
environments were conserved rather than exploited in the 
production and consumption process, or preserved inviolate 
rather than subject to human scientific management. 
Always the information feeding human preferences even if 
individuals are assumed fully informed can never be in any 
ultimate sense 'true'. Knowledge as to whether, say, human 
actions on a particular landscape are irreversible, of whether a 
specific species is endangered, of whether the workings of 
particular ecosystems are intrinsically unknowable, is always 
socially constructed. All knowledge about the functionings of 
natural systems as well as about economic systems is necessarily 
governed by the beliefs and characterizing value judgements of 
the scientific community in question. 
Nevertheless, the claim for cost-benefit is that if only 
resources could be allocated in accordance with its principles 
then the sum total of human satisfaction from their allocation 
could be maximized, based on individual preferences expressed as 
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willingness to pay or as compensation required for satisfactions 
foregone. And the allocation of resources would continually be 
adjusted to reflect changing human preferences and information. 
However, both the principles and practice of cost-benefit 
analysis have critics within and outside the economics 
profession. 
Mishan15 was one economist very much concerned with what he 
perceived as an uncounted decline in the quality of life 
associated with growth in the production and consumption of 
goods and services, who advocated the use of cost-benefit 
analysis to improve the allocation of resources. But Mishan 
was also concerned about the incidence of costs and benefits 
across income groups. A feature of environmental externalities, 
he said, was their inequitable distribution in that the rich had 
comparative freedom to escape from the deterioration of their 
environment caused through noise, congestion, pollution and the 
destruction of natural beauty. 16 
Mishan suggested cost-benefit analysis be conducted on the 
basis of a realignment of property rights, whereby every human 
being was granted a 'right to amenity', and where actual 
compensation was paid to individuals for intrusions upon their 
personal preferences. For those individuals who did not wish to 
sell their right to amenity at any price, Mishan proposed a 
system of separate facilities -largely closed to the modern 
world, closed for instance to cars and never flown over by 
planes. 17 
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Rowley and Peacock echoed Mishan's criticism of the 
transference of the Kaldor-Hicks potential compensation 
principle to cost-benefit analysis, but they did so from a 
rather different 'liberal' perspective. Their main objection 
was that if compensation is not actually paid to the losers of a 
resource change, respect for the initial distribution of 
property rights would be violated. '8 
However, from the perspective of many conservationists the 
whole orientation of economic cost-benefit analysis is too 
liberal in that it seeks, and seeks to respect, individual 
preferences. Mishan no less than Rowley and Peacock was seeking 
ways to reflect accurately existing individual preferences about 
the best allocation of resources. Whilst the latter sought to 
minimize the coercive nature of government interventions in the 
economy to uphold individual freedom, Mishan sought by 
government intervention to ensure 'quality of life' preferences 
were taken into account where the market failed to reflect them, 
but still individual preferences were taken as given. 
Berry voiced his objection to the principle of cost-benefit 
analysis precisely because it incorporated the assumption that 
individual preferences are sacrosanct. In so doing he voiced a 
sentiment often expressed in the conservationist literature 'The 
beauty and danger of cost-benefit analysis', he wrote, 'is that 
no matter how relevant or irrelevant, wise or stupid, defensible 
or indefensible a want may be, an economic analysis is able to 
derive a legitimate policy from cost-benefit analysis because 
all the options are considered to be equally valid and good'. 
19 
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While the principles on which cost-benefit calculations 
should be based are disputed amongst economists and between 
economists and conversationists, a position on which all 
involved have come to be increasingly in agreement is on the 
extreme difficulty, and indeed impossibility, of accurately 
operationalizing such analysis. 
The practical difficulties of attempting to identify and if 
possible monetarize all possible costs and benefits from a 
proposed or existing activity have always been seen as 
formidable and subject to error because, by definiiton, many of 
the crucial calculations involve non-marketed variables. Past 
attempts by economists to place monetary value on amenities and 
human life have in particular been the subject of severe 
criticism from within and outside the profession. 
In Britain, the much criticized cost-benefit analysis 
carried out by the Roskill Commission in the late 1960s to 
determine the best site for the third London airport, 
contributed to subsequent lack of influence and enthusiasm for 
the use of cost-benefit analysis to determine social choices. 
Adams20, for instance, repeated the Roskill Commission 
assumptions on benefits and costings for an airport centred on 
Westminster, and produced a convincing case for siting the third 
London airport in Hyde Park. 
Both theoretical and practical problems associated with 
cost-benefit are exaccerbated by the introduction of materials 
balance models into economics. 21 Such models suggest material 
residuals from production and consumption are pervasive, that 
their growth in terms of mass will be close to the total amount 
of terrestial energy and materials entering the economy, and 
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that their physical harmfulness will be related to when and 
where residuals are released and on their physical interaction 
with the rest of nature. This holistic approach suggests 
economists' models which attempt to determine optimal trade-offs 
between produced goods and services and those naturally 
available, such as clear air, beautiful views and endangered 
species, should be of a general equilibrium form, to take 
account of interdependencies, rather than based on the partial 
equilibrium framework often used for the analysis of 
externalities, and also ideally be dynamic. 
22 
Neoclassical economists' general equilibrium models have an 
additional layer of complexity as compared with the purely 
physical materials balance models, in that they purport to 
incorporate the preferences of fully informed individuals 
in 
order to assess social preferences for one allocation of natural 
environments over another. Nevertheless, economists' evaluation 
of costs and benefits must incorporate an interpretation of 
physical realities. For instance, if in relation to whole 
ecosystems, such as rain forests wetlands and lakes, the view of 
the physical world (as finely balanced and intrinsically 
unpredictable) presented by many ecologists, is accepted as 
'true', then the accurate costing of externalities becomes 
impossible even conceptually. The difficulty occurs because 
full knowledge would have to incorporate the notion of intrinsic 
uncertainty whereby the destruction or disruption of one natural 
environ will have literally unknowable effects on others. 
Thus 
the number of human beings affected, and how, is also 
unknowable. 
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If intrinsic uncertainty in nature is rejected as a 'true' 
interpretation of reality, or is considered applicable only to 
certain natural assets, then still statistical uncertainty 
confronts the economic reformer. The theoretical problem of 
measurability then takes the form of either risk, where the 
value of a variable (costs and benefits flows or discount 
rates), is not known but its probability distribution is, or of 
uncertainty where neither the value of a variable, nor its 
probability distribution is known. 
Empirical studies23 by economists in collaboration with 
physical scientists have sought to establish damage and costs of 
control estimates in many situations, in order to attempt to 
establish optimal allocation of natural environments. The 
fragmentary nature in particular of damage estimates, however 
leads many economists to the conclusion that in practice such 
optimal levels cannot be accurately established. 
The general message of Welfare economists is that whilst 
governments should be responsible for allocating natural assets 
as optimally as possible as between conservation and 
development, cost-benefit analysis can only provide partial 
guidance to any would-be social welfare maximizing decision- 
maker. Nevertheless, case by case cost-benefit analyses to help 
determine the most socially desirable use of natural assets such 
as environmental media, whole ecosystems, or other living 
species, may provide the best guidance available. 
On the matter of how best to achieve desired levels of 
intervention, whether it be the achievement of desired 
environmental quality standards, the continued existence of 
certain designated ecosystems, endangered species or scenic 
views, Welfare economists claim to be more positively useful. 
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Both theory and much supporting evidence24 has established for 
instance, that for achieving a given desired environmental 
quality standard fiscal instruments, (Pigovian taxes or their 
equivalent such as the sale of 'pollution' rights), rather than 
direct legal controls on pollution levels or the stipulation of 
a given technology, are generally likely to be most cost 
effective. 
Similarly governments may prevent over-exploitation of a 
common-property renewable resource, such as a fishery, by a per 
unit tax on the resource, say per ton of f ish landed or per 
boat, possibly adjusted for net mesh size. 25 And again direct 
controls can created economic inefficiencies. For example, 
restrictions on the kind of fishing gear used can create 
technical, inefficiencies, and control only of total catch from a 
given area can create a problem of over-capitalisation as each 
fishing boat seeks a larger share of the total quota. 
The most obvious exceptions to the relative efficiency of 
market-oriented instruments of control are when, in relation to 
a specific natural asset, the desired level of damage is zero, 
or when, say, pollution emission levels or fishing levels need 
to be changed rapidly, for instance in response to changing 
weather patterns, when it might be impractical suddenly and 
frequently to alter taxes or the number of pollution or fishing 
permits sold. Otherwise for any given desired, governmentally 
determined, balance between natural assets and produced goods 
and services in effect to sell the optimal amount of the natural 
resource to the highest bidder should usually ensure that such 
resources are put to their highest value use, based on 
willingness to pay. 
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It is not appropriate in the context of the present, study 
to pursue neoclassical environmental economics in intricate 
detail. Suff ice to say that the economic approach to 
environmental 'quality of life' issues, as briefly reviewed 
here, can be seen as consistent with the neoclassical Welfare 
economic approach outlined in-chapter 8. An ideal, efficient 
allocation of resources is stipulated in line with outcomes from 
a perfectly competitive market with no externalities. 
Generally, efficiency problems only are considered, and 
controversy over the proper use of the physical environment 
amongst economists then turns on whether or not environmental 
resources are allocated efficiently, and which instruments 
governments should use to achieve socially desired allocations. 
Natural assets are indeed often inefficiently used, Welfare 
economists contend, because the goods and services the 
environment provides are treated as external to the economic 
system, being either unpriced or inefficiently priced as they 
enter the system. The role of the economic reformer is to 
determine optimal intervention levels which would establish an 
efficient balance between produced goods and services and 
environmental assets, based on consumers' willingness to pay for 
each. Thereafter, the welfare economist must determine the most 
cost-effective instruments that social welare maximizing 
governments can use to, control externalities to optimal levels. 
Determining the 'applicability' of the theory to particular 
cases is more difficult. In total, the optimal balance between 
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conservation and development, with concomitant environmental 
pollution and elimination of whole ecosystems, endangered 
species and scenic views, will inevitably be exactly that, some 
balance between the two. But, in relation to a specific natural 
asset, socially optimal damage levels based on willingness to 
pay may well be zero. Also the economists' general presumption 
in favour of Pigovian solutions as least cost in terms of social 
utility foregone, is subject to case-by-case empirical 
confirmation. Moreover, the optimal size of any fiscal 
instrument is, in practice, impossible to determine because the 
extent of any environmental externality problem is impossible to 
measure accurately. 
Needless to say, Chicago-style neoclassical economists and 
Austrians who perceive economic reality, in general, differently 
from Welfare economists, who see the government role as a 
facilitating one, and extensive government involvement in market 
economies as neither necessary or desirable, also analyse the 
environmental problem differently. 
9.4 ENVIRONMENTAL EXTERNALITIES - THE NEOCLASSICAL CHICAGO AND 
AUSTRIAN APPROACH 
As noted in chapter 8, the Pigovian theory of externalities was 
challenged by Coase26, who argued that Pigou's theory assumed 
uneconomic behaviour on the part of economic actors. Coase 
recognized externalities as negative outputs jointly produced 
with-positive outputs, and that for an efficient allocation of 
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all resources, including environmental amenities, 'consumers' of 
the negative outputs must be compensated for their losses. But, 
said Coase, within a given property rights structure and in a 
world of zero transaction costs maximizing individuals will 
engage in voluntary bargaining over negative outputs as they do 
in other areas. In effect, the right to inflict losses would be 
bought and sold in markets, making non-voluntary government 
-imposed methods of externality control, such as the imposition 
of standards, prohibitions and Pigovian taxes unnecessary. 
-An answer to market failures arising from externalities 
therefore, according to Coase, is to specify the relevant 
property rights. Such a solution, moreover, would encourage a 
least-cost method of dealing with externalities as compared with 
Pigovian taxes. A corrective tax may encourage perpetrators of 
an externality to internalize it at lower cost relative to 
direct controls such as a government stipulated technological 
standard for equipment. But such a tax provides no incentive 
for victims of externalities to take evasive action. If the 
perpetrators and victims bargained directly, on the other hand, 
a least-cost method of internalization could be expected to 
occur. 
Failure of an injured party to induce his injurers to 
desist implies that the marginal cost to the injurer of 
desisting is greater than the marginal benefit of non-injury to 
the injured. This proposition can fail to hold only if varying 
the quantity of the externality alters the distribution of 
income significantly by changing relative prices, including 
shadow prices. 
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Coases' ideas launched a vigorous attack on the Pigovian 
tradition and in turn caused the central ideas of Coase and his 
followers to be critically examined. 27 Thereafter for 
proponents and opponents alike arguments over externalities have 
been coached in terms of transactions costs and property 
rights. But still, in general terms, neo-classical Welfare 
economists use the equilibrium of a perfectly competitive 
economy with no externalities as a 'bench-mark' against which to 
evaluate real-world economies, find real world economies wanting 
in comparison with the ideal and suggest government remedies to 
correct for market failure. Chicago neoclassical economists in 
effect take an opposite view. They find static competitive 
equilibrium analysis as a useful idealization of the conditions 
that would prevail in actual economies if government 
intervention was largely restricted to endorsing and enforcing 
property rights, within which framework voluntary exchange can 
take place with confidence. 
Welfare economists thus concede that Coases's theory may be 
relevant to the limited kind of externality problem exampled in 
his original article where the discussion was cast in terms of 
two-party externalities, as between say the cattle rancher and 
the wheat farmer. But the externality problem arises in the 
real world, they will argue, because there are typically large 
numbers of parties on both sides of the externality, and 
therefore substantial transactions costs are likely to occur. 
Controlling the use of such natural assets then takes on the 
characteristics --of a public good, being non-rivalous, 
non-excludable and susceptible to free riding. In such 
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circumstances, when transactions costs block the formation of a 
market the choice, Welfare economists point out, is between 
doing nothing and imposing some collective control, such as a 
tax. It may not be possible to achieve a first-best Pareto 
solution with collective action as compared with the ideal, by 
nevertheless for the government to claim collective rights over 
common property resources in order to avoid over-exploitation 
may provide a better second-best solution than non-intervention. 
Demsetz28 would not necessarily agree that the presence of 
large transactions costs induces the need for government to 
assume rights over a resource. He argued that when transactions 
costs inhibit a voluntary bargaining solution to an 
environmental problem the status quo must-be optimal 
in that the 
benefits from a different structure-of rights are less than 
their costs, -including transactions costs. 
In fact communal property rights whereby everyone has the 
right to use a resource, can be efficient if either there is 
sufficient of the resource for all intended purposes so that 
there is no opportunity cost involved in its use, or if when 
exercising communal rights the individuals concerned take full 
account of their actions on others and hence internalize 
potential externalities by such consideration. 
29 Where neither 
of these conditions holds, then the resource will tend to be 
over-used and total welfare may be improved by recognized limits 
on behaviour. 
In a situation where the costs of common rights have come 
to exceed the benefits, then any change in property rights which 
restricted access would result in efficiency gains. But either 
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private or government owned property rights may evolve in the 
sense that either state or individuals may be assigned or assume 
the right to exclude others from the use of a resource which has 
become economically scarce. But there is no theoretical or 
empirical reason, say market economists, to presume that in the 
circumstances state ownership of such rights would be more 
efficient than private ownership. There are good reasons in 
fact to be sceptical that governments will systematically make 
decisions in the collective interest, assuming the collective 
interest could be defined. In the real world, Stigler30 argued, 
regulators who are charged with looking after the public 
interest are sometimes captured by those they should be 
regulating, and act to promote the latter's interest rather than 
the public interest. More generally, there is no reason to 
presume that the self-interest of politicians and bureaucrats 
will always coincide with the common interest. 
The alternative to public ownership of rights is the 
specification of individual private rights. Private rights 
could result by one person buying up the common rights of 
others, or a group of individuals could agree on collective 
rights resulting - from a mutual agreement whereby all owning 
common rights renounce them in exchange for a collective right 
to a share in the product of a given environmental resource. If 
large numbers are involved this will usually" imply using some 
voting process to choose a particular person or small group of 
people to manage the resource on behalf of the group. They 
would retain their management rights so long as the consortium 
believed they were being exercised sufficiently effectively on 
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their behalf as to outweigh the costs involved in changing the 
management. Thus even with environment assets displaying 
'public goods' characteristics, the government need not be 
involved, except perhaps when the individuals comprising the 
whole nation exercised communal rights initially. Moreover, De 
Aless13l has argued, public management of a collective resource 
is likely to be less efficient than private management because 
of the differing costs of transferring ownership shares. An 
individual can exchange property rights in a portfolio of 
publicly managed resources only by moving from one jurisdiction 
to another. This is likely to be far more costly than buying or 
selling rights in a privately managed collective resource where 
collective rights to 'shares' in the product of the resource can 
be exchanged. Since property rights in public organisations are 
non-transferable the owners' incentive to detect and inhibit 
undesirable managerial behaviour is much weaker than in private 
organisations. This gives government managers greater 
opportunities to increase their own welfare relative to that of 
the owners. 
Thus the idea that governments should intervene in cases of 
'over use' of open access resources, on efficiency grounds, by 
managing them on behalf of all the individuals of a nation is no 
longer uncontroversial. For neoclassical Chicago economists, on 
the contrary, in many cases government intervention to improve 
externality problems would be better directed at specifying and 
protecting an effective system of private rights and thus 
encourage markets to operate, rather than by using cost-benefit 
analysis, externality taxes or direct controls. 
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For Austrians the crucial issue is which pattern of rights 
is likely to lead to the most effficient allocation of resources 
over time. And in answering such a question they invariably 
come down on the side of individual rights. Kirzner32 for 
instance points out that there is no reason to believe that 
governments are likely to be more knowledgable about the 
presence and size of externalities than' individuals. And if 
individuals are given rights to sue for damages they will have 
greater incentive to seek out new knowledge and be alert to the 
existence of externalities and the scope for improvement. For 
liberals of whichever school of economic thought there will 
invariably be presumption in favour of defining and upholding 
private rights. 
All economists though make an exception'in relation to pure 
public environmental. goods where the relevant non-excludable 
group involves the whole nation or several nations. Then 
government involvement is likely to be required to correct for 
market failure, for instance in relation to global environmental 
pollution, and possibly also in relation to endangered species 
or unique national or global scenic areas. 
We can still see, however, that the arguments amongst 
economists concerning the relative merits of market versus 
government allocation of natural assets leave untouched some of 
the conservationists' concerns. For pro-market advocates the 
private ownership of say a lake would ensure its efficient use. 
Persons polluting the lake could be sued in court for damages. 
But a private firm could also buy the lake and turn it into a 
waste dump if it seemed the most efficient use for it on the 
basis of consumers' willingness to pay. Similarly species may 
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be hunted to extinction on efficiency grounds, or their habitat 
turned over to an, alternative higher value use. 
Equally even the most far-sighted all-knowing social 
welfare maximizing government could take similar decisions on 
efficiency grounds if the individuals comprising society put a 
low value on environmental resources. , Neither the pursuit of 
efficiency alone, nor even the. equitable distribution of 
efficiency gains, will ensure that society chooses to place a 
high value on either common, privately managed or publicly 
managed natural assets, as conservationists would wish. 
If individual preferences were accurately reflected in the 
allocation of such assets either by improving the operation of 
markets or by by-passing markets the end results may be as 
conservationists would wish, but we cannot be sure. Thus a 
fundamental change in individuals' preferences in favour of the 
environment may be required, as many conservationists who argue 
for greater weight to be given to 'quality of life' issues 
suggest. Or a dictatorship based on environmental values could 
produce the required effect. 
9.5 THE WELFARE OF FUTURE GENERATIONS33 
The application of economic analysis to the efficient allocation 
of the physical environment can be extended to incorporate 
consideration for the welfare of future generations, both in 
terms of their prospective 'quality of life' and their material 
well-being. 
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As far as the quality of life is concerned, it can be 
argued that some self-motivated individuals would gain 
satisfaction, and be willing to pay, to preserve natural 
amentities for the benefit of future generations. Later 
generations too might then enjoy the option of using naturally 
beautiful areas, say for recreational purposes, or derive 
satisfaction from knowing that many species continue to exist 
which might otherwise have been deliberately or accidentally 
driven to extinction due to mankind's economic activity. Such a 
perceived stewardship role. over naturally available assets would 
increase their value to members of current generations and 
hence raise the opportunity cost of exploiting as opposed to 
preserving, such assets. 
In addition the welfare of more distant generations is 
likely to be considered, by some individuals, in relation to the 
possible environmental and physical. costs imposed on their 
successors from the activity of developing and transforming some 
part of the physical environment into produced goods, and 
services for the benefit of current consumers. 
Such costs may take the form of possibly irreversible 
environmental effects34 associated, for instance, with nuclear 
power. Radiation leaks from nuclear power stations, 
reprocessing, or the transportation of spent fuel could 
conceivably damage present members of society, but they have the 
choice, albeit imperfectly articulated through the political 
system, of not opting for the risks as-well as the benefits of 
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nuclear power. But future members of society, who have no say 
in present decisions, also risk suffering from a current 
accident through` genetic damage or ecological disaster. 
Radioactive waste, whatever the storage mechanism, carries with 
it some risk of failure and some waste requires storing for 
hundreds of years. Future generations thus bear some of the 
external costs associated with nuclear power use in that certain 
risks are imposed on them. 
An integenerational compensation scheme35 may be one way of 
solving the problem of shifting irreversible costs on to future 
generations, who have no say in whether they accept or reject 
them. Compensation for future damage could be in the form of 
sums of money set aside to earn interest at the going market 
rate. However, even assuming the will to implement such a 
scheme, serious practical problems would remain. 
The problems result from the difficulty of knowing how 
large the fund should be. The 'insurance' assessment would need 
to take into account the probability of the occurrence of an 
unfavourable event, such as a major accident at a nuclear power 
station, and the possible scale of damage, translated however 
imperfectly into money terms. 
For assessing risk probabilities use is commonly made of 
available historical data on similar disasters which have 
occurred. But, for the kinds of events envisaged, there is 
little by way of past records from which objective assessments 
could be made, so that the probabilities would be largely 
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subjective. Similarly, since estimates of the size of possible 
damage would need to take into account the timing, extent and 
duration of a potential disaster, such estimates could be no 
more than educated guesses. Market interest rates would also 
have to be forecast over the lifetime of the compensation fund 
so that the size and timing of the necessary contribution could 
be calculated. 
A related problem is whether this kind of compensation 
scheme could be adjusted to reflect adequately individual 
members of society's attitude to non-poolable risk and, in 
particular, to risks borne not by the generation taking the 
decision but by later generations. 36 Neither individuals nor 
governments can eliminate non-monetary risks to future human 
life and the environment by pooling or spreading risks. And 
observation suggests that acceptance of risk depends in part on 
whether participation is, voluntary or involuntary. For 
acceptance of risks which are beyond the control of the 
individual (involuntary risks), higher compensation seemsto be 
required. Moreover, there seems to be less public concern about 
the possibility of a number of widely- distributed small-scale 
accidents'than about the possibility of. major, catastrophes. 
37 
Dislike of involuntary risk might logically make members of 
present generations more risk-averse towards the prospect of 
future generations carrying environmental and physical risk from 
present-day activities than they are to carrying such risks 
themselves, since distant generations have no direct say in 
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whether or not they participate in such risk-bearing. Allowance 
for involuntary risk-bearing by future generations is therefore 
likely to raise the cost of any money-based compensation fund. 
And, -for some members of present day societies, the risks posed 
to' the earth and its inhabitants in the future from some 
particularly environmentally risky activities may well be 
perceived as so great that the potential future costs of such 
activities outweigh current benefits. 
But concern for the welfare of future generations may 
revolve not only around the preservation of, natural areas, 
endangered species and unpolluted environmental media, concern 
may also be about the adequacy of the non-renewable natural 
resource base which directly fuels the economic process. 
-Whether any particular finite resource would be of greater 
value to society if lef t to be exploited by later generations, 
rather than being used now, is a virtually unanswerable question 
depending on unknown future supply and demand conditions. 
Nevertheless, it is possible that some individuals might wish to 
insure future generations against certain possible outcomes. 
And the worst possible future outcome would probably not be that 
some undepleted finite reserves became superceded by more 
cheaply available substitute resource. A more serious problem 
would be that some resource became relatively more scarce and 
expensive in the future than it is now, hence jeopardizing the 
material well-being of later inhabitants. 
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Slower depletion profiles would leave more finite resources 
invested in the ground and available to cushion the worst 
effects of such an eventuality in the distant future, at the 
expense of raising current resource costs and consumer prices 
and thus reducing material standards of living in the present. 
Similarly investment of scarce resources in the enhanced 
recovery of resources from currently mined deposits, or in 
technologies which produced goods and services with a lower 
natural resource input or in other ways reduced current demand 
for natural and environmental resources, might be considered for 
the sake of future generations. 38 
In each case, whether by investing in resources in the 
ground, in repletion by enhanced recovery, or in demand-side 
measures to reduce resource use`per unit of output, members of 
society incur the' opportunity costs of not employing their 
resources in other ways. Whether or not such use of resources 
is likely to be considered beneficial depends on the size of the 
costs 'incurred relative to the vicarious benefit derived from 
preserving natural resources for use, if need be, by our 
successors. 
In general then, economists identify various facets of the 
intergenerational problem; in particular they suggest that some 
individuals within current generations are likely to be willing 
to pay or provide compensation for imposing on them involuntary 
environmental and physical risks, and be willing to pay to 
insure against basic natural resources becoming extremely scarce 
and expensive in the unforeseeable future. 
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The same characteristics of a particular physical asset 
which are likely to raise the value placed on the asset by 
individuals on their own behalf are also likely to be valued 
highly on behalf of unborn generations. Thus if a physical 
asset is apparently subject to irreversibility as a result of 
economic activity, if its use is likely to impose harmful 
effects of unknowable magnitudes or if there are few close 
substitutes,, then the more highly are individuals likely to 
value, the vicarious benefit of conserving the asset for the 
benefit of future generations. 
The size of the vicarious benefit derived from preserving 
different aspects of the physical environment may be calculated 
by estimates of their actual scale and timing suitably 
discounted to determine the present value of the benefits. Some 
form of discounting is always implicit in efficiency decisions 
about 'the future. '. Even those who believe they ignore 
discounting in effect use a zero discount rate and therefore 
make an implied judgement about present versus future use of the 
natural environment and its resources39 as far as maximizing 
total human welfare is, concerned. 
For neoclassical. Welfare economists the 'ideal' discount 
rate would measure the opportunity cost of not being able to use 
the resources involved, either for current consumption or to 
provide for the future with different investments. The extent 
of discounting is particularly important in contemplating very 
long-run investments, but despite long and wide-ranging academic 
argument, there is as yet no consensus on how to select 
appropriate social discount rates. 40 
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The leading contenders are some direct estimate of 'social 
time preference', representing society's preference at a given 
time- for a small increase in current welfare over a similar 
increase some time in the future, or alternatively an estimate 
of the opportunity cost of using the resources in one form of 
investment rather. than another. 
If capital markets operated perfectly, there would be no 
conflict between time preference and. opportunity cost of. capital 
measures of the discount rate and the appropriate rate would be 
observable in the market. In the- perfect markets of the 
neoclassical theorists, the assumptions of perfect knowledge and 
costless , exchange ensure that society exchanges present 
consumption for future consumption until the marginal social 
time preference rate (the sum of individual time preference 
rates) in any period equals the marginal rate of return on the 
'investment' of postponed consumption. Public or private 
investment will be carried out so long as the expected rate of 
return exceeds the rate of return required by investors. 
Changes in equilibrium interest rates occur with changes in 
society's time preference rates or in investment opportunities. 
In an ideal situation market interest rates ensure a continuous 
reassessment of the best allocation of society's resources 
between present consumption and saving, between private and 
public investment and between different projects in- each 
sector. Perfect capital markets would therefore provide a 
flexible structure within which the necessary reassessments for 
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intergenerational efficient resource allocation could take 
place, bearing in mind that efficient use means maximizing total 
human welfare seen from the perspective of current generations, 
based on their willingness to pay. 
No actual market works like the ideal but for neoclassical 
Welfare economists the theory of perfectly functioning capital 
markets and of possible market imperfections and failures 
provides a useful benchmark against which to compare the 
workings of imperfect real-world financial markets. 
From this perspective, undersaving' may be a problem in 
real-world markets because imperfections cause saving and 
investment to be less than the public 'really' wishes to 
undertake. Undersaving may occur, for example, because of 
restricted outlets for private saving or because information is 
lacking about saving opportunities. In these circumstances 
governments acting to maximize total social welfare would adopt 
either market-improving policies - such as increasing saving 
outlets and spreading information - or a market-displacing 
strategy. The latter would involve increasing the total value 
of saving and investment compared with the market outcome by 
directly increasing public saving and investment. 
However, neoclassical Welfare economists suggest a 
different reason why individual saving for the sake of distant 
generations will be' below the ideal socially optimal level, 
deriving from analyzing intertemporal equity as a public good4l 
to members of present generations and hence converting the 
problem of intergenerational fairness into an efficiency 
problem. 
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Consumption by future generations can be perceived as a 
public good to members of present generations on the supposition 
that individuals derive non-rivalous and non-excludable 
satisfaction from the prospect of a reasonable standard of 
living for future civilization. But unless it is assumed 
individuals are perfectly altruistic, valuing the welfare of all 
equally with their own, then a 'free rider' problem is likely to 
exist in a large community. 
Assume that some individuals are altruistic to a degree, in 
that they wish to benefit distant generations but that they 
value personal and family welfare more highly. Then such people 
will be happy to leave other altruists to provide for the 
distant members of society, since they consider only their own 
negligible contribution to the fund of saving in deciding 
whether or not to 'free ride'. 
It is possible that, by reasoning about the unfortunate 
outcome if everyone behaved in the same way, individuals might 
decide to co-operate spontaneously and a market solution would 
be preserved. Some writers42 have indeed expressed a belief in 
a 'contagion' theory such that, if members of society act 'as 
if' altruistic in one area of life, then by example the same 
kind of 'as if, behaviour will spread to other areas. 
Similarly, it has been suggested that a diminution of the 
opportunity for altruism in one area, for instance by changing 
the British system of blood donation43, would weaken a general 
tendency to spontaneous altruistic behaviour in the community. 
But the welfare of distant generations may have no particular 
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emotional appeal to raise people's consciousness (as for example 
details of the plight of children waiting for blood transfusions 
may do). 
The possibility of 'as if' behaviour apart, there does 
appear to be good reason to think that individual saving for the 
sake of distant generations will be below the socially optimum 
level as defined by Welfare economists. If that is so, then from 
this same perspective the government can legitimately increase 
saving and investment to benefit distant generations, though it 
is clearly very hard to calculate how far such saving and 
investment should. go. We might, in theory, look to the 
political decision-making process for the answer, and assume 
that through that process individuals express their willingness 
to be taxed for financing very long-term investment they 
collectively desire.. But just as real-world markets are 
imperfect compared with the ideal, so too are democratic 
processes. 
If there is no way of accurately summing individuals' 
preferences to give a 'true' social time preference rate for 
distant generations, we might ask if there is any a priori 
reason for supposing society would choose to give much or little 
weight to the welfare of distant generations. Such an overall 
social time preference rate would implicitly include two types 
of discounting. The first discounts utility in that, quite 
independently of future levels of real income, the same unit of 
welfare may be considered to be worth less in the future than in 
the present. It is usually held that individuals discount for 
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social distance44 much as they discount their own future welfare 
due to impatience or myopia. Thus one would expect society's 
'utility' discount rate as applied to the welfare of distant 
generations to be positive. By contrast, pure altruism would 
ensure the welfare of distant generations was valued equally 
with society's present consumption and would indicate a zero 
discount rate for utility. 
Gains in welfare accruing to future generations may also be 
discounted due to real income growth, in much the some way as 
individuals would take account of their own future expected real 
income levels in a personal time preference rate. Therefore, if 
distant generations are expected to be richer per capita than 
society is now, the 'income' discount rate wilt also be 
positive, since little weight is likely to be attached to 
such distant welfare by present generations. But if it is 
believed that society will suffer deprivation in the future then 
the income discount rate may be negative and the overall social 
time preference rate may be zero or even negative. Thus, the 
appropriate rate for discounting very long-term investments 
will 
incorporate both individual preferences and empirical 
assessments about the future. Nobody can say with any degree of 
certainty therefore what the actual rate should be, and 
individuals and groups in society will have differing opinions 
about it. 
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Marglin45 argued only that the social discount rate, 
although not necessarily zero, would be below the private market 
rate because the 'public good' nature of provision for distant 
generations would result in private undersaving. If Marglin's 
public good analysis is accepted then the proper social policy 
is not to discount public projects at a rate below that used by 
private investors which would divert investment from high- 
yielding private projects to low-yielding public ones; instead 
discount rates should ideally be driven down by the government 
throughout the economy. 46 It remains the case, however, that it 
is virtually impossible to sum up individual preferences and 
decide on a 'correct' rate for discounting very long-term 
investments, and it is difficult even to decide on the relevant 
range within which one might expect the correct social rate to 
be. 
One way of overcoming disagreement about the discount rate 
to use is to disregard individual views and have the government 
impose what it regards as an appropriate rate, assuming it to be 
interested, in maximizing intergenerational social welfare. 
Alternatively, individuals or groups may attempt by moral 
persuasion, or by claiming superior knowledge of future events, 
to promote a social consensus as to the correct weight to be 
attached to the welfare of future generations. 
Economists have been amongst-- those who have suggested that 
present generations should consider whether they are evaluating 
future welfare appropriately. Perhaps the most famous comment 
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along these lines is Ramsay's in the introduction to his model 
of optimal saving, 'we do not discount later enjoyments in 
comparison with earlier ones, a practice which is ethically 
indefensible and arises merely from the weakness of the 
imagination'. 47 
More recently, Rawls48 advocated a different approach be 
taken to welfare. Instead of attempting to maximize the present 
value of total human welfare, he suggested maximum social 
welfare be determined by maximizing the welfare of the most 
disadvantaged member of society. The maximin criterion is thus 
not additive as is the present-value criterion, and if applied 
to intergenerational equity49 rather than being applied, as 
Rawls intended, within one generation, it would suggest maximum 
intergenerational welfare would result from maximizing the 
welfare of the most disadvantaged generation. 
, 
This approach no longer analyzes consumption of future 
generations as an efficiency issue, that is as a public good to 
members of the present generation, an approach which may or may 
not lead to a. low or negative social discount rate. Instead, 
maximin could be used to justify shifting consumption to the 
future solely on grounds of equity if it was believed that 
generations living in the distant future will be disadvantaged 
due for instance to lack of natural assets and resources. 
But use of the maximin criterion would not mean that 
consumption was, automatically shifted forward. If it was 
assumed that substitutability of other factors, capital, or 
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'know how' was virtually inexhaustible even if resources are 
not, and that future generations are likely to be better off, 
then a logical consequence of the application of maximin would 
be to shift consumption away from the future, on equity 
grounds. ' Changing the welfare criterion, therefore, is not 
sufficient to guarantee that, if applied, greater weight would 
be given than at present to saving the physical environment from 
current use. Unfavourable empirical estimates about future 
income levels would still be required. 
Pro-market economists will question the whole basis of the 
above neoclassical Welfare debate. They will point out that 
altruism, in the sense of concern for the welfare of more 
socially distant and unknown members of society, is not absent 
from capital markets, and generations in any case overlap. In 
addition, to compare. the imperfect working of these real world 
markets with some 'ideal' and then suggest 'optimal' government 
intervention on behalf of future- generations is unrealistic. 
The application of the economics of public choice would lead us 
instead to question whether real-world governments would have 
much incentive to apply low discount rates to prospective very 
long-term investment', or apply other criteria which would push 
consumption into the future, when the costs will fall on present 
voters and vicarious benefits depend so much on judgement about 
society's living standards decades or centuries from now. 
Moreover, provision for the future involves decisions about 
numerous different assets and even if future welfare can be 
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analyzed in general as a 'public good' the government need not 
always be involved. Groups can, for instance, get together and 
purchase a natural asset for their own benefit as well as their 
descendants, ` and a monopolistic owner of a natural resource may 
behave altruistically by keeping the resource in the ground as 
an insurance for distant generations. Only in certain 
instances, say where global pollution threatened distant 
welfare, might imperfect government intervention be better than 
imperfect markets. 
In this brief review of the future generations literature 
we have not addressed the problem of future population size. 
This is because, for the most part, economists address problems 
of social choice affecting future generations in circumstances 
where future population sizes are given, the objective of study 
being the level of welfare under various policy options with the 
'same number' choices. 50 There is a small literature51 in 
Welfare 'economics under the heading of optimum population, but 
again the optimum` size of such populations is considered in 
effect as a 'public good' from the perspective of present 
generations, where the problem asked is how many lives should 
there be in the future and at what standards should they be 
lived. 
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9.6 CONCLUSIONS 
Economists are not indifferent to 'quality of life' issues nor 
to the welfare of future generations. Moreover many, from 
various school of thought, would agree that current allocation 
of natural assets and resources underprovide for both. However, 
as with the conservationists, the way different economists 
approach these problems determines their solutions. 
Neoclassical Welfare economists analyzing the problems from 
the perspective of ideal markets identify various market 
imperfections and failures to be corrected by all knowing 
social-welfare-maximizing governments. 
Neoclassical Chicago economists and Austrians will tend to 
suggest that problems arise not so much from market failure 
but 
because markets have not been given a chance to exist. The role 
of government-is then either to do nothing and allow the organic 
evolution of private property rights to take their course, or 
possibly to aid market outcomes by defining private property 
rights, enforcing private contracts, or providing information 
for individuals to use in the bargaining process. Even so, 
Austrians in particular will question where governments' 
supposed superior knowledge will come from. 
For liberal economists, the least coercive policy options 
will usually be favoured. From their point of view, the 
provision of public goods by governments has a disadvantage. 
Whilst government provision and finance by taxation may prevent 
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'free riding' by those who would like to consume the good but 
avoid payment, it also forces people to consume and pay for the 
good even if they do not want it. Government-supplied public 
goods, in other words, are non-rejectable and hence coercive. 
The main 'difference between the analysis of these problems 
by economists, as compared with conservationists, is the 
professional stand they take on individual preferences which are 
to be taken as given and thereafter reflected as far as possible 
in the actual allocation of resources. Thus cutting back on 
consumer demand for the sake of future generations or to 
increase the 'quality of life' is unacceptable unless backed by 
the summation of individual preferences. Usually 
intergenerational equity problems are converted into efficiency 
problems and hence evaluated from the perspective of the 
preferences of current generations. For the most part, 
allocations of resources are considered with given population 
levels. Nevertheless, when optimal future populations are 
considered they too are considered as an efficiency problem from 
the perspective of the current generation. 
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CHAPTER 10 
CONCLUSIONS 
Both conservationists and economists present conservation of the 
physical environment, loosely defined, as a goal society ought 
to pursue. Yet there is considerable mistrust in the 
conservationists' literature about the economic approach to 
environmental issues, and sometimes scathing comments are made 
by economists about conservationists. There are considerable 
intra-group differences, too, in the way the problem of 
conservation is approached. 
Past and present debates within the philosophy of science, 
discussed in Chapter 2, have proved very useful to the present 
study in enabling us more clearly to identify where intra and 
inter-groups differences arise. The fundamental distinction 
between basic and non-basic value judgements is a simple but 
crucial starting point for such an analysis. A basic 'ought' 
statement applies under all conceivable circumstances whilst a 
non-basic goal is implied by a combination of some basic goal or 
goals and contingent facts. 
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A major purpose of this study has been to make explicit the 
often implicit basic value judgements to which various groupings 
and individuals adhere. Thus for some radical 'ecocentric' 
conservationists preservation of the natural world seems to be a 
basic social objective. Moreover, some of these radicals 
present conservation not as one of several basic social goals 
which, when in conflict, can be traded one against the other 
with each usually given some weight in the overall social 
welfare function. Instead, conservation is a compulsive social 
objective with other goals subject to an overriding conservation 
constraint. Similarly, some economists, radical 'liberals', 
would see individual freedom as a non-tradeable overriding basic 
social goal with the pursuit of conservation subject to this 
'liberal' constraint. 
Yet, for many economists and conservationists, conservation 
of the physical environment is not only tradeable against other 
objectives, it is also a non-basic goal dependent in part on 
scientific knowledge about how the world is and is likely to be 
in the future. 
The main message from Chapter 2 about these pertinent facts 
is that scientific knowledge of the world, whether of the 
physical world or of the economic world, can never constitute 
'justified true belief'. Such certainty is a chimera. 
Underlying all 'acceptable' scientific statements about how the 
world is or will be are pre-scientific value judgements which 
constitute the basic paradigm of the scientists in question, 
including their agreed procedures for justifying claims to 
knowledge. 
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Such procedures cannot ensure that true explanatory 
universal theories are never mistakenly rejected, that false 
theories are never mistakenly accepted, nor can true general 
theories be proved incontrovertibly true nor false theories 
incontrovertibly false. Some scientists evade such problems by 
suggesting knowledge is the power to predict and no more. 
Either way, scientific knowledge is socially defined, but real 
nevertheless in that many people within and outside scientific 
communities accept some theories as 'true', or 'adequate' 
instruments of prediction, whereas others using different 
criteria may reject their validity. All will usually act in 
accordance with their scientific beliefs. 
The subjective element in scientific knowledge clearly 
presents difficulties in the resolution of scientific disputes. 
Yet recognition within the philosophy of science of the 
limitations of the hypothetico-deductive model of scientific 
explanation - whereby every scientific explanation must be a 
potentially checkable prediction - also opens up new 
possibilities of inter- and intra-disciplinary understanding and 
co-operation. Progress towards the admissibility as scientific 
of - explanations which cannot support precise prediction and a 
corresponding down-playing of mathematical formulations could 
undoubtedly help engender a more open methodological debate 
between conservationists and economists and between subgroups in 
each category. In particular, conservationists and economists 
who concentrate on the intrinsically uncertain areas of the 
physical and economic worlds could then be able to enter the 
mainstream. 
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Emphasis on the subjective view of theories has also meant 
that the focus of attention of much philosophy of science has 
shifted somewhat, from being concerned primarily with the 
structure and justification of fully developed theories to the 
study of the discovery, emergence and use of theories, a shift 
of emphasis which when applied to the position of 
conservationists and economists can be very illuminating. 
Conservationists,, as we discussed in Chapter 3, made 
constructive use of Kuhn's concept of paradigm to describe the 
'worldview' of existing western cultures and the sciences they 
have spawned, as well as suggesting alternative worldviews and 
concomitant scientific, philosophy. Not everyone, or all groups 
share the dominant worldview of course, but conservationists 
claim the values and beliefs they identify are predominant to 
the extent that they can be used to account for broad patterns 
of behaviour. 
Though they stress different aspects, the conservationists' 
general theory about the present dominant worldview is that it 
comprises a widely held but mistaken belief that natural and 
environmental resources are plentiful and that the physical 
world, together with the economic world which it sustains, are 
predictable and controllable, so that their essence can be 
captured in formal theoretical models. This impression of the 
world is conveyed conservationists say by many sciences and 
scientists. Alongside these dominant factual judgements and 
interacting with them, are ultimate values which tend to place 
human welfare above the welfare of other species, material goods 
and services provided from the physical environment above the 
non-material services it provides and the welfare of present 
generations above that of distant generations. 
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The maintenance of these basic values and fact judgements, 
conservationists predict, will continue to produce derived 
non-basic social objectives, such as increasing economic growth, 
which will result in the continuing relative disregard for 
non-human life, non-productive uses of the physical environment 
and welfare of distant generations, if the human race survives, 
and possibly the inadvertent demise of the human race before 
physical resources are exhausted. 
To contrast with the dominant worldview, conservationists 
posit alternative theories about the physical environment and 
mankind's relationship to it, and they suggest a different set 
of ultimate value judgements. Thereafter, from different basic 
values and different factual assumptions about how the world is, 
conservationists derive a set of instrumental goals which 
individuals and governments should pursue. 
Individual value judgements become ethical collective value 
judgements, guiding social behaviour and serving as guides for 
acceptable individual attitudes and behaviour, if a 
large 
section of society comes to share the same views. Basically 
conservationists would want their own personal value judgements 
to become ethical judgements. However, their hierarchy of 
values differs from conservationist to conservationist. 
The most radical 'ecocentric' conservationists are united 
in giving the preservation of the natural environment, for its 
own sake (but also to improve the quality of human life), 
absolute priority is any hierarchy of social goals. Mankind 
takes 'on a stewardship role on behalf of all other species and 
on behalf of the non-living world, encapsulated in the maxim 'do 
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no harm'. The basic overriding value judgement, that the 
physical environment should remain unmanaged, rests comfortably 
with the view that in any case the physical world is in 
important respects intrinsically unpredictable and hence 
unmanageable. Individuals with an ecocentric man-in-nature 
value system are therefore likely to be attracted to a 
scientific 'hardcore' which incorporates the notion of intrinsic 
uncertainty, though the ecocentric value system and the factual 
judgements about the unpredictability of the physical world do 
not necessarily have to be so linked. 
In Chapter 4 we distinguished homocentric conservationists 
from ecocentric conservationists primarily by their basic value 
systems. Homocentric conservationists, we suggested, are 
predominantly concerned with the welfare, including the material 
welfare, of future generations, captured by Page in the 
invocation of an intergenerational 'maximini' criterion. Coupled 
to an overriding concern for the welfare of the most 
disadvantaged generation is a vision of the physical world and 
the resources it contains from the perspective of that same 
generation. And, say homocentric conservationists, from that 
perspective all physically finite resources will be economically 
scarce. In other words, the indiscriminate use by present 
generations of 'resources which are currently economically 
abundant would be deemed by that later disadvantaged generation 
as having a high opportunity cost in terms of their own 
welfare. If, then, society values the welfare of the least 
advantaged generation above all else, the intergenerational 
distribution of rights over the use of natural and environmental 
resources has to be adjusted accordingly. 
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Once again we can see that for homocentric conservationists 
as for ecocentric conservationists there is a consistency 
between their basic values and their vision of how the world 
is. This time the consistency is between an overriding 
objective of benefitting the most disadvantaged generation and a 
perspective of the world, global and long term, which stresses 
not only its physical finiteness but the economic scarcity of 
the resources it contains. 
Within this basic scientific framework and to achieve their 
compulsive social objective of intergenerational justice, 
homocentric conservationists go on to suggest different 
integenerational social contracts. Some suggest rights over the 
use of resources should be distributed equally. Others, such as 
Page and Boulding, suggest in effect a notional exchange of 
rights whereby the depletion of resources by one generation 
could be compensated by increased 'know-how' in the discovery 
and use of substitute resources. Others suggest controlling 
population in order, effectively, to keep physically limited 
resources economically abundant and available to all current and 
subsequent generations. 
But clearly these social objectives, such as population 
control, depletion control and technological advance, are 
non-basic instrumental goals. That is, their value lies in the 
fact that they are collectively or separately seen as being 
important in attaining the desirable end of intergenerational 
fairness in the distribution of welfare. Sometimes a non-basic 
goal deemed to be instrumental in achieving one ultimate aim 
will be perceived by some as conflicting with the achievement of 
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another. Thus Commoner, wishing to give due weight both to 
individual freedom and the welfare of distant generations 
rejected population control in pursuance of the latter because 
of its coercive nature. 
However a non-basic goal may help achieve more than one 
ultimate end; population control, for instance, may aid both the 
preservation of natural environments and the welfare of future 
generations. Increasingly too, as conservationism gives way to 
environmentalism the non-basic objectives of ecocentric and 
homocentric conservationists are likely to coincide. In 
particular the preservation of ecosystems may be seen as helping 
to promote human welfare and satisfy the values of man-in-nature 
conservationists. 
Clearly this coincidence of interests will not always occur 
and clashes between different hierarchies of ultimate values is 
likely, on occasion, to result in disputed non-basic social 
objectives. Technological advance for example, may be perceived 
as potentially increasing the welfare of current and future 
human generations but conflict with a man-in-nature ethic. 
So too will conservationists inevitably dispute the 
efficacy of a particular instrument, for the way a problem is 
posed tends to determine its solution. Moreover, the approach 
to a problem is likely to be influenced not only by the 
disciplinary paradigm of the analyst but also by implicit or 
explicit personal or group values. Thus if the social domain is 
held constant, as for instance in Erhlich's analysis, with human 
preferences, prices and technology unresponsive to changing 
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resource conditions, one can project an inevitable clash between 
resources and population, which could be resolved by government 
action to cut back use of the former and control the latter. In 
general, there seems to be close links between the personal 
basic values of conservationists, the ethical judgements they 
hold as desirable for whole societies and the body of knowledge 
they accept as scientific. It is impossible to test 
conclusively the validity of their theories about how the world 
is. Conservationists justify the relevance of their theories to 
the real world either by claiming the assumptions are a priori 
true, or by comparing the predictions of general theories with 
specific past and present observations. Meanwhile 
' conservationists' predictions about the future based on their 
own theories and an unchanged 'worldview' also lie an 
unpredictable distance into the future, so they also are 
untestable. 
Yet conservationists' models which purport to explain how 
the world is and will be under different regimes and from 
different perspectives do have the ability to increase our 
understanding if studied in context, even if their theories 
'- preclude accurate predictions. Our analysis of the 
conservationists' approach tends therefore to confirm that it 
may well be fruitful to encourage a broader definition of what 
kinds of explanations may be deemed scientific. The analysis 
confirms even more perhaps, that to understand a theory one must 
understand its use and development. 
We have also uncovered several, often non-trivial, 
differences of value and emphasis within the conservationists' 
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camp. What tends to unite them is a view of the world which, 
taking a global and very long term view equates physical 
finiteness with economic scarcity, and sees ecosystems as finely 
and delicately balanced. 
For economists, as for conservationists, basic values and 
scientific analysis are intimately linked. Our discussion of 
the foundations of economics in Chapter 6 started from the 
problem Adam Smith addressed when considering the Nature and 
Causes of the Wealth of Nations. As a student of eighteenth 
century economic conditions, his casual observations and his 
Scottish enlightenment values led him to formulate the theory 
that, in 1776, England was the richest country because it was 
also the country in which individuals were left freest to pursue 
their own self-interest. 
However, economic life was still fettered by extensive 
government regulation and intervention and in consequence Smith 
wrote his famous anti-mercantilist treatise, An Inquiry into the 
Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. In it Smith argued 
for governments to leave individuals more free to pursue their 
own specific interests. Individuals know best their own 
interests and the competitive social interaction of the 
self-motivated economic activities of individuals would result 
in social harmony. With competition as the regulator 'a simple 
and obvious system of natural liberty' would promise to increase 
social well-being within a social contract which recognized and 
upheld both private property rights over the means of production 
and markets through which factors of production and goods and 
services could be allocated. 
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Later economic science, which sought to explain how 
resources are allocated in market-based economic systems, was 
formally separated from normative economics, concerned with how 
resources 'ought', to be allocated. And, as discussed in Chapter 
7, for the most part mainstream economists became and remain 
wedded to the hypo thetico-deductive model of explanation and 
agree that theories should be expressed formally. Though 
developments in the methodology of economics indicate the 
beginnings of a more liberal methodological stance, still the 
Austrian school of economics (which stresses the intrinsic 
uncertainty and hence unpredictability of market outcomes and 
whose models are non-mathematical) remains outside the current 
mainstream. 
All of the schools of economic thought discussed however 
explain, and sometimes predict, the allocation of resources via 
markets as being the outcome of the self-motivated actions of 
rational individual decision-makers, whilst within the sphere of 
normative economics individual preferences remain sacrosanct. 
Provided a socially equitable pattern of private property rights 
were established and individuals were able to exchange their 
rights freely to the extent that some other combination gave 
them more satisfaction, then the allocation of resources at any 
point in time and over time would result in a socially optimum 
allocation. On this basis, for economists, the socially chosen 
allocation of resources based on the accurate reflection of 
individual preferences cannot be wrong. 
It is on this issue that economists frequently part company 
with the value system of conservationists, not all of whom would 
place great value on respecting individual preferences when 
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considering the overall social welfare function and all of whom 
would seek in one way or another to change individual and social 
preferences. 
Moreover, economics is undoubtedly homocentric in that it 
is human preferences which explain the allocation of resources 
in the real world and it is human preferences which economists 
believe should determine the allocation of resources. 
Nevertheless, as noted in Chapter 6, the motivation of economic 
man has been the subject of controversy throughout the history 
of economics. There is no reason indeed why individual human 
preferences should not take into account quality of life aspects 
of human existence, or incorporate respect for other species, or 
concern for the welfare of future generations. A major message 
from economists to conservationists is that it may not be that 
individual preferences are creating the perceived neglect of the 
physical environment highlighted by conservationists. It may be 
instead that for some reason those preferences are not being 
accurately reflected in the allocation of resources. 
However, whilst economists agree that market-based economic 
systems may fail to allocate resources efficiently in accordance 
with the summation of individual preferences they identify 
different possible causes and hence different possible solutions 
to that failure. For economists who explain and/or predict that 
markets will produce the best possible allocation of resources 
any shortfall is seen as a consequence of government neglect or 
interference. For welfare economists, on the other hand, who 
maintain that markets can fail in several different ways to 
allocate resources efficiently compared with an ideal 
allocation, government intervention becomes an answer and not 
the problem. 
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Once again the way the problem is posed determines the 
solution. But economists are no more able than conservationists 
to prove that their particular vision of how the world is 
conforms to "reality". Moreover, though it does not have to 
follow, still it is often the case that individual economists 
who give high priority to individual freedom as a basic value, 
also adopt a pro-market stance. 
In the introduction to this study we stated one of the aims 
was to determine whether antagonism between conservationists and 
economists revolved around different basic values. The answer 
is that differences at this level are important. But it is not 
that economists are materialistic, homocentric and concerned 
only with the welfare of current generations. Rather economists 
are concerned that the allocation of resources at any point 
in 
time and over time reflects as accurately as possible individual 
preferences. Those preferences may or may not incorporate the 
concerns of the conservationists to the extent that the 
latter 
would wish. The death of an ecosystem or the extinction of a 
species need not be economically inefficient. But 
if individual 
preferences, accurately reflected, did not allocate resources as 
conservationists would have them allocated then for economists 
those preferences remain as given, whereas conservationists 
would press for change. It follows, too, that for most 
economists total social welfare (being the aggregate of 
individual welfare levels) will, give some weight to a wide 
variety of social goals with no one goal overriding all others. 
A'second aim of the study mentioned in the introduction was 
to determine to what extent conservationists and economists are 
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cohesive groups. The answer is that they are not. Either in 
terms of basic values or in terms of how they explain and/or 
predict how the world is or will be, subgroups became apparent. 
Within the conservationists' grouping differences are most 
apparent in their hierarchy of basic values, hence our 
distinction between ecocentric and homocentric 
conservationists. With economists the major distinctions occur 
in positive economics, in how they explain and predict the 
workings of economic systems, hence Austrian, Chicago and 
Welfare economics schools of thought have to be analyzed 
separately. 
To some extent, the conservationists' critique of 
economists and the economists' critique of conservationists have 
already produced positive results. Some economists have 
listened carefully to conservationists in order better to 
appreciate the motives which might feed individual preferences 
and to investigate why conservationist preferences may fail to 
be reflected in actual allocation of resources. Some 
conservationists too have incorporated the notion that for any 
given non-basic goal they might wish to stipulate - say certain 
levels of population control, depletion control, or control of 
environmental pollution - market-oriented instruments rather 
than direct controls may be appropriate. 
But conservationists seem to have failed to examine 
seriously the more radical market-oriented ideas of economists 
concerning the possibility that evolving private property rights 
and the exchange of those rights may yet service 
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conservationists' aspirations better than either coercive 
government measures, or a change in individual values. Equally 
economists, still mostly formulating mathematical 
hypothetico-deductive models to explain the workings of economic 
systems, seem not to have fully incorporated the 
conservationists' message, that economic systems are embedded in 
a physical world a major feature of which is its intrinsic 
uncertainty. 
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